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Abstracts 
The two mega tsunami occurred in 2004 and 2011 in the Indian Ocean and Pacific regions were 
beyond human expectation in terms of its impact on human being and built environment. The 
extreme differences on the number of fatalities between these two disaster events were obviously 
due to the existence of tsunami warning system, public awareness and preparedness; beside this 
was also due to other parameters, such as parameters of susceptibility and capacity of affected 
area and physical characteristics of tsunami, i.e. earthquake magnitude, tsunami arrival time, 
tsunami height, run up, propagation at land, and inundation.  
For Indonesia, the 2004 tsunami has been awakening milestone for the development of tsunami 
early warning system called Ina-TEWS which was completely established at the end of 2008 to 
protect people from future tsunami. Under intensive collaboration with the national, regional and 
international community, the hardware component of Ina TEWS known as STRUCTURE 
component aims for detecting, monitoring, processing, aggregation, simulation and 
dissemination information of potential tsunami to the CULTURE component and interface 
agencies. In the Culture component as also in the case of Japan, the early warning to general 
public is mandated to regional and local government, unless otherwise responsibilities are given 
to particular agencies by regulations. An extensive countermeasure of tsunami disaster risk 
reduction has been exercised in 7 national show case cities, however chaotic situation was still 
shown in the city during the occurrence of several tsunamigenic earthquake in the past 7 years; 
as if the tsunami warning system and the tsunami disaster risk reduction countermeasures 
implemented have no effect. This shows that the Culture component is a very critical element in 
the mechanism of TEWS. 
The high number of Indonesian tsunami prone cities, almost 30%, the ability of tsunami warning 
reaching tsunami prone area until the last mile, as well as the complexity and level of 
vulnerability, capacity and resiliency of the tsunami prone area actually have made the 
CULTURE component becomes more critical; leading to questioning the effectiveness of 
tsunami early warning system itself. Using a holistic cognitive mapping to acquire and to 
structure the relation between physical phenomena, external factors and internal factors of people 
mindset toward the existence of tsunami early warning system, it is expected that the model 
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developed by this study, i.e. Integrated Logic Model of Effective Tsunami Early Warning 
System, could provide a complete logic model to base the policy making for assessing, building, 
improving, and evaluating the capacity of Culture component. Having a sound policy for disaster 
risk reduction countermeasures, reliable warning device, prepared government and responsive 
people; it is expected that the city will have an effective tsunami early warning system leading to 
saving people. 
To obtain exhaustive and holistic knowledge from complex phenomena and/or factors associated 
with tsunami early warning system, two approaches of logic model are used in the process 
development of the model. First is Physically Based Logic Model – PBLM, a methodology to 
acquire and structure the correlation of physical events/phenomena based on the up-to-date 
secondary data directly obtained from related institution and reconnaissance survey conducted 
after September 30, 2009 devastated earthquake. Second is Tacit Knowledge Based Logic Model 
– TKBLM, a cognitive mapping methodology to acquire and structure the people’s mind or 
thinking in responding tsunami early warning system by the use of the tacit knowledge which are 
formed by prior knowledge and/or heuristic knowledge.  
To bridge the limitation of TKBLM approach, i.e. missing and unforeseen information, first the 
study improves methodology for logic model knowledge acquisition by introducing the use of 
semi-open questionnaire based interview. Even though it is time consuming but this 
methodology is able to explore more in-depth and detailed for all supporting and hindrance 
factors which includes the unforeseen ones that are indelible in people mind. It is also able to 
obtain more certain numbers of targeted data and information from the interviewee compare to 
questionnaire circulated by mail. Second, for the TKBLM numerical modeling, the numerical 
analysis was done using modification of Principal Component Analysis – PCA approach. It 
means that the PCA is used not only to structure and analyze the numerical correlation of all 
observed variables/factors among the members component of each level/cluster but also to 
uncover the unobservable variables/factors. However in order to have a complete TKBLM model 
of people mind mapping, there is no elimination or reduction for the least contributor factors as 
commonly done by standard approach of PCA’s regression analysis. 
Findings of the study are not only the two new methodologies as also discussed in above sections, 
i.e. first methodology in modeling the phenomena of tsunami early warning system in the form 
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of Integrated Logic Model using combination of PBLM and TKBLM approaches and second 
methodology in knowledge acquisition, mapping and numerical analysis of people’s mind using 
TKBLM approach. The findings of the study also include six output models developed.   
1st Model is a map of Functioning and Malfunctioning Indicators developed during stage 1 - 
problem structuring. In-depth investigation was conducted to obtain any indicators associated 
with an end-to-end performance of tsunami early warning system in Indonesia, besides 
conducting direct observations on the chaotic performance of the preparedness indicators during 
September 30, 2009 earthquakes. These indicators were identified from four different 
areas/sources of Ina-TEWS, i.e. general scenario/scheme, Warning Information Dissemination 
Flow, Stakeholders, and several intensive documentations taken during the preparation and 
conducting the full scale of end-to-end tsunami drill at some national show case cities. The 
Problem structuring also shows that Culture Component is the most critical points to solve and 
play important role for achieving effective tsunami early warning system.  
2nd Model developed during stage 2 of research study, i.e. modeling phenomena of effective 
tsunami early warning system in the form of integrated logic model, consists of integration of 
four phenomena, i.e. natural, socio, technical and physical phenomena. The integration is shown 
by layer logic models and floating model. There are four layer of logic model: Natural 
Phenomena model which include the correlation among primary and its collateral hazards of 
tsunami, Structural model describing the correlation of the hardware system. Cultural 
Component 1 called as the Government Model recognizes the correlation of all factors inside the 
government officials mind to response and take action when there is strong shaking with or 
without tsunami warning received, and Cultural component 2 called as People Model 
recognizing the correlation of all factors inside the people mind to response and take action when 
there is strong shaking with or without tsunami warning received.  
3 rd Model developed during the stage 3 of the research study is the floating model that are 
described also as Preparedness Index. This is a model which consists of factors commonly 
affecting each layer. The model is developed using the principle of disaster risk assessment to 
analyze the secondary information of risk level and preparedness of the city at risk. The model 
complement to layer model aims for assessing the level of preparedness of the city at before the 
countermeasures intervention or after the intervention. This is very useful to assess also the level 
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of effort should be taken for increasing and improving the capacity of government (government 
model) and the people readiness (people model).  
4th Model developed during the stage 4 of the study consists of layer model 1 and 2, i.e. Natural 
Phenomena model and Structural model, which are developed using the Physically Based Logic 
Model (PBLM). The detailing of these two logic model are based on the physical data obtained 
explained in previous section as well as based on the Functioning and mal-Functioning indicators. 
To build TKBLM for 5
th
 Model of Government and 6
th
 Model of People, a comprehensive and 
time consuming city scale data acquisition is conducted under this study. Padang City was 
selected as case study city because of three reasons. First, the city is highly exposed to tsunami 
risk with frequent occurrences of tsunami-genic earthquake. Second, the city is the most fast 
growing city at the outer West part of Indonesia. Third, it is a leading city for its tsunami 
preparedness among national show case cities. The government official data was obtained 
through an in-depth semi-open questionnaire based interview conducted for officials who 
represent the local government institutions associated with the tsunami and disaster management 
at the city level as well as provincial level.  While the people data were obtained through an in-
depth semi-open questionnaire based interview conducted for general public from 14 tsunami 
risk zone/cluster.  It is fortunate during the study that two major natural phenomena have stricken 
Padang City, i.e. devastated tsunami-genic earthquake occurred in September 30, 2009 and a 
Mentawai Tsunami occurred in October 25, 2010. To accommodate this window of opportunity, 
the data acquisition was divided into two timeline set of data. First data set consisted of 461 
people and 20 government officials interviewed at the time after the devastated earthquake and 
prior to the tsunami. Second data set included additional interview for 61 people representing 2 
out of 14 clusters conducting after the tsunami, some were re-interviewed. 
In 5
th
 Model and 6
th
 Model, the detailing of the cognitive mapping is confirming the logic model 
ability to exhaustively recognize and structure the people mind set based on prior belief and/or 
heuristic rules in responding the tsunami warning. All foreseen and unforeseen of hindrance and 
supporting factors which are indelible or temporarily inherent in people mind were clustered and 
hierarchically structured as a logic model tree. There are 6 major clusters in this logic model 
recognizing both prior belief and/or heuristic belief, i.e. E - reasons for immediate, postpone or 
never evacuated after strong shaking, H -Hazard and Disaster Perception and Experiences, V - 
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Social Vulnerability and Capacity, T - Knowledge on Tsunami Risk and Triggering Event, CM - 
Disaster Risk Reduction Countermeasures and TEWS -Appreciation to Tsunami Early Warning 
System. Each cluster consists of several sub-cluster and/or factors/variables. The number of 
variables recognized in government model is about 515 variables structured in 6 clusters, i.e. 84 
in Social Vulnerability and Capacity, 92 in Appreciation to Tsunami Early Warning System, 25 
in Knowledge on Tsunami Risk and Triggering Event, 30 in Hazard and Disaster Perception and 
Experiences, 48 in reasoning for immediate, postpone or never evacuated after strong shaking, 
223 in Disaster Risk Reduction Countermeasures and 13 in reasoning for evacuation. Meanwhile 
for people model prior to tsunami, 500 factors were recognized, i.e. 87 in Social Vulnerability 
and Capacity, 60 in Appreciation to Tsunami Early Warning System, 9 in Knowledge on 
Tsunami Risk and Triggering Event, 29 in Hazard and Disaster Perception and Experiences, 184 
in reasoning for evacuation, and 118 in Disaster Risk Reduction Countermeasures. For the 
people model at the post tsunami, 498 variables were recognized, i.e. 86 in Social Vulnerability 
and Capacity, 60 in Appreciation to Tsunami Early Warning System, 9 in Knowledge on 
Tsunami Risk and Triggering Event, 29 in Hazard and Disaster Perception and Experiences, 183 
in reasoning for evacuation, and 118 in Disaster Risk Reduction Countermeasures. 
7th Model is the numerical model developed using regression analysis of principal component 
analysis (PCA). There are 7 evacuation decision scenarios used for the numerical analyses of 
people mind toward tsunami early warning system, i.e. people and government officials. These 
scenario show that there are two type heuristic decisions making, i.e. first decision making 
triggered by natural phenomena only in the case of strong shaking occurrence and second 
decision making triggered by combination of both natural phenomena and tsunami warning. 
These two decision making are combined with 3 expected outcome of prior belief based decision 
making, i.e. immediate evacuation, not immediate (postponed/delayed) evacuation, or never 
evacuation; as well as combined with other prior belief reasons for evacuation, i.e. plan or 
spontaneously. These prior belief decisions making are significantly influenced by many 
different type of hindrance and supporting factors as well as foreseen and unforeseen factors 
recognized and structured by TKBLM described.  
The correlation among variables/factors of each cluster and among clusters of each scenario 
shows significant different pattern among the government and people model, as well as people 
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model prior tsunami (people model 1) and people model post tsunami (people model 2). In 
scenario 1, i.e. immediate evacuation scenario triggered by the natural phenomena only, the 
correlation of upper variables (cluster) close to decision node in contributing to the evacuation 
decision are different between government model, people model 1 and people model 2.  For the 
people model 1, the strong correlations are shown by V - Social vulnerability and capacity 
(21.28%), followed by T - knowledge on tsunami (20.65%), TEWS appreciation of people to 
tsunami early warning system (18.05%), E - reason for immediate evacuation (17.94%), H - 
hazard and disaster perception and experience (16.98%), and CM - tsunami disaster risk 
reduction countermeasures (5.10%). To compare, the people model 2 shows that the occurrence 
of tsunami phenomena even though minor one has influenced and shifted the degree of 
correlation among factors or variables to the heuristic decision making. For scenario 1, the 
people model 2 shows that strongest correlations contributed by H - hazard and disaster 
perception and experience (24.45%) and E- reason for immediate evacuation (22.45%). 
Meanwhile for the government model, the most significant contribution coming from V - social 
vulnerability and capacity (29.26%) and CM - tsunami disaster risk reduction countermeasures 
(22.53%). This shows that the mind thinking of government officials toward tsunami response 
are normative. Further analysis showing the degree of contribution among the variables in the 
same level/same of cluster and down to the root can be seen in Chapter 5 and 6 of this 
dissertation. The process development numerical analysis model is using the bottom up approach, 
while for the usage purpose is top down. 
Detailed result of numerical model developed in this study is very useful to recognize how the 
people minds are influenced by their social status (job position), prior perception/belief to 
tsunami early warning system triggered by past experience and past information, and heuristic 
belief triggered by current external factors. The study also finds that prior belief based risk 
perception of the people toward disaster experience has limitation, as shown by the correlation 
among factors/elements between different group and different timeline of data acquisition. This 
numerical analysis performed is confirming the correlations among variables/factors in every 
level of the tree and in each cluster, as well as in the decision scenario.  Then keeping all factors 
(no reduction), is conforming the holistic logic model.  
vii 
To conclude that the outcome of the study is proving two original findings, i.e. the integrated 
logic model developed and the new methodology for the process development of logic model 
which is a new theory as a gate for better methodology in policy making.  
It is expected that the model developed by this study will be a useful policy making tool for the 
city managers from tsunami prone area in Indonesia as well as in other region for achieving 
effective tsunami early system. In the future, the more frequent the model used, the more 
exhaustive the model. For future work, the model can be up-scaled for comparison analysis 
between cities from tsunami prone area for policy development and policy review at local, 
regional or national level. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Effective tsunami early warning system is an integration of natural, socio, technical 
and physical phenomena, aiming to save people as many as possible by alerting the 
people at risk with sufficient lead time to make decision for evacuation. 
1.1. Background and Research Challenge 
Less than a decade, two devastated mega tsunami generated by 9.0 – 9.2 magnitudes 
earthquakes have stricken the Indian Ocean and Pacific regions beyond human 
expectation, i.e. 2004 Sumatera-Andaman tsunami known as Indian Ocean tsunami 
and 2011 Great Tohoku Tsunami recognized as East Japan Tsunami. Not only their 
widespread devastated impacts in both regions, but also they become awakening 
milestones for the establishment and/or performance evaluation of tsunami early 
warning system at both regions especially for anticipating the near-field tsunami, i.e. 
tsunami stricken with limited elapsed time approximately less than 40 minutes.  
The extremely high number of 2004 tsunami fatalities from Indonesia and other 14 
affected countries in the Indian Ocean region was obviously due to no tsunami early 
warning system in place and lack of public awareness on tsunami. Approximately 
167,799 Indonesian died among 230,273 of total loss of life. The word tsunami 
hardly known that time in the region, however the absent of this tsunami awareness 
was surprising since Sumatra region has been stricken by big tsunami more frequent 
than other region in Indonesia. About 15.3% of total tsunami occurrence in Indonesia 
has occurred in this region (H. Latief et al, 2000), see also Figure 1.1 that the tsunami 
intensity and frequency of occurrence in multi-colored circles concentrated in the 
west coast of Sumatera. Even though the Indonesian Tsunami Catalog has listed that 
about 20 major tsunami events occurred in this region within period of 1770 to 2005, 
nevertheless most people in this region have forgotten the local wisdom about tsunami 
except the people from Simeulue Island, the closest area to the 2004 earthquake 
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epicenter. Approximately 99.82% people in the island were saved because of local 
wisdom “smong”; only 6 people died among 3,368 total residents. The word smong 
literally meant as a “notice for potential tsunami” has been a legacy since the Sumatra 
tsunami in 1833 and 1907 (JICA, 2003; H. Yogaswara and E. Yulianto, 2010).  
To illustrate the impact of 2004 tsunami, Figure 1.2 shows the famous Baiturrahman 
Mosque in Banda Aceh at the aftermath of tsunami. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To contrast, the 2011 event which was simultaneously broadcasted in real time with 
video footage has shown direct visual image of unforgettable natural phenomena’s 
destruction to Japan coastal cities in this century caused by tsunami. Beyond that, this 
visual image may affect the people mind not only from the affected area but also 
around the globe, in terms of causing prolonged memory and increased people’s 
perception toward tsunami risk, known also as prior belief. This 2011 tsunami has 
caused 15,550 people died and 5,344 missing (Japan National Police Agency by July 
2011); yet the existence of effective tsunami early warning system has been proven to 
save the lives.  
Table 1.2 shows that even though tsunami lead time were less than 20 minutes at 
some cities close to earthquake epicenter (i.e. Rikuzentakata, Kesennuma, 
Minamisanriku), the ratio of the number of people saved to the number of people at 
risk is still very high, i.e. 92.57% in average (sources: EERI, 2011) indicating that the 
tsunami destruction could have been even worse. 
  
Figure 1.1 Location of tsunami occurrence (in big multi- 
colored circles) in Indonesian Archipelago (H. Latief, 
2005)  
Figure 1.2 Impact of 2004 Tsunami in Banda 
Aceh (Photo Courtessy of ITB Team) 
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Table 1.1 2011 Tohoku Tsunami Impact and characteristics at selected cities (Sources: EERI, 2011) 
The aftermath of devastated destruction; the 2004 tsunami has become awakening 
milestone for the establishment of tsunami early warning system called Ina-TEWS to 
protect people from future tsunami. Under intensive collaboration with the national, 
regional and international community for the development of Ina-TEWS, the 
hardware component known as STRUCTURE component was built by adopting and 
adapting the existing technology used by Japan, USA and German in the Pacific 
TEWS and North Atlantic and Mediterranean TEWS.  
The aims of the Structure component completely established at November 11, 2008 is 
for detecting, monitoring, processing, aggregation, simulation and dissemination 
information of potential tsunami to the CULTURE component and interface agencies, 
see also Figure 1.3. While in the Culture component of Ina-TEWS, as also in the case 
of Japan (Cabinet Office Government of Japan 2011) the early warning to public is 
mandated to regional and local government, unless otherwise responsibilities are 
given to particular agencies by regulation.  
The revised grand scenario of Ina-TEWS after the Mentawai tsunami October 25, 
2010 shown by Figure 1.3 describes the responsibilities of local government in 
conveying the tsunami warning to the community at risk or general public were 
represented by the city disaster management office (DMOs) and supported by the 
media in information dissemination (Ristek, 2010). 
To complement with the development of Structure component, a series of extensive 
countermeasures of tsunami disaster risk reduction have been exercised in 7 national 
show case cities since 2005 to 2008, i.e. Padang, Denpasar-Bali, Cilegon-Banten, 
Gorontalo, Menado, Banda Aceh and Bantul, the location of these cities can be seen 
in Figure 3.3 of Chapter 3.   
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Figure 1.3 Revised Grand Scenario of Ina-TEWS (Sources: Ristek 2010) 
To test the readiness of both the Structure and Culture components developed at these 
cities, a full scale of end-to-end tsunami drill or simulation were conducted.  These 
tests reviewed that disseminating and conveying the tsunami warning were fully 
performed, the city officials were ready, and the people were responsive to evacuate 
to the designated shelter within the provided lead time known also as the golden time. 
In the contrary, when the city was really tested by natural phenomena, i.e. occurrence 
of several tsunamigenic earthquakes in these past 7 years, the chaotic situations were 
shown in the city. As if the existence of tsunami warning system established and 
implemented countermeasures have no effect. This has challenged this study to 
investigate further, which was graphically described in Figure 1.4. 
During September 12, 2007 earthquake generated 3.6 m tsunami and September 30, 
2009 with 0.8 m tsunami, the tsunami warning have been issued by the Structure 
component within less than 5 minutes which was compliance with the target of Ina-
TEWS.  However, the people were panic, evacuation processes failed, no official in 
place, and many designated vertical shelter collapsed due to the earthquake. The city 
mayor himself has attempted to convey the tsunami warning message through the 
radio station, however most supporting infra for conveying the tsunami warning were 
malfunction due to direct earthquake damage and electricity cut off affected by the 
earthquake (H.P. Rahayu, 2009; EERI, 2009). These infra included the siren, TV, 
radio, mosques speaker as praying caller also functioned for public announcement 
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(PA), mobile phone, fix phone, text message and some others. This shows that the 
critical problem of effective tsunami early warning remains at the Culture component. 
 
These entire problem discussed shows that the Culture component and the existence 
of effective tsunami early warning system seem to be very critical in the mechanism 
of TEWS. The existence of effective early warning system in Indonesia becomes 
necessary. See also Figure 1.4 the illustration of research challenges of this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4 Research challenge for this study 
In addition to that, the occurrence of Mentawai tsunami in October 25, 2010 showed 
that the Structure component was fully performed and able to issue the potential 
tsunami warning less than 5 minutes after the main-shock. Still, the Culture 
component once again failed to convey the tsunami warning to the people at risk, 
especially the last mile in this case the people living in Mentawai islands (the closest 
area to epicenter) who suffered devastated damages and loss of life (Ristek and 
BMKG, 2010). 
Almost 30% of Indonesian cities are tsunami prone, i.e. 146 from 497 cities/regencies 
(Ristek, 2000). The complexity and diversity of city’s vulnerability, capacity and 
resiliency as well as its tsunami hazard exposure have made the Culture component 
becomes more critical. Some guidelines for certain disaster risk reduction 
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countermeasures have been published / endorsed by the Government of Indonesia, 
however these were not sufficient; and no such comprehensive model of Culture 
component as part of effective tsunami early warning system yet to be used to develop 
a tsunami ready city.  
To better describe the important of the study, after the description of background and 
research challenge for this study, this chapter will present the basic definition, the 
study objective, the study area, the research approach and methodology, and the 
organization of this dissertation. 
1.2. Basic Definition  
The basic premise of the warning system is to detect impending disaster, to give the 
information to people at risk, and to enable those in danger to make decision and take 
action. For the tsunami, this simple definition in fact becomes very complex, since it 
links many expertise and institutions/organizations, as well as it needs responsibilities 
sharing between the central government and the local government, between the 
government and the private sectors, and between the government and the people; as 
expressed in the grand scenario of Ina-TEWS in the form of Structure and Culture 
components.   
Meanwhile, the Tsunami early warning system as defined by terminology of UN-
ISDR on disaster risk reduction is the set of capacities needed to generate and 
disseminate timely and meaningful warning information to enable individuals, 
communities and organizations threatened by a hazard to prepare and to act 
appropriately and in sufficient time to reduce the possibility of harm or loss (UN-
ISDR 2009). This definition encompasses the range of factors necessary to achieve 
effective responses to warnings, where the people should be the important subject in 
the system not as the object. During the WCDR (World Conference on Disaster 
reduction) conducted in Kobe January 2005, it was stated that to be effective the early 
warning systems must be embedded in, understandable by and relevant to the 
communities which it serves. The warning information should be understood, timely, 
viewed as legitimate and ultimately responded by the diverse array of people at risk. 
At the beginning of the development of Indian Ocean Tsunami early Warning System, 
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UN-ISDR has expressed a terminology of “end-to-end warning system” used to 
emphasize that warning systems need to span all steps from hazard detection through 
to community response. 
Thus, as it is stated at the opening of this chapter, this study defines that Effective 
Tsunami early warning system is an integration of natural, socio, technical and 
physical phenomena, aiming to save people as many as possible by alerting the people 
at risk with sufficient lead time to make decision for evacuation. 
1.3. Study Objectives 
The objectives of this study are: 
 To investigate and model the phenomena of effective tsunami early warning 
system established in Indonesia, which includes investigating how effective the 
countermeasures implemented at the CULTURE component in achieving the goal 
of the tsunami early warning system to save lives of all people at risk.  
 To introduce the use of new approach for model development to recognize all 
underlying hindrance and supporting factors of the people mind toward the issue 
of effective tsunami early warning. 
 To develop a tool which is able to : 
o Recognize holistic underlying hindrance and supporting factors to the 
effectiveness of TEWS established and the effectiveness of DRR 
countermeasures intervention implemented. 
o Assess or measure the level of tsunami preparedness of those tsunami 
prone cities to base the policy making for DRR intervention for supporting 
the Culture component of TEWS. 
o Review or develop new policy making for implementing countermeasures 
to build Culture component of TEWS. 
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1.4. Study Area 
Padang is selected as the case study city for this research study because of three 
reasons. The city is exposed to the highest tsunami risk (see Figure 1.6) with frequent 
occurrence of tsunamigenic earthquake (see Figure 1.5), and it is the most fast 
growing city at the outer west part of Indonesia. The city is as one of leading city 
among national show case cities for its tsunami preparedness with its problem 
discussed previously in Section 1.2 of this chapter. 
The risk profile of Padang is a very densely populated city located in the very active 
seismic activity as shown in Figure 1.5, where significant earthquake with magnitude 
above 7 are frequently occurred. The very high population density situated at low 
lying plain area has marked Padang as the city with highest tsunami risk in the world 
as shown by Figure 1.5 with 141,326 people/km
2
 of population density. Risk indicator 
used in the map is population density of a strip along 2 km width from the coastline of 
all tsunami prone area in the world with elevation below 10 m, i.e. most severe (red 
color) above 75,000 people per km
2
; severe (orange color) between 30,000 – 75,000 
per km
2
; and moderately severe (yellow color) below 30,000 per km
2
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With this highest population density, inadequate infrastructure for tsunami evacuation 
and some other factors of vulnerability; previous study (H. Latief and H.P. Rahayu et 
al., 2007) on scenario based risk analysis and evacuation time estimate (ETE) for 
people of the Padang city shows that approximately 71.43% of 14 sub-sub-district 
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(recognized in this study as cluster) are tsunami high risk. The scenario used for the 
analysis is based on 8 magnitude of earthquake, which generated tsunami with 27 
minutes of estimated travel time, and with moderate assumption of 8 minutes for 
Structure component to disseminate tsunami warning and another 4 minutes time 
needed by Culture component to convey the warning to the public for evacuation. The 
result of analysis shows that among 14 sub-sub-districts located at the 5 km width of 
low lying coastline area,  only 2 sub-sub-districts are in the tsunami safe zone, another 
2 in high risk zone and 10 in very high risk zone (see also Figure 1.7 below).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.7 Study locations using the result of previous study on risk assessment for evacuation  
 
However, the city government of Padang has put high effort to collaborate with local, 
regional, national and international community to build the city of Padang as tsunami 
ready city. Extensive disaster risk reduction countermeasures for tsunami have been 
implemented. Active community and stakeholders’ involvement were shown during 
the implementation of the national tsunami drill. As previously discussed in Section 
1.2 of this chapter, the critical issues of effectiveness of tsunami warning and 
countermeasures implemented become the focus to be solved under this study.  
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An in-depth and holistic approach of this study described in next section is used to 
acquire information from city government officials representing the disaster related 
institutions and people representing these 14 clusters.  
1.5. Research Methodology and Hypothesis 
To recognize the problem and to model the effective tsunami early warning system, 
an approach and methodology developed by this study is shown in Figure 1.8 below, 
which consists of several stages of study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1.8 Research approach and methodology 
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In-depth investigation under this study was aimed to structure the problem of 
enhancing the effective tsunami early warning system established in Indonesia, which 
is described as the integration of natural, socio, technical and physical phenomena. It 
was found that not only the Culture Component has not yet fully developed, but also 
no existence of such model/standard and no thorough approach to recognize the 
problem exhaustively.  
To describe better the integration of natural, socio, technical and physical phenomena 
as effective tsunami early warning, a logic model approach is used by this study. The 
logic model is a cognitive recognition method to acquire and structure the relation 
among these phenomena with external and internal factors of people mindset toward 
the existence of tsunami early warning system. The phenomena of effective tsunami 
early warning system is modeled as layer models and floating factors, named as 
Integrated Logic Model of Effective Tsunami Early Warning System.  
The model is expected to be able to provide a complete logic model to base the policy 
making for enhancing the effective tsunami early warning system by having sound 
policy for disaster risk reduction countermeasures, reliable warning device, prepared 
government and responsive people leading to saving people. 
For the development of the model, an exhaustive and holistic knowledge of complex 
phenomena and/or factors associated with tsunami early warning system can be 
recognized and structured by using two methods of logic model, i.e. Physically Based 
Logic Model – PBLM and Tacit Knowledge Based Logic Model – TKBLM.  
The method of PBLM is a methodology to acquire and structure the correlation of 
physical events/phenomena based on the up-to-date secondary data directly obtained 
from related institution and reconnaissance survey conducted after September 30, 
2009 devastated earthquake. The method of TKBLM is a cognitive mapping 
methodology to acquire and structure the people’s mind in responding (heuristic 
judgment) to tsunami early warning system by the use of the tacit knowledge based on 
prior knowledge, social and physical influence, and access to information and 
appreciation to the warning system.  Prior knowledge is the human perception toward 
tsunami disaster risk which is formed by previous direct experience and/or trained 
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experience, for example tsunami drill. Meanwhile the heuristic judgment is an 
experience-based decision making for evacuation. 
To bridge the limitation of TKBLM approach, i.e. missing and unforeseen 
information, there are 2 approaches have been used by this study. First the study 
improves methodology for logic model knowledge acquisition by introducing the use 
of semi-open questionnaire based interview, which is described in detail in Section 
5.2 of Chapter 5 and Section 6.2 of Chapter 6. The advantage of this approach 
compare to ordinary logic model is its ability to explore more in-depth and 
comprehensive all supporting and hindrance factors including the unforeseen ones, 
which may indelible in people mind. In addition to that, it has certainty in obtaining 
the number of data and information from the interviewee compare to the questionnaire 
circulated by mail. However, more time consuming for data acquisition compare to 
ordinary logic model is the main disadvantage.  
Second, the numerical modeling of TKBLM is done by adapting the Principal 
Component Analysis – PCA approach. In this study, there is no elimination or 
reduction for the least contributor factors as commonly done by standard approach of 
PCA’s regression analysis. The PCA is used not only to structure and analyze the 
numerical correlation of all observed factors among the members component of each 
level/cluster, but also to uncover the unobservable factors. 
1.6. Research Framework 
There are six output models developed under this study in five stages of research 
study, see also Figure 1.9.  These 5 stages of study are: stage 1 - problem structuring, 
stage 2 - modeling phenomena of effective tsunami early warning system in the form 
of integrated logic model, stage 3 - developing TKBLM models, PBLM models and 
Preparedness Index as floating models, stage 4 - conducting site survey, data coding, 
development of detailing logic model and development of numerical modeling using 
PCA (principal component analysis), and stage 5 - the result of the study. Meanwhile 
the 6 output models can be described as follows: 
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The 1
st
 output model is a map of Functioning and Malfunctioning Indicators 
developed through in depth investigation on indicators associated with the end-to-end 
performance of tsunami early warning system during September 30, 2009 and 
September 12, 2007 tsunamigenic earthquakes. These indicators are identified from 
four areas, i.e. Ina-TEWS general scenario/scheme, Ina-TEWS Information Flow, 
Stakeholders of Ina-TEWS and documentation of preparing and conducting full scale 
of end-to-end tsunami drill in 2006 and 2007 at national show case cities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.9 Research framework 
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The 2
nd
 output model is the modeling of tsunami early warning phenomena as 
Integrated Logic Model which consists of integration of four phenomena, i.e. natural, 
socio, technical and physical phenomena in the form of layer logic models and 
floating model. There are four layer of logic model representing: Natural Phenomena 
model which include the correlation among tsunami primary hazard and its collateral 
hazards; Structural Component of tsunami early warning system which describes the 
correlation of the hardware system; Cultural Component 1 called as the Government 
Model which recognizes the correlation of all hindrance and supporting factors of the 
government officials mind in receiving, responding and taking action for duty to save 
people when strong shaking occurred and with and/or without tsunami warning 
received; and Cultural Component 2 called as People Model which recognizes the 
correlation of all hindrance and supporting factors inside the people mind to receive, 
response and take action when there is strong shaking with or without tsunami 
warning received.  
The 3
rd
 output model is the floating model described also as Preparedness Index, i.e. a 
model consisting of factors commonly affecting each layer. The model is developed 
based on the principle of disaster risk assessment to analyze the secondary 
information on tsunami risk level and the city preparedness toward tsunami. Beside as 
a supplement to layer model, this floating model can also be used to assess the level 
of city preparedness before and after the intervention of countermeasures. It can also 
be used to assess the level of effort needed for increasing and improving the capacity 
of government (government model) and the people readiness (people model). 
The 4
th
 output model is the layer model 1 and 2, i.e. Natural Phenomena model and 
Structural model, developed based on the Physically Based Logic Model (PBLM). 
The detailing of these two logic model as also explained in previous section are based 
on the physical data obtained and the Functioning and mal-Functioning indicators. 
The 5
th
 output model of government and 6
th
 output model of people are developed 
based on TKBLM. Comprehensive and time consuming city scale data acquisitions 
are conducted under this study using in-depth semi-open questionnaire based 
interview on government officials representing city and provincial government 
institutions which related with tsunami and/or disaster management as well as on the 
people from 14 tsunami risk zone/cluster.  
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During the study, the occurrences of devastated tsunamigenic earthquakes in Padang 
on September 30, 2009 and a 12 m Mentawai Tsunami occurred in October 25, 2010 
have made the study more complete in recognizing the real problem of enhancing the 
effective tsunami early warning system. To accommodate rare windows of 
opportunity, under this study the data acquisition for TKBLM are divided into two 
time-series data, i.e. first data acquired after the tsunamigenic earthquake before 
Mentawai tsunami and second data obtained after the tsunami. The first set of data 
consisted of 461 people interviewed from 14 clusters and 20 government officials 
interviewed. The second data consisted of 61 people re-interviewed representing 2 out 
of 14 clusters.  
Detailing of the cognitive mapping in the 5
th
 model and 6
th
 model is confirming the 
logic model ability to exhaustively recognize and structure the people mind set using 
prior belief as well as heuristic rules in responding the warning and/or natural 
phenomena. All foreseen and unforeseen of hindrance and supporting factors which 
are indelible or temporarily inherent in people mind are well structured and 
hierarchical clustered in the forms of logic tree.  
There are 6 major clusters developed in this logic model recognizing both prior belief 
and heuristic rules/judgment, i.e. E - reasons for immediate, postpone or never 
evacuated after strong shaking, H -Hazard and Disaster Perception and Experiences, 
V - Social Vulnerability and Capacity, T - Knowledge on Tsunami Risk and 
Triggering Event, CM - Disaster Risk Reduction Countermeasures and TEWS -
Appreciation to Tsunami Early Warning System. Detailed of the process development 
of these two model are presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 of this dissertation. 
The 7
th
 output model is the numerical model developed using regression analysis of 
principal component analysis (PCA). There are 13 evacuation decision scenarios used 
for the numerical analyses of people (general people and government officials) mind 
toward tsunami early warning system. These scenario shows that there are two type 
heuristic decisions making using heuristic rules. First decision triggered by natural 
phenomena in this case is very strong shaking. Second judgment is the decision 
triggered by combination of both natural phenomena and tsunami warning. These 13 
scenarios are developed by integrating these two scenarios with 3 heuristic rules 
(conditions of expected outcome of decision or judgment), i.e. immediate evacuation, 
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not immediate (delay) evacuation or never evacuation; and with 2 other heuristic 
judgment, i.e. plan or spontaneously. Detailed of the process development of 
numerical modeling is exhibited in Chapter 5 and 6 of this dissertation.  
1.7. Organization of Dissertation  
The structure of this dissertation is basically can be divided into three main parts, i.e. 
research introduction, model development and conclusion. The organization of the 
dissertation is shown in Figure 1.10 and described further as follows: 
PART I – RESEARCH INTRODUCTION AND STATE OF THE ART 
 Chapter 1 – Research Introduction: outlines the study background which 
includes the the background and research challenges, the basic definition, the 
rationale and objective of study, the area of study, the research approach and 
methodology, the research framework and the organization of dissertation. 
 Chapter 2 – The State of The Art for Effective TEWS: review all the existing 
and current works related for the area of effective tsunami early warning 
system, people centered early warning, countermeasures for tsunami 
preparedness, broader lesson learned from 2011 Tohoku tsunami. 
PART II – DEVELOPMENT OF INTEGRATED LOGIC MODEL OF EFFECTIVE 
TEWS  
 Chapter 3 – Problem Structuring and Model Development: showing the first 
stage of the logic model development through problem structuring and 
identification of TEWS functioning and malfunctioning indicator using the 
real phenomena test case on the case study city; then it is followed by the 
describing the process development of modeling the phenomena of effective 
tsunami early warning system in the forms of integrated logic model 
consisting 4 layer model and 1 floating model. 
 Chapter 4 – Development of Preparedness Index and PBLM: showing the 
second stage of model development where the floating model is developed 
using the preparedness index approach based on the disaster risk assessment 
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approach, this is followed by the development of the first two layer model 
using physically based logic model approaches, the two model are natural 
phenomena model and structural model. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.10 Organization of the dissertation 
 
 Chapter 5 – Development of People Model - TKBLM (Layer 4): showing the 
process development of modeling the people mindset toward tsunami early 
warning system using the ability of logic model in conducting cognitive 
mapping of people  mind to TEWS with tacit knowledge based logic model 
approach, there are two people model, i.e. one for model of people before 
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intervention of natural phenomena tsunami and second model is for the same 
people after interrupted with tsunami phenomena, the steps of data acquisition 
and data coding is presented, followed by detailing the logic model in the 
format of tree-based logic model, and the last part to develop the numerical 
model for this people model logic model. 
 Chapter 6 – Development of TKBLM of Government Model (Layer 3): 
showing the process development of modeling the government mindset toward 
tsunami early warning system using the ability of logic model in conducting 
cognitive mapping of government officials  mind to TEWS with tacit 
knowledge based logic model approach, the steps of data acquisition and data 
coding is presented, followed by detailing the logic model in the format of 
tree-based logic model, and the last part to develop the numerical model for 
this government logic model. 
PART III – RESEARCH FINDING AND FUTURE WORKS 
 Chapter 7 – Research Findings and Future Work: proving of the research 
methodology and hypothesis. The study proved the process of describing the 
phenomena of effective tsunami early warning system as 4 layers model and 1 
floating model.  The use of integrated logic model for describing the 
phenomena is a fruitful approach for simulation of the natural, physical, socio 
and technological phenomena and for cognitive recognition of the people’s 
mind toward the existence of tsunami early warning system. The numerical 
model developed based on two types of questionnaire-based interviews is 
proved to be able to analyze the correlation of all cognitive factors of the 
people’s mind either as regulator and/or general public toward the existence of 
effective tsunami early warning system. The research methodology and the 
model developed are expected to be novel contributions for the area of policy 
making by providing better methodology for policy analysis for the policy 
development for achieving effective tsunami early warning system as well as 
for other area. In the future, the more implementation of the model in several 
different type of city and culture, the more complete and universal the model 
obtained. 
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Chapter 2 
State of The Art of Effective Tsunami Early Warning 
System 
 
2.1 Disaster Trends  
Many countries in the tectonic subduction region in the world, especially in the ring 
of fire region have long concerned on the huge impacts that natural disaster especially 
tsunami have on the society in both developed and developing countries. Nearly a 
million people in the world have been killed over the last decade (2001 until 2010) 
from disasters caused by several types of natural hazards, i.e. storms, droughts, floods 
and earthquakes; however one third has died during the 2004 Sumatera Indian Ocean 
tsunami (EM-DAT, 2010).  
For Indonesia region, geodynamic position as a meeting point of 4 major plates, i.e. 
Indo-Australia, Eurasia, Pacific and Philippines see Figure 2.1.a, has put Indonesian 
archipelago on a very high seismic activity with high occurrences of tsunamigenic 
earthquakes at both subduction area and/or major fault at the seabed. Tsunami 
Catalog for Indonesia as shown in Figure 2.1.c describes the statistics of tsunami 
occurrences with 20-year interval, where some high frequencies occurred between 
1845 – 1865 (30 events), 1885 – 1905 (33 events), 1965 – 1985 (16 events) and 1985 
– 2005 (21 events) (H. Latief and S. Hadi, 2007).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Profile of seismic and tsunami hazard in Indonesia  
20 
The distribution and intensity of these tsunami occurrences can also be seen in Figure 
2.1.b as multi-colored circles, i.e. dark blue representing low tsunami intensity (scale I 
to IV) up to the dark red representing very high tsunami intensity (scale IX to XII); 
where the scale is classified based on the tsunami impact and the tsunami height. 
Within 1965-2010, there were 15 major tsunami events, with the average of 
occurrence about 1 in every 2.5 year (A. Muhari and Immamura, 2007).   
These mean that Indonesia archipelago is highly exposed toward major tsunami threat 
which should be considered carefully in the development planning, as it is known that 
the tsunami disaster always has long-term impacts on recovery, rehabilitation and 
reconstruction on the built environment, economic growth and development 
especially on the developing countries where capital resources are limited. 
In addition to that, the trend of urban-centered natural disaster, i.e. natural disaster 
affecting urban area, has been increased in these three past decades. The complexity 
and dynamic change of the urban area have significantly contributed to the level of 
disaster affected cities in Indonesia. Among those urban-centered disasters in 
Indonesia, the one causing most severe impact on number of people death in the last 
two centuries is tsunami disaster (BNPB, 2010), see also Figure 2.2 below. From 
years to years, the tsunami disaster seemed significantly increased in terms of number 
people killed and level of damages.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Disaster impact on number of people killed within 1972-2010 (source: Inventar 2012)  
According to Indonesian Tsunami Risk Map (Ristek, 2009), there are almost 30% of 
Indonesian cities, i.e. 146 out of 457, are prone toward tsunami, ranging from low 
tsunami risk up to very high. About 36 cities are classified to be very high risk, 
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meanwhile 58 cities to high risk, 36 cities to moderate risk and 16 cities to low risk.  
Most cities with very high tsunami risk are located in west coast of Sumatera, i.e. 14 
cities/regencies. The criteria used for this risk classification is the tsunami hazard map 
developed based on two tsunami parameters (i.e. tsunami height and tsunami travel 
time) and generic vulnerability parameters of coastal cities, i.e. population and 
infrastructures at both city level including regency capital city. Figure 2.3 below 
shows both the tsunami hazard map and the distribution of tsunami risk 
cities/regencies in Indonesia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Indonesia tsunami hazard map and city tsunami risk (source: Ristek, 2009) 
Considering the tsunami disaster risk is defined as the probability of harmful 
consequences, or expected losses (deaths, injuries, property, livelihoods, economic 
activity disrupted or environment damaged) resulting from interactions between 
tsunami hazards and vulnerable conditions as well as the people capacity and ability 
to cope with the disaster as adapted from UN-ISDR (2004a).  
Therefore, the geodynamic and geographical position of Indonesia discussed above 
coupled with the dynamic changing and complexity of high populated cities in 
Indonesia has created those classified cities at risk are profoundly exposed to tsunami 
disaster risk, leading to increasing the number of people at risk.  Almost half of 
Indonesian coastline, i.e. 54,716 km
1
 which is also the second longest in the world 
after Canada (Wikipedia 2012), are susceptible to tsunami disaster with not less than 
20 million people living in those coastal cities/regencies are threatened by tsunami. 
These disaster risks are then compounded by increasing number of emerging cities 
and changing demographics profile as the consequences of autonomous policy 
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(decentralization) in year 2000 and other vulnerability factors related to technological 
and socio-economic conditions, i.e. unplanned urbanization, development and illegal 
settlement within high-risk zones, and insufficient infrastructure for emergency 
response purposes.  
In addition to that the city vulnerability is also increasing due to more people tend to 
live on hazard prone area illegally. The poor are often forced to live in disaster prone 
area and marginal area; with limited coping ability then they become the most severe 
affected every time disaster occurred; where the main obstacle for the preparedness 
are come from the level of poverty which commonly disables the abilities for 
protection. The greater the number of people suffered, the higher the potential 
national economic damaged.  Since protecting the citizen for the threat of disaster has 
always been the state function, thus having better risk management becomes one 
measure of good governance for any high risk countries (K. Sierra, 2006).  
As lessons learned from most Japanese people in responding the warning during 2011 
Tohoku tsunami, adequate early warning systems coupled with better preparedness 
and response mechanism are recognized as the best way in reducing the number of 
loss of lives. On the other hand the 2004 tsunami showed the worse case of the 
nonexistence of tsunami early warning system. Thus no matter how dynamic and 
progressive the state of the art of early warning mechanism has been achieved, the 
effectiveness of the early warning system can only be enhanced if it involves the 
whole stakeholder’s participatory, i.e. the government, the people and the other 
stakeholders. 
2.2 Challenges for Tsunami Early Warning System 
Despiteful destructive impact, for Indonesia the occurrences of 2004 Sumatera-
Andaman Indian Ocean mega tsunami actually has been triggering event for the 
establishment of tsunami early warning system, while and 2011 Tohoku mega 
tsunami has provided valuable lesson learned for the evaluation of tsunami early 
warning system established especially for its performance in anticipating the near-
field tsunami as well as for the tele-tsunami. 
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Figure 2.4 shows tsunami travel time of these mega tsunamis and its widespread 
effect both as near-field-tsunami and tele-tsunami. For the case of near-field tsunami, 
the 2004 tsunami has hit Banda Aceh City and surrounding area within 30 minutes, 
while 2011 tsunami has stricken some cities of Miyagi and Iwate province within 20 
to 25 minutes. Here it shows that for both phenomena, the existence of effective 
tsunami early warning is critical either as national tsunami warning center (NTWC) 
for near-field tsunami or as regional tsunami warning provider (RTWP) to other 
affected countries for tele-tsunami (Ristek, 2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To challenge the above natural disaster risk issues in general, in these past two 
decades several extensive disaster risk reduction initiatives have taken place in 
Indonesia as international commitment to the Yokohama Strategy 1994. It has 
provided landmark guidance on reducing the disaster risk and the impacts of disaster, 
which was then followed by the Hyogo Framework of Action 2005 where tsunami 
early warning becomes the central issues of the disaster risk reduction 
countermeasures for building the nation resilience (see Figure 2.5).   
In fact from 2005 till now, the numbers of people affected and economic losses 
caused by natural disaster were still increasing.  The substantial issues of disaster risk 
reduction have often been oversight, such as the issues of recognizing real problem 
and reducing underlying risk factors in building resilience and ensuring systematic 
action to address disaster risks in the context of sustainable development and building 
resilience. 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Tsunami travel time map for the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and 2011 Tohoku   
tsunami. The number tags represent hours after the initial event (NOAA, 2011). 
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Figure 2.5 UN-ISDR strategy for disaster risk reduction (source: UN-ISDR, 2004a) 
 
In many cases the official policy of government in reducing tsunami risk often did not 
address the deep causes of vulnerability (Ben Wisner et al., 2003), but rather 
emphasized on technical measures to control tsunami impact through populist policy, 
such as implementing structural mitigations countermeasures and one-way public 
awareness campaign. It is very often that some countermeasures implementations 
were donor-tailored, which were not suitable to the local needs. For example: building 
inefficient vertical tsunami shelters that cannot be used for daily needs of surrounding 
people, and unsustainable public education program which confused the target people. 
However, the most critical issue which challenged this study is that among identified 
problems faced by tsunami prone area in several cities, lack of timely and proper 
response toward the warning is a major concern. This leads to the needs for the 
soundly effective tsunami warning system that able to disseminate warning with 
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sufficient lead time for those people at risk to make decision for evacuation to save 
their own lives.  
2.3 Effective Tsunami Early Warning System in International 
Appreciation 
Early warning system could be simply defined as a mechanism to observe potential 
disaster, to make available that information to people at risk, and to enable those in 
danger to make decision and take action (J.H. Sorensen, 2000). This simple definition 
for the area of tsunami hazard threat in fact is very complex. The classical system 
generally include 3 main elements of early warning chain, i.e. understanding and 
mapping the hazard; monitoring and forecasting impending events; processing and 
disseminating understandable warnings to authorities and people/population, and 
undertaking appropriate and timely actions in response to the warnings (UN-ISDR, 
2004a). 
Currently, the early warning systems for natural hazards are found to be increasingly 
perceived as an integral component of disaster risk reduction program, involving a 
broad spectrum of actors, since it has been address in UN International Strategy for 
Disaster Reduction shown in Figure 2.5. It is shown that the early warning 
countermeasures cannot stand alone. It has direct correlation with risk assessment, 
preparedness and emergency response management shown in red circled and indirect 
relation with the rest countermeasures in the strategy framework to reduce the disaster 
risk.  
Prior to the event of 2004 Sumatera Andaman /Indian Ocean tsunami, the 
international appreciation toward early warning system – EWS initiatives were mainly 
focused on the climate and volcanic hazards; except among Pacific regional 
communities leaded by Japan and US which has established Pacific Tsunami Warning 
System – PTWS since 1968.  The initiatives for promoting and integrating the early 
warning system as an essential component in the disaster risk reduction 
countermeasures and in the culture of disaster resilience has been encouraged by the 
UN General Assembly and initiated by the UN International Decade for Natural 
Disaster Reduction – UNIDNDR for the period of 1990 to 1999.  This lead in the 
acknowledgement of its importance in the 1994 Yokohama Strategy and Plan of 
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Action for a Safer World, endorsed at the UN World Conference on Natural Disaster 
Reduction – UNWCNDR in Yokohama 1994. Such acknowledgment could be seen in 
the principle no 5 which relates to early warning, i.e. early warnings of impending 
disasters and their effective dissemination are key factors to successful disaster 
prevention and preparedness. 
Later after 2004 tsunami, during the UNWCDR – World Conference on Disaster 
Reduction in Kobe 2005, the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction - UNISDR, 
i.e. the successor to the UN-IDNDR, has introduced a stronger focus on vulnerabilities 
and emphasized the needs to integrate disaster risk reduction into sustainable 
development. During this World Conference, the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-
2015: Building the resilience of nations and communities to disasters has been 
addressed, in which risk assessment and early warning has been acknowledged as one 
of the five priority of action for reducing the disaster risk.  
During the 2005 Kobe world conference, the initiatives for early warning system has 
been appreciated to be more necessary and relevant to reduce natural disaster risk 
especially tsunami to compare with they were firstly conceived in 1994.  Several 
international initiatives tried to promote the tsunami early warning system, i.e. 
establishment of regional tsunami early system for Indian Ocean - IOTWS, which was 
expected to become the second regional tsunami early warning system in the world 
after PTWS. However due to political matter overruled socio-technological matter, 
the IOTWS has never been similar to PTWS. It becomes only a network of several 
national tsunamis warning center of Indian Ocean countries.  
Other initiative was the establishment of UN-ISDR Platform for Promoting the Early 
Warning System – PPEW; with specific recommendations to call countries to develop 
people-centered early warning systems.  In line with the PPEW initiatives, the 
tsunami early warning system has been defined as the provision of timely and effective 
information, through identified institutions, that allows individuals exposed to a 
hazard to take action to avoid or reduce their risk and prepare for effective response 
(UN-ISDR, 2004a). This is then refined in the UNISDR Terminology (2009) as the 
set of capacities needed to generate and disseminate timely and meaningful warning 
information to enable individuals, communities and organizations threatened by a 
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hazard to prepare and to act appropriately and in sufficient time to reduce the 
possibility of harm or loss.  
Meanwhile the second concepts which has been proposed by PPEW basically 
consisting of four interacting elements (UNITED NATION, 2006), namely: (i) risk 
knowledge, (ii) monitoring and warning service, (iii) dissemination and 
communication and (iv) response capability, as shown in Figure 2.6 below. The 
existence of these four elements is not in a logical sequence, but each element has 
direct multi-way linkages and interactions with other elements. To take analogy to the 
grand scenario of the TEWS, these figure shows 3 component of 4 elements are 
Culture component; meaning it stressed more on the Culture  than Structure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6 Four elements for effective Early Warning (PPCEW) - down load by October 1, 2011 
(http://www.unisdr.org/2006/ppew/whats-ew/basics-ew.htm) 
This definition encompasses the range of factors necessary to achieve effective 
responses to warnings, which are expressed in the concept of end-to-end warning 
system and the concept of people-centered early warning system.  
The element of risk knowledge consists of the knowledge of all relevant hazards, and 
of vulnerabilities of people and society related to these hazards. The element of 
monitoring and warning service includes the technical capacity to monitor hazard 
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sources (generator), to predict hazard phenomena, and to issue warnings. The 
dissemination and communication element covers the dissemination of warnings 
which is acceptable and understandable by those people at risk as prior preparedness 
information. Then, the response capability element contains knowledge, plans and 
capacities for timely and appropriate action by authorities and the people at risk. 
Currently the element of monitoring and warning service is the most well recognized 
as part of the early warning system practices, but experience has shown that 
technically high-quality predictions by themselves are insufficient to achieve the 
desired reduction in loss of lives. The human factor in early warning systems is very 
significant. Failures in early warning systems typically occur in the communication 
and preparedness elements, as well as failure in respect to risk knowledge, i.e. a lack 
of full public and political appreciation (Twigg, 2002).  
To sustain four elements over long run, it is necessary to have strong political 
commitment and durable institutional capacities, which in turn depend on public 
awareness and an appreciation of the benefits of effective warning systems. Such the 
case after the 2004 tsunami the public awareness and political support is often high 
immediately, such moments should be capitalized to strengthen and secure 
sustainability of early warning systems otherwise the political will and euphoria will 
be evaporated after some time. 
Some relevant development frameworks for promoting tsunami early warning system 
were Agenda 21, multilateral environmental agreements, Barbados Plan of Action for 
Small Island Developing States, and Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. Mostly, 
all of these initiatives tried to call for actions to expand, deepen and strengthen local, 
national and international initiatives to develop early warning in particular and 
disaster risk reduction in general, as critical tools for promoting sustainable 
development and poverty reduction for the developing countries. 
Other than that, the international conferences on early warning, i.e. EWC-I 1998, 
EWC-II 2003 and EWC-III 2006, have addressed guiding principles for the 
development of early warning systems which implicitly outlined related program on 
early warning to reduce disasters using proposed technical considerations, strategic 
issues and institutional requirements and made specific recommendations for 
strengthening early warning systems, including the incorporation of early warning 
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into policy and development frameworks, a greater emphasis on the social factors in 
early warning systems and mechanisms sustaining dialogue and collaborative action 
among key stakeholders.  
However, to be effective, the early warning systems need to have not only a sound 
scientific and technical basis, but also a strong focus on the people exposed to risk, 
and with a systems approach that incorporates all of relevant factors in that risk, 
whether arising from natural hazards or social vulnerabilities, and from short-term or 
long-term processes (R. Basher, 2006). As also accommodated in EWC II (2004) to 
be effective and complete, an early warning systems must be both technically 
systematic and people-centered.  
Existing paradigm to model early warning systems is that the use of linear model-
based early warning systems as opposed to previous techno-centric concepts. The 
linear model emphasizes necessity to have all element of the early warning chain in 
place and connected. Two works on this approach, first is most common current view 
of early warning systems comprising of a simple warning chain, i.e. a linear set of 
connections from observations through warning generation and transmittal to users. 
The characteristic and limitation of linear model are presented in Table 2.1 below. 
The second is the end-to-end concept aiming to make forecasts and warnings more 
relevant and useable to the end-users. Even though this existing end-to-end linear 
concept is an advance, however it has several limitations, such as: 
a) focus still tends to remain on hazard, with less emphasized on vulnerabilities, 
risks and response capacities  
b) different hazards are handled by separate independent technical institutions, 
with few synergies or mutual benefits being sought 
c) expert dominance lead to difficulties in user appreciation, i.e. warning content, 
warning uncertainty, nature of false alarms and necessary responses to 
different types of warnings, 
d) lack of engagement or empowerment of those people at risk in development 
and operation of warning system,  
e) a tendency by end-users (people) to lack any sense of ownership in the system 
and to mistrust experts and authorities 
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f) lack of systematic mechanisms to improve system through incorporation of 
knowledge, experience and feedback from users and those at risk, and 
g) lack of public engagement and recognition tends to lead to lack of political 
and budgetary support for warning system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.1 Example of linear model characteristics and limitations: tsunami early warning systems 
As stated at the opening statement of this thesis in Chapter 1, to have better 
understanding toward the phenomena of the tsunami early warning system, this study 
defines the Effective Tsunami early warning system as an integration of natural, 
socio, technical and physical phenomena, aiming to save people as many as possible 
by alerting the people at risk with sufficient lead time to make decision for evacuation, 
see also.  
Then to better describe the phenomena of the system, the effective tsunami early 
warning system is modeled using the logic model approach which is able to recognize 
and structure all the challenges faced by the tsunami early warning system practices. 
Detailed of process development of the model are presented in the next part of this 
dissertation.  
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2.4 Current Status of Tsunami Early Warning System in 
Indonesia  
The 2004 tsunami has been a wake-up call for Indonesia for the establishment of 
tsunami early warning system called Ina-TEWS to protect people from future tsunami. 
The Government of Indonesia has put high priority for the development of Ina-TEWS 
which was completely established at the end of 2008. The system consists of two 
main components, i.e. the hardware component known as STRUCTURE component 
and Culture components; see also the grand scenario of Ina-TEWS in Figure 2.7.  
To support the development, deployment, operation, and maintenance of Ina-TEWS, 
hence a set of legal framework was endorsed, i.e. disaster management law and its 
related government regulations. The establishment tsunami early warning system and 
the enforcement of these legal frameworks are as part of the Indonesian Government’s 
international commitment for Hyogo Framework of Action (HFA) 2005-2015 to build 
the resilience of nation and communities toward natural disaster.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7 The Ina-TEWS Scheme (Sources: Ristek 2008) 
Under intensive collaboration with the national, regional and international community 
for the development of Ina-TEWS, the STRUCTURE component was built by 
adapting and improving the existing technology of tsunami early warning system 
from Pacific Tsunami Early Warning System - PTWS. The aim of this component is 
for detecting, monitoring, processing, aggregation, simulation and dissemination of 
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the information for potential tsunami, see also Figure 2.7 above. By the use of a 
multimode communication device, i.e. radio internet (substituted by digital video 
broadcast), internet, SMS, fax, and phone, the warning of potential tsunami is 
disseminated to the CULTURE component, which is addressed to Disaster 
Management Offices (DMOs) at local government including some related interface 
agencies, i.e. media and DMOs at provincial government (H.P. Rahayu et al., 2007; 
2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8 Current Status Ina-TEWS by December 2011 (Sources: BMKG 2010) 
The current status for the Structure component can be seen in Figure 2.8. It shows the 
hardware capacity of the system for detecting the seismic parameter using 
seismometer and accelerometer networks, tsunami phenomena using tsunameter using 
dart buoy network, GPS and tide gauge network; then analyzing using the DSS and 
Tsunami Database; followed by dissemination of the tsunami warning to local 
government (DMO) using multi-mode networks of communication.   
The content of warning using the international standard format, i.e. consisting of 4 
categories:  major warning (red color) for expected tsunami height above 3 m, 
warning (orange color) for expected tsunami height between 1-3 m, advisory (yellow) 
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for expected tsunami height below 1 m, and end or all clear (green color) for lifting 
up the warning sequences. This international standard of warning format and content 
has become debatable issues during the 2011 Tohoku tsunami among practices and 
scientist in tsunami early warning system. For the case of mega tsunami, the major 
warning could be misled the end-user (government officials and the people) since in 
fact tsunami height could way above 3 m. 
While in the Culture component of Ina-TEWS, as also in the case of Japan (Cabinet 
Office Government of Japan 2011), the early warning to public is mandated to 
regional and local government, unless otherwise responsibilities are given to 
particular agencies by regulations. This shows a responsibility sharing between 
national and local government.  The national government has developed and deployed 
the hardware for Structure component, meanwhile the local governments of those 
tsunami risk cities are expected to provide the supporting infrastructure to convey the 
warning and for evacuation.  
For the first purpose, the supporting infrastructure may vary from high tech such as 
networks of smart tsunami siren up to local knowledge such as mosque speakers etc. 
For the evacuation purposes, the infrastructure may vary depending on the city’s 
economic condition, such as from good and sufficient evacuation routes, sign board 
and vertical shelter up to nothing existed.  
During the development stage of the Culture component, several extensive 
countermeasures of tsunami disaster risk reduction have been promoted and exercised 
in 7 national show case cities from 2005 to 2008 aiming for increasing the city 
readiness and its community preparedness of tsunami prone area. These cities, i.e. 
Padang in West Sumatera, Denpasar in Bali, Cilegon in Banten, Gorontalo and 
Manado in North Sulawesi, Cilacap in Central Java, Bantul in Yogyakarta and Banda 
Aceh, are expected to be the role model city for tsunami prone area in Indonesia. 
Example of implemented disaster risk reduction countermeasures for Culure 
component can be seen in Figure 2.9. 
However, the local governments from other tsunami prone cities were showing their 
willingness to invest the countermeasures to protect their citizen from tsunami threats. 
This willingness was addressed on the Declaration of Agreement of City/Regency 
Governments during the Earth Day in year 2007 (H.P. Rahayu et al., 2007; 2008). In 
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the declaration the countermeasures needs for developing Culture components of Ina-
TEWS are explicitly extended and written to include 10 mandatory tasks, as shown in 
Table 2.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9 Tsunami DRR countermeasures in Denpasar Bali (Sources: H.P. Rahayu 2006)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.2 Ten mandatory task of local government for culture component (Sources: H.P. Rahayu 
2007; 2008) 
In fact, during the exercise at these national show-case cities in the period of 2005 - 
2008, most countermeasures implemented have been only focused on the preparation 
of end to end tsunami early warning simulation known also as full scale tsunami drill. 
Such countermeasures included fulfillment of task 2 up to 8. However, as mentioned 
in Chapter 1 that prior to 2004 Sumatra-Andaman Indian Ocean tsunami there were 
no existence of tsunami knowledge and low capacity toward tsunami preparedness.  
Therefore the countermeasures exercised in those national show case cities was within 
various range  depending on the political will of the local government and its 
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stakeholders to support the national tsunami drill. The most common countermeasures 
conducted were public education, government and community training, action 
planning both at city level and neighborhood level, beside by the help from national 
government jointly with university to prepare scientific based tsunami inundation map, 
evacuation route map, evacuation sign boards, setting up the standard operation 
procedures – SOP for emergency operation center - EOC at city disaster management 
office - DMO.  
The aim of the end to end tsunami early warning simulation is to test linearly the 
performance of Ina-TEWS starting from the STRUCTURE component (under 
authority of Indonesian Tsunami Warning Center as part of BMKG – Agency for 
Meteorology Climatology and Geophysics) to CULTURE component (under 
authority of local government), i.e. starting from detecting, obtaining, analyzing and 
disseminating the information of potential tsunami reaching all targeted people at risk.  
This simulation was up-scaled in the regional level. Such simulation conducted to test 
the performance of the Indonesian Tsunami Warning Center as Tsunami Warning 
Provider to the region, i.e. at the level of Indian Ocean Region known as IO-Wave 
end-to-end simulation and at the level of ASEAN recognized as ARDEX. In addition 
to that, the role of Culture component in enhancing the goal of Ina-TEWS in saving 
life has been also socialized to all local government of tsunami prone region through 
national technical guidelines, local regulations, presidential decree and disaster 
management law. 
However, the chaotic situations were still shown in many cities during the occurrence 
of several tsunamigenic earthquakes in these past 7 years; as if the existence of 
tsunami warning system and implementation of disaster risk reduction 
countermeasures having no effect. These earthquakes occurred in 2005, 2007, 2009 
and 2010 actually has generated from minor tsunami at the city of Padang to major 
tsunami at some cities in the west coast of Sumatera, see also the tsunami warning 
issued for these event in Figure 2.11.  
The readiness of the government officials and responsiveness of the people were 
tested in real scale. No officials performed their duty during the critical hours after the 
strong shaking, the city was chaos due to people panic, evacuation not to follow the 
procedure as exercised in tsunami drill, and only 1 out of 9 tsunami warning siren 
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functioned. Description of real situation during the disaster events to contrast situation 
during simulation tested are presented in Figure 2.10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.10 Effect of simulation tested and naturally tested in the city of Padang 
Meanwhile at the beginning stage of Ina-TEWS development, there were some 
disadvantages of false warning or malfunction of siren in the City of Banda Aceh (the 
ground zero of the 20-4 tsunami) which created huge public confusions thus led to big 
distrust by the public to the system. However, in since 2007 the performance of the 
hardware or Structure component has been improving.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.11 Performance of structure component (Sources: BMKG 2010) 
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To contrast with the performance of Culture component during these natural events 
the mechanism of issuing the tsunami warning with sufficient lead time was fully 
performed by Structure component. First warnings have been disseminated to local, 
media and interface agencies in average about 5 minutes after the main shocks. As 
recorded the performance of Structure component in these past two years was able to 
issue the warning within 2’53” to maximum of 10’5” leaving sufficient lead time to 
the government official to convey the warning as shown by Figure 2.11. 
By looking at the current status and the challenges and obstacle found during the 7 
years of operation of Ina-TEWS, both effectiveness of tsunami early warning system 
established and countermeasures intervention conducted for the development of 
Culture component has become the research question for this study. The 3 criteria of 
effective tsunami early warning system are necessary to be investigated further, i.e. 
ability and sustainability of the system to disseminate the potential warning accurately 
with sufficient lead time, readiness of local government and supporting infrastructure 
to receive and convey the warning to all people at risk by issuing the order for 
evacuation, and responsiveness of the people to the warning to save their lives (H.P. 
Rahayu et al., 2007; 2008).      
 
2.5 Lesson Learned from 2011 Great Tohoku Tsunami 
After 2.5 years of the completion of establishment for tsunami early warning in 
Indonesia, the 2011 Tohoku tsunami becomes an important wake up call for 
reviewing the tsunami early warning system in Indonesia. What would be happened if 
the same magnitude of earthquake and the same intensity of tsunami were occurred 
again in Indonesia? Were the Structure and Culture component performed and 
complement as expected? How many people responded to the warning? How many 
people could be saved? How the performance of the the government officials? Were 
there any impacts of the disaster countermeasure implemented to save the people? 
What most appropriate supporting devices for conveying the warning? These 
questions emerged since the 2011 Tohoku tsunami occurred during the completion 
stage of this study.  
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Beyond a deep grief for the victim of 2011 Tohoku tsunami, there are countless 
valuable lessons from the performance of tsunami early warning system in Japan 
especially the Culture component of the system as well as the advantage and 
disadvantage impacts of disaster risk reduction countermeasures intervention to save 
people that can be learned by this study to enrich the process development to model 
an effective tsunami early warning system using integrated logic model approach. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.12 Location of reconnaissance survey for Tohoku, April 6-10, 2011 
In this section, the discussion on the learning from best practices and lesson from the 
2011 Tohoku tsunami focuses on several issues that related to these 3 points of view, 
i.e. Tsunami Warning and People Perception, Public and Formal Tsunami Education, 
Role of Government, and Paradigm Shift in Susceptibility. The information reviewed 
for this study were based on brief reconnaissance survey in several affected cities in 
Miyagi and Iwate prefectures done 3 weeks after the disaster and investigated on line 
data and secondary data regarding the 2011 Tohoku tsunami, as well as related 
information on the legacy of Japanese culture in disaster risk reduction 
countermeasures. Location of reconnaissance survey is shown in Figure 2.12 
conducted on April 6 to April 10, 2011.  
This covered Sendai City; Onagawa; Wakabayashi Ward included Arahama Beach a 
coastal residential area; Ishinomaki; Kesennuma a big fishery port, central business 
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district and residential area devastated by tsunami; Karakuwacho  used to be a small 
beautiful coastal town located at the outmost northern area of Miyagi prefecture 
between Kesennuma and Rikuzentakata with almost all area washed away by tsunami, 
see also Figure 2.13; Rikuzentakata a relatively big fishing port town badly affected 
by tsunami; Ofunato another important fishing port having similar situation and 
condition with Rikuzentakata. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.13 Karakuwacho Town, April 9, 2011 
 
 
2.5.1 Tsunami Warning and People Perception 
The 2011 tsunami actually has been a long awaited event which has been used for 
capacity building for city and people preparedness in the region, where historically 
this area have been stricken by major tsunami many times. Even though this 9.0 
magnitude tsunami was far above the anticipated magnitude of 8.0, still there are 
many best practices and lesson from the viewpoint of tsunami early warning and 
appreciation of people that can be learned.  
Several valuable and important ones discussed in the next few paragraphs are starting 
from the success performance of early warning to deal with the near-field tsunami, 
followed by the good practices of the warning to reach the last miles including the 
existence of supporting infrastructure for conveying the warning, the controversial 
debate regarding the needs for reviewing the warning content, up to the positive and 
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negative appreciation of the people to the warning which are influenced by their prior 
belief. The summary of best practices and important lessons for this area are listed in 
Table 2.3 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.3 Identified best practices and lesson from the performance of tsunami warning system 
Besides, there is high accomplishment of ability to issue the tsunami warning within 3 
minutes after the earthquake’s main shock and leaving sufficient lead time for the 
people at risk to make decision for evacuation. This is the best practices for the 
countries that are prone to near field tsunami such as Indonesia; the first wave came to 
the closest cities to the earthquake’s epicenter was between 20 to 25 minutes, see also 
Table 1.2 of Chapter 1. The first updated warning was issued in the following 25 
minutes, and continuously broadcasted for about 51 hours 09 minutes until lifted by 
17:58 a.m. JST on March 13, 2011. The lifted up warning issued until all the regions 
of Japan are all clear from this tsunami, where Okinawa was the the farthest one. 
Figure 2.13 shows the first warning and the all clear warning (lifted up) issued by 
JMA (http://www.jma.go.jp/jma/en/2011_Earthquake.html ). 
Tsunami Warning & People Perception: 
1. Tsunami warning system Structure component - ability to issue the warning for near field tsunami in 
3 minutes after main shock with sufficient lead time.  
2. Tsunami warning system Culture component - Able to reach the last mile by continuous 
broadcasting via TV, radio, internet/webpage, customized information sharing via community FM, 
and community self-help in the form of volunteer based firefighting organization. 
3. Controversy debate on content of major tsunami warning – the controversy debate among scientist 
and practice of disaster manager regarding the need to revise the warning as to accommodate if the 
mega tsunami with tsunami height far above 3 m. Just looking at the warning where estimated tsunami 
height 3 m and more, the people at risk often taking wrong decision, see also wrongful decision taken 
at Kamaishi School 
4. People appreciation to tsunami warning – shown by high number of people responded to the warning 
and saved, in average about 92.57% of people at risk from saved (EERI Report November 2011).  
5. People mis-perception to tsunami risk – beside due to family/personal reason, some people did not 
evacuate due to feel safe mis-perception, cognitive biases (systematic error) on fatal judgment, 
undermining the warning content, etc. 
6. Short memory of people to disaster – an analogy can be taken by looking at the public interest and 
media on the disaster, less than few weeks the interest were declined. For example in Twitter tweets 
counts on Japanese disaster conducted by some research. 
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Figure 2.14 Performance of structure component (Sources: BMKG 2010) 
Supporting infrastructure used in reaching the people at risk: Meanwhile at the 
down end of warning system mechanism, what is called Culture component in the 
Indonesian Early Warning System – Ina TEWS, there are several best practices in 
reaching the people at risk especially the last mile during the 2011 event. Not only 
real-time and continuously broadcasted via TV, radio and JMA webpage, but there are 
also other multi mode dissemination infrastructure used in real time, i.e. J-ALERT by 
the central government to disseminate real-time warning to all municipalities and 
conveyed by the City Disaster Management Office (DMO) to the people by wailing 
the siren and public announcement speaker (PA). Example of J-Alert at Kochi City 
Disaster Management Office can be seen in Figure 2.15.  
In addition to that, there are other best practice of conveying the warning at the grass 
root level, i.e. the existence of customized information sharing via Community FM, 
community self-help organization such as volunteer based firefighting organization, 
and spontaneous neighbor, family and friends. The Community FM proved to be very 
effective to transfer government information to community during the event (Asahi 
Shimbun).  
These kinds of needs for customized information sharing between the affected people 
and the government is very important and can be elaborate further for tailored need 
radio programs. 
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Figure 2.15 J-Alert of Kochi City Disaster Management Office 
High appreciation to tsunami warning: However, the people appreciation to tsunami 
warning was very high, this can be shown by the number of people responded to the 
warning and saved. In average, about 92.57% of people at risk from the most severe 
affected cities were saved, i.e. Rikuzentakat, Kesennuma and Minamisanriku see also 
Table 1.2 of Chapter 1 (EERI Report November 2011). An interviewed based 
assessment conducted following the 2011 event shows that in average about 49% of 
people from Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima Prefectures have heard tsunami early 
warning that day, but not paying attention to the content of warning message (such as 
tsunami height), because about 40%-47% people busy with evacuation, 14%-20% 
people not hearing any warning information from the city Disaster Management 
Office, around 5%-12% people having electricity cut off, 1%-10% cell phone not 
functioning, and 3%-10% just being ignorant to the warning (Yamazaki Noburo, 2011 
with source: National Fire Agency, JMA and Cabinet Office, Nov 2011).  
 This high number of 40%-47% people evacuate based on the warning and not paying 
attention to the detail warning information has argued the controversy debate about 
the need for revision of tsunami warning content. It was recognized that tsunami early 
warning issued promptly, but underestimated tsunami heights at the first warning 
might have affected people’s behavior to make decision for evacuation.  Other 
interviewed-based assessment on 25 respondent at the affected area presents that a 
high percentage of people responded to the warning and evacuated (JICA 2011), i.e. 
62% people immediate evacuation and 38% not immediately. The reasons for 
delaying the evacuation were: confirming family members’ safety, not consider 
  
Photo; H.P. Rahayu, 
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tsunami higher than dyke, back home cleaning after earthquake, based on experience, 
and did not consider tsunami at all. 
Early warning system is effective when it is properly perceived: Although there was an 
early warning issued immediately, often people misperception toward tsunami risk 
occurred. Such as people underestimated the height of the tsunami due to repeated 
occurrences of earthquakes, then a feel safe misperception prevailed. Other than that, 
the attitude of taking for granted or taking the knowledge blindly of public education 
or tsunami drill may create cognitive biases (systematic error) leading to fatal 
judgment. This can be seen at the case of Okawa Elementary School in Ishinomaki, 
Miyagi Prefecture, where 74 children died or went missing after being caught in the 
tsunami while evacuating since time has been consumed for the assembled the student 
as the trained procedure for evacuation, see Figure 2.16. 
Other example due to misperception is about wrong judgment taken at school 
evacuation is at Togura Junior High School in Minami-Sanriku of Iwate Prefecture. 
The school building actually was designated as one of evacuation shelter in the 
neighborhood area. However the teacher worried about building damaged due to 9.0 
magnitude earthquakes, then students were assembled at the school grounds instead. 
The tsunami struck while the students were there, one girl died after being caught up 
in the wave (Asahi Shimbun). It is clear here that during critical situation people need 
for proper perception to make decision for necessary actions. 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.16 Okawa Elementary School in Ishinomaki, Miyagi Prefecture in the March 11 tsunami 
Short memory of people to disaster: Other important lesson is about the memory of 
people toward disaster. Even though no formal scientific based assessment has been 
conducted following the 2011 event, there is popular assessment conducted on the 
Photo: Shinichi Iisuka 
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public interest and media on the disaster in time line on Twitter tweets counts on 
Japanese disaster conducted on Twitter tweets counts on Japanese disaster (source: 
http://twitter.com/). In less than few days the interest were sharply declined, and re-
emerged if there was other issues such as occurrence of strong aftershocks and further 
damage of Fokushima nuclear power plant etc. Figure 2.17 shows that after a month 
from the main shocks the euphoria interest of common people were decreased.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.17 Short memory of people toward disaster shown by twitter on interest for 2011 Mega 
disaster (source: http://twitter.com/)  
To summarize, between tsunami early warning and people perception to worse 
tsunami risk, the root causes of controversy debate among scientist and disaster 
manager practices in the scientific forum and/or media regarding the need to revise 
the warning content as to accommodate the mega tsunami height which is far above 3 
m. As admitted by head of JMA Akira Naga, it is difficult to transfer such kind of 
technical information to general public; therefore as added by Fumihiko Immamura 
that the scientist numbering warning information is Natural Science, but how to make 
general public/people reading the number is difficult problem and need  more research 
on social science. This debate was then expanded to the need for socialization to local 
government and general public to have better understanding about the meaning of 
height for 3 different tsunami parameters, i.e. estimated tsunami heights as stated in 
Tsunami Warning, tsunami inundation, and tsunami run up. Tsunami height refers to 
the gap in sea level raised by tsunami from the normal sea level. Tsunami run-up 
height is the elevation in which tsunami runs up from waterfront toward inland 
ranging from as the expected tsunami height released in the warning to maximum 
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around quadruple. For the society equipped with good warning mechanism the people 
often did not have any idea about the last two parameter of tsunami phenomena, 
which in fact to be the most affected parameters to their lives. By only relying on the 
warning with estimated tsunami height 3 m and more, the people at risk will taking 
wrong decision, see also wrongful decision taken at Kamaishi School discussed in the 
next section. 
 
2.5.2 Public and Formal Tsunami Education 
Identified best practices and lesson learned the area of Public Education and Disaster 
Prevention for Education are listed in the following Table 2.4.  
Mainstreaming disaster risk reduction into both main curriculum and external 
curriculum are the best practices to increase preparedness, leading to the increased of 
prior belief in risk perception. Success impact of regular tsunami drill conducted 
every Sept 1 in Iwate Prefecture for commemoration of Great Showa Sanriku 
Tsunami 1933 is shown by the fact found in Kamaishi city student who were saved 
almost 99.98% students are saved, i.e 5 student death among a total of 3,000 students 
(1,927 Elementary School and 999 Junior High School) even though the city was 
stricken by 10 m tsunami. When the school building started to pitch and sway 
violently, pupils at Unosumai Elementary School, foreground, join Kamaishi-Higashi 
Junior High School students started evacuation promptly and voluntarily following 
their experience of evacuation drill conducted in June 2010 (Asahi Shimbun). Several 
other areas performed regular disaster drills on March 3 for the day of 1933 Great 
Showa Sanriku Tsunami, which was just one week before the disaster. See Figure 2.18. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.18 Pupils at Unosumai Elementary School, foreground, join Kamaishi-Higashi Junior High School 
student in an evacuation drill in June 2010 (2
nd
 row). 
 
Photo: Toshio Kikuchi 
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Table 2.4 Identified best practices and lesson from public and formal tsunami education 
Beyond the controversy of many tsunami-hit schools found to have inadequate 
evacuation school action plan, there were a great number of school children were 
saved due to taking right decision to evacuate. From the tsunami stricken school, 
Public and Formal Tsunami Education : 
1. Socialization to local government and general public - to have better understanding about the 
meaning of height for different tsunami parameter, i.e. estimated heights of tsunami as stated in 
Tsunami Warning, tsunami inundation, and tsunami run up; as well as the temporal and spatial 
differences showing the sequence of largest wave. In many cases for the society equipped with 
good warning mechanism having no idea about the last two parameter of tsunami phenomena 
(tsunami inundation height and tsunami run up) which was actually the one that affected their 
lives. 
2. Disaster Prevention for Education – the best practices shown in mainstreaming disaster risk 
reduction into both main curriculum and external curriculum to increase preparedness, leading to 
the increased of prior belief in risk perception, to contrast with fatal judgment due to cognitive 
bias, that will be worthwhile to make the best of tsunami education. 
3. Intensive public education and drill - seemed very effective to save many people, many positive 
impacts of tsunami drill done to save their live (good story from evacuee). In contrary, many 
elderly used to be the most active participants for the drill and town watching activities were the 
one who washed away. 
4. Advantage and disadvantage of simultaneously broadcasted video footage on Mega tsunami to 
the public – able to increase prior belief leading to the increase of tsunami risk knowledge and 
risk perception of the people of Japan and around the globe, in the other hand a psychological 
effect called the anchoring heuristic will influence the people mind to underestimate the unsafe 
level of tsunami height. As found that by the 2010 Chilean tsunami, roughly 70 percent identified 
that a 10-foot (3.05 m) tsunami is a hazard with 60 percent willing to evacuate in the event, but 
after the 2011 Tohoku disaster only 45 percent of respondents realized that a 10-foot tsunami was 
unsafe with only 31 percent willing to evacuate (Satako, 2011).  
5. Local Wisdom from ancient era – among uncountable local wisdom on disaster risk reduction 
countermeasures have saved many people during the 2011 Tohuku tsunami, i.e. local culture of 
“tendenco” saved many people’s lives, memorial stone marker as crude tsunami warning system 
from the ancient has saved some people lives in many places in Tohoku area, the culture of 
Dissemination of information to future generations through storytelling to the school children 
from the old people, and the legend of Inamura (rice sheaves) has been legacy on for the 
countermeasures of prevention for tsunami disaster. Not to mention local wisdom on 
infrastructure measures from ancient, i.e. the construction of dyke an many region in Tohoku 
region, man-made hill in Kamogawa city, and vegetative buffer zone in Kamaishi after 1611 
Keicho tsunami. 
47 
about 40 % of 56 elementary and junior high schools did not specify evacuation areas 
in their school disaster-prevention manuals, about 21 tsunami-damaged schools failed 
to provide adequate information on evacuation destinations, while 11 had their 
students remain in the school buildings after the earthquake (Asahi Shimbun on line, 
downloaded November 29, 2011).  
Some example of right decision taken based on prior belief formed by trained 
experiences are shown by students in Kamaishi saved because of learning from a 
Gunma University Professor who advising the students to keep on evacuating higher 
and higher without stopping whenever hearing tsunami warning and/or wailed siren. 
An example of deadly decision but saving student lives showing by a decision 
straying from evacuation procedures shown when a section of Otsuchi Elementary 
School in Otsuchi Iwate Prefecture destroyed by fire following the strong earthquake, 
a teacher was bravely to lead the student to evacuate through undesignated routes and 
places.  
This shows best lesson on the ability to take sound judgment based on intuition and/or 
knowledge in any emergency situation by that will be worthwhile to make the best of 
tsunami education; to contrast with the fatal judgment due to cognitive bias formed by 
systematic error shown by disaster wrong decision taken in Togura Junior High 
School in Minami-Sanriku Iwate Prefecture discussed in previous section. Other than 
that, there is strong need to review the School Disaster Prevention Manuals (Asahi 
Shimbun) based on the  survey conducted during July to August for investigation on 
education boards, where only 66 education boards from 47 prefectures and 19 seirei-
shitei-toshi cities (a government-ordinance-designated cities with population of 
500,000 or more) participated. The 2011 event has prompted these education boards 
to put priority for tsunami as disasters to prepare for. 
Vast majority of education boards currently review school manuals on crisis 
management manuals and disaster preparedness education. About 90 % officials 
consider building students' abilities to make sound judgments on their own in 
emergency situations, since many student swept away by tsunami because too much 
time elapsed in the process of trying to evacuate them. Hence, the education board 
encourage that, schools should put priority on making sure students flee immediately 
to evacuation areas, when an earthquake with an intensity level of 5 or higher on the 
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Japanese scale of 7 occurs, not assembling in schoolyards and calling out a list of 
names. The education boards of some prefectures with long coastlines (Wakayama, 
Toyama, Kagawa, Oita and Miyazaki) have strengthened the crisis management 
manuals to deal with tsunami, meanwhile Aichi Prefecture plan to strengthen their 
disaster preparedness education so that children can judge and act appropriately 
under any circumstances. 
Intensive public education and drill seemed very effective to save many people. 
Many positive impacts of tsunami drill done to save their live (good story from 
evacuee). In contrary, many elderly used to be the most active participants for the drill 
and town watching activities were the one who washed away (A. Muhari, 2011). 
Advantage and disadvantage of simultaneously broadcasted video footage on Mega 
tsunami to the public – is a good public education tool to increase prior belief leading 
to the increase of tsunami risk awareness, knowledge and perception of the people of 
Japan and around the globe. In the other hand, a psychological effect called the 
anchoring heuristic will influence the people mind to underestimate the unsafe level 
of tsunami height. As found that by the 2010 Chilean tsunami, roughly 70 percent 
identified that a 10-foot (3.05 m) tsunami is a hazard with 60 percent willing to 
evacuate in the event, but after the 2011 Tohoku disaster only 45 percent of 
respondents realized that a 10-foot tsunami was unsafe with only 31 percent willing to 
evacuate (Satako, 2011).  
Local Wisdom from ancient era, there are uncountable local wisdom on disaster risk 
reduction countermeasures have saved many people during the 2011 Tohuku tsunami. 
First is the local culture of tendenco have saved many lives, which actually emerged 
after 1896 major earthquake and tsunami where many people wanted to look for their 
family and neighbors after the tsunami. The deep meaning of this culture is built on 
the mutual trust; people were taught to be evacuated with the trust and belief that their 
family members will also take proper shelter. Other best practice of local wisdom is 
that a crude tsunami warning system from the ancient was proven saving lives, i.e. 
dundreds of memorial stone marker from the ancient marked the Japan coast line. 
Collectively these stone markers form a basic tsunami warning system for Japan. 
Some stone marker came from 600 year ago, see Figure 2.19.  
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Others just simply showed the evidence of past tsunami; reminding people not to 
build any housing below the marker, or just showing daily reminder such as if an 
earthquake come beware of tsunami.  However, many facts show that many people 
have forgotten these local wisdoms, for example one memorial stone marker in 
Kessenuma mentions that always to be prepared for unexpected tsunamis; the 
prioritize lives over your possession and valuables. Some people follow advice, but 
many just went back to save valuables after shakings stop, then they were washed 
away by tsunami.  
Dissemination of information to future generations, in several areas frequently hit 
by tsunami, the dissemination of past experiences conducted through storytelling to 
the school children from the old people, which is considered as an important 
educational tool. Last but not least, the legend of Inamura - rice sheaves (Cabinet 
Office – Disaster Prevention Group) has been the legacy on for the countermeasures 
of prevention for tsunami disaster. Not to mention local wisdom on infrastructure 
measures from ancient, i.e. the construction of dyke an many region in Tohoku region, 
man-made hill in Kamogawa city, and vegetative buffer zone in Kamaishi after 1611 
Keicho tsunami. Most judgment for evacuation was based on prior belief formed by 
trained experiences, i.e. training. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.19 Example local wisdom and ancient era 
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2.5.3 Role of Government and Paradigm Shift in Susceptibility 
The strong role of many local governments, i.e. City Disaster Management Office, in 
conveying the tsunami warning to save people by non-stop wailing sirens and public 
announcement speaker (PA) to order people for evacuation, seems very effective. A 
heroine of tsunami early warning, Ms. Miki Endo of Minamisanriku City Disaster 
Management Office, becomes legacy in this area of tsunami early warning. Figure 
2.20 shows the condition of Minamisanriku City Disaster Management Office at 
before and after tsunami stricken (sources: website of Minamisanriku City). Other 
valuable lesson learned is a shifting paradigm for the composition of vulnerable group 
of people at risk. Common composition prior to 2011 tsunami, it consists of 4 groups, 
i.e. children below 15 years old, elderly above 60 years, women and difabel (people 
with different ability). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.5 Identified best practices and lesson on role of government and paradigm shift in 
susceptibility 
 
Role of Government and Paradigm Shift in Susceptibility : 
1. National Government’s first  response on day one - very quick as tsunami warning 
simultaneously transmitted to municipalities  using J-ALERT within 3 minutes and 
Emergency Disaster Response Headquarters established within 28 minutes after the 
earthquake. 
2. Role of local government – government officials responsibility shown by the tsunami 
heroine from Minamisanriku City Disaster Management Office who becomes the legacy in 
disaster management best practice, i.e. Ms. Miki Endo 
3. Paradigm shift in demographic susceptibility (vulnerable target group) - The 2011 Tohoku 
tsunami the biggest portion of fatality was the elderly, i.e. total for elderly 60 year old and 
above was 65% and the children below 20 years old was the smallest about 6%. The most 
vulnerable target group elderly and working class age, due to some physical and 
responsibility reasons; while exclusion of school children from vulnerable group is as the 
good impacts of mainstreaming tsunami education into school curriculum and program. 
4. Location of critical facilities and evacuation shelter - public facilities such as the nursing 
hospital in underestimated inundated area, causing elderly become the most severe victims; 
over 1001 designated evacuation site was hit by tsunami and several inundation maps were 
underestimated (Asahi Shimbun). 
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Figure 2.20 Minamisanriku Disaster Management Office before and after 2011 Tohoku Tsunami 
(Source: Minamisanriku City) 
Such the case of 2004 Sumatera tsunami, the highest victim were children below 20, 
with approximately 43% in West Aceh District – Indonesia and 44.6% in Ampara 
District – Srilanka. To compare, the impact of 2011 Tohoku tsunami on the 3 most 
affected prefectures, the victim from children below 20 years was 6.0%; meanwhile 
the biggest number of fatalities was elderly above 65 years old with contribution 
about 65%, followed by working age people, see also Figure 2.21 and 2.22 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.21 Fatalities by cities over 1% 
population, http://earthquake-report.com/2011/ 
10/ 02/japan-tohoku-earthquake-and-tsunami-
catdat-41-report-october-2-2011/  
Figure 2.22 Composition of fatalities by group 
(Sources: Prime Ministry and Cabinet Office 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/incident/index.html) 
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Other critical issues associated with city land use planning, many critical facilities, i.e. 
school, and nursing hospital for elderly are located in the inundation area and very 
close to shore line. Even though with the best structural countermeasures with multi 
stories building, the elderly and school children are commonly to be as the most 
vulnerable one during any disaster situation. Not only that many multi stories nursing 
hospital for elderly located in high tsunami risk zone were designated as the vertical 
tsunami shelter were badly inundated. The underestimate tsunami risk scenario for the 
development plan has made a lot of misjudgment in emergency response management. 
Example of susceptible conditions found in Arahama beach of Wakabayashi Ward – 
Sendai shown the Figure 2.23 taken during the survey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.23 Example of susceptibility: Critical land use planning for critical facilities 
  
Other facts shown by many elderly did not leave the house for evacuation even 
though there was sufficient elapsed time for evacuation. This was contrasted with 
their active involvement in many tsunami educations and tsunami drill, not to mention 
their own direct experience to tsunami occurred in the past. Figure 2.24 shows the 
study on the distribution of deaths vs. density of population at risk based on the 
residential address, the highest evacuee population and the highest number of 
fatalities are from shore-lines area, where the biggest proportion of fatalities are 
elderly followed by working age group shown by yellow color. Only small number of 
children under 14 years old shown by green color have affected by the tsunami. 
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Figure 2.24 Distribution of deaths and densities of evacuees at their residential address in Sendai City 
(Isoda, 2011) 
2.6 Summary 
As the old Japanese counsel says "a disaster strikes when it is forgotten", which 
emphasizes on three messages, i.e. an unimaginably long recurrence period of hazard, 
a hazard may become a disaster if people are not prepared for it, and forget. Learning 
from best practices and its failure from 2011 Tohoku tsunami to review the existence 
of Ina-TEWS and to solve foreseen and unforeseen problem of enhancing effective 
tsunami early warning could make a better prepare for tsunami. 
Based on the in depth review of the disaster trend in Indonesia, it challenges for 
tsunami early warning system, the state of the art effective tsunami early warning 
system in the international appreciation, the current status of tsunami early warning 
system in Indonesia by 2011 as well as its hindrance factors and problem, and the 
valuable lesson and best practices learned from 2011 event, this study recognize that a 
necessity to put people not as the object but as the subject positioned in the center of 
tsunami early warning system, not at the front or the top nor at back or the bottom.  
Here it does not meant physically positioned in the center, but it is more to put the 
people as the main focus to be recognize their needs, understanding and capacity in 
developing the effective tsunami early warning system. The people under this study 
are not only the general public who is the end user and the one who need to know 
their ability to perceive, their understanding about the warning and their right to know 
the right things. The people also include the government officials, and other 
stakeholders of the system. It is a very complex issue to model, as previous mentioned 
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in Chapter 1 that logic model is the most reliable approach to portray the problem, 
which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
Problem Structuring and Model Development 
 
3.1  Introduction  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the tsunami warning system is a complex and dynamic 
area. Some school of thoughts has attempted to improve the practice of the natural 
hazard warning system (including tsunami) from some angles. Majority of scholar in 
this area viewed the warning system as a high-techno center which emphasizing more 
on the technology capability to issue the warning with high accuracy and real time. 
Some attempted to introduce both off- and near-shore sensors used simultaneously to 
build an efficient TEWS especially for near field tsunami (L.K. Comfort et al., 2011, 
G. Bellotti et al., 2009). Others have viewed the system from people center with 
expected easy access to the information and good preparedness own by the people at 
risk, such as proposed by PPEWC – UNISDR (PERI, 2006; F. Thomalla, 2009; F. 
Thomalla et al., 2008). Moreover UN-Secretary General encourage for a broader 
context of global multi-hazard EWS in the world (UN-SG, 2006).  
In other perspective, some conceived the system as a top down, simple and linear 
warning chain (J.H. Sorensen, 2000), from central government to the people. Some 
considered as bottom up approach, emphasizing involvement of community to 
identify needs, patterns of vulnerability and to develop the legitimacy. However, this 
community based early warning system commonly work for slow-onset hazard 
(flood) not for sudden-onset hazard (tsunami), unless supported at higher levels by 
appropriate scientific and analytical capacity and policy frameworks; or unless it was 
cultivated in subculture of people at risk, such as in the case of Nishiki Town at Mie 
Prefecture which have strong disaster cultivated subculture and mutual trust in 
strengthening local tsunami warning system (M. Takahashi et al., 2008). 
From the Structure component, the current success of Ina-TEWS as a technology is 
shown by its ability in issuing tsunami warning within 5 minutes. However, its 
outcome is measured socially to the extent for preventing and/or reducing damage to 
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lives and property. Ina-TEWS therefore adopts both structural focused on high-techno 
center and cultural approaches focused on government and people at risk.  
After three years of development and another 3 years of establishment, the challenges 
of tsunami early warning system in Indonesia, and lesson from 2011 Tohoku tsunami; 
this study believes that there should be a shifting paradigm in viewing the practice of 
tsunami early warning system. The system should be viewed as a multi facet, complex 
and dynamic phenomena.  There is no dichotomy of viewing the system; both 
component, i.e. structure and culture, are equally significant for tsunami prone cities 
especially for anticipating the short travel time of near-field tsunami. However, 
several external factors related with the physical and socio-economic susceptibility 
have significantly affected the performance of the two components during 2005, 2007, 
2009 and 2010 events in the case study city.   
Thus, this study attempts to describe these problem issues by defining the system to 
be effective should be as an integration of natural, socio, technical and physical 
phenomena, aiming to save people at risk by alerting them with sufficient lead time to 
make decision for evacuation.  
Common practice of policy development in disaster management area assumes that 
solving the problems are purely objective oriented conditions obtained by determining 
the facts in a given case. This naive view often fails to recognize that the same facts 
may be interpreted in different ways by different stakeholders. This leads to the 
thought of structuring problem as a critical stage in recognizing problem issues before 
providing problem solution, since a policy solution is the output of problem solving 
which depends on proficiency/capability of problem structuring (W.M. Dunn, 2008).  
Therefore to recognize holistically the problem issues of effective tsunami early 
warning system, this study introduces the use of logic model approach for acquiring 
and structuring the problem associated with the natural, socio, technical and physical 
phenomena. The advantage of this model is able to capture in-depth mindset of people 
toward some issues, and mindset of multi-level stakeholders with multi-disciplinary 
approach and a wide range of human being capacity and capability in perceiving 
tsunami threat, tsunami warning, coping ability, and appreciation to the government 
and/or other stakeholders. 
57 
3.2  Method Description 
Initially logic model is defined as a systematic visual knowledge representation of 
people mind to resources they have, activities they plan, and outcome they expect (S. 
Nasu, 2007). Currently, there is a wide range of logic model methodologies used to 
acquire and represent the people mind. Some scholar has worked on an interview 
based cognitive mapping to develop the logic model. Others assumed logic model as 
an application of problem structuring method based on interview surveys and 
cognitive maps among identified stakeholders (H. Kato et al., 2007).  
According to R. M. Kitchin (1994), cognitive mapping is a process composed of a 
series of psychological transformations by which an individual acquires, stores, 
recalls, and decodes information about the relative locations and attributes of the 
phenomena in his everyday spatial environment. General belief sees that cognitive 
mapping explaining and leading not only to the understanding of spatial behavior, but 
cognitive map is a mental building which is explicit, analogical, metaphorical or 
hypothetical that actually influences behavior. It shows a strong correlation between 
mind of people and physical and non-physical environment surrounding the human 
being that influences the decision to act or behave. 
Some other scholar assumed the knowledge representation can be structured by using 
physically based logic model - PBLM; where knowledge acquisition is based only on 
physical data/information and no interview involved (S. Nasu (2011), personal 
communication). Most of works on logic model have emphasized the interviewed 
based survey, which is followed by questionnaire based survey (T. Kariya and S. 
Nasu, 2009; T. Kariya, 2008). Here, the information obtained for structuring the 
problem issues are purely based from the thought, knowledge and/or perception of 
people being interviewed with regard to some issues and/or willingness. Thus this 
study sees current trend of logic model as a new theory of problem structuring method 
which is based on interview surveys and/or cognitive maps.  
However for structuring problem of the effective tsunami early warning system 
characterized by multi facet, complex and dynamic phenomena; two types of logic 
model method are introduced and used in this study. These are Physically Based 
Logic Model – PBLM and Tacit Knowledge Based Logic Model – TKBLM. The 
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PBLM is a non-interviewed based knowledge mapping. The method of PBLM is used 
in this study to acquire and structure the correlation of physical events/phenomena 
based on the up-to-date secondary data directly obtained from related institution and 
reconnaissance survey conducted after September 30, 2009 devastated earthquake.  
Meanwhile the TKBLM is a modification of common logic model with the use of 
tacit knowledge in structuring the problem issues. The method of TKBLM is a 
cognitive mapping methodology to acquire and structure the people’s mind in 
responding (heuristic judgment) to tsunami early warning system by the use of the 
tacit knowledge based on prior knowledge, social and physical influence, and access 
to information and appreciation to the warning system. Prior knowledge is the human 
perception toward tsunami disaster risk which is formed by previous direct experience 
and/or trained experience, for example tsunami drill. Meanwhile the heuristic 
judgment is an experience-based decision making for evacuation. Detailed 
methodology of these two logic model in structuring problem are presented in Figure 
3.1 and 3.2.  
The two figures present overall view of research methodology developed by this 
study: 
First is to recognize problem situation.  
Through in-depth investigation at both components of the system, i.e. Structure and 
Culture, and the performance of both component during the 2005, 2007, 2009 and 
1010 events; exhaustive problem issues were identified. This was followed by 
examining any related susceptibility, capacity and resiliency factors that hindered and 
supported the performance of both components during those events. It was found that 
not only Culture component not yet fully developed, but also no existence of such 
model/standard and no thorough approach to recognize problem issues exhaustively.  
Second is problem structuring and logic model development.  
To describe the phenomena of effective tsunami early warning system which integrate 
natural, socio, technical and physical aspects; an integrated logic model has been 
developed by this study consisting of integrated 4 layer model and 1 floating model.  
The first two layers and floating model were developed using PBLM, while the 
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remaining two are based on TKBLM. To bridge the limitation of TKBLM, i.e. 
missing and/or unforeseen information, two further approaches used at this stage of 
the study, i.e. improvement of information acquisition and using Principal Component 
Analysis to keep all factors instead of eliminating them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Research Methodology 
 
 
The first improvement is to introduce the use of semi-open questionnaire based 
interview survey, which is used for logic model’s knowledge acquisition. The 
advantage of this improvement is the ability to explore more in-depth and 
comprehensive all supporting and hindrance factors including the unforeseen ones, 
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which may be indelible in the people mind. In addition to that, it has more certainty in 
obtaining the target amount of data and information from the interviewee compare to 
the questionnaire circulated by mail, but it is more time consuming if a large data set 
required. This is because it needs to interview people on one to one basis. Based on 
this data obtained, the cognitive mapping can be performed. There are two stages of 
interview based survey to structure the problem issue using the TKBLM. Details of 
data acquisitions are discussed in the next section. 
Second improvement is to keep the model set holistic, the numerical modeling of 
TKBLM is done by adapting the Principal Component Analysis – PCA approach with 
no elimination or reduction for the least contributor factors as commonly done by 
standard approach of PCA’s regression analysis. The PCA is used not only to 
structure and analyze the numerical correlation of all observed factors among the 
members component of each level/cluster, but also to uncover the unobservable 
factors. 
Third is numerical model development.  
Detailing in structuring problem is confirming the ability of the two logic model 
approaches used to model the phenomena of effective tsunami early warning system. 
While the use of regression of PCA is conforming the relationship among all 
recognized factors and/or variables. Then using PCA in keeping all variables and/or 
factors is conforming for modeling a complete and holistic phenomenon, however 
small the contribution in the relation among the variables and/or phenomena as entity 
they are still significant to be recognized in the map. As it has been discussed in that 
the characteristic of the effective TEWS phenomena is dynamic and multifaceted. 
Thus the smallest contributor to perception of people minds to make decision for 
evacuation for example, may change in the future. 
Fourth are the findings of this study.  
Findings of this study are not only the two new methodologies as also discussed 
above sections, i.e. first methodology in modeling the phenomena of tsunami early 
warning system in the form of Integrated Logic Model using combination of PBLM 
and TKBLM approaches and second methodology in knowledge acquisition, mapping 
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and numerical analysis of people’s mind using TKBLM approach. The findings of the 
study also include six output models developed; see also Figure 1.8 Research 
Framework of this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Methodologies for Problem Structuring  
 
By limiting the focus of the study on the roles of Indonesian Tsunami Early Warning 
System only as a National Tsunami Warning Center – NTWC and not to include its 
role as Regional Tsunami Watch Provider - RTWP, then the practice, policy, facts, 
potential risk and other factors associated with the issues of why the warning not 
effective during the 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2010 event in the case study area and what 
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the criteria of effectiveness and/or ineffectiveness are recognized and structured based 
on national and local context. The five stages of process of structuring and 
restructuring the problem starting from recognizing, acquiring, mapping, reacquiring 
and improve mapping are summarized in detail by Figure 3.2. 
3.3  Case Study City 
3.3.1 Rationale for Selection  
To accomplish the rationale and objectives of this research study, Padang is selected 
as the case study city among those six national show case cities for tsunami 
preparedness (Figure 3.3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Location of Case Study City among National Show-Case City in the Map of Indonesian 
Seismicity 1973-2010 (Courtesy of BMKG 2007) 
 
They are Padang-West Sumatera, Denpasar-Bali, Cilegon-Banten, Banda Aceh, 
Bantul-Yogyakarta, Gorontalo and Manado in Sulawesi. These cities has been chosen 
to host the national end-to-end tsunami simulation (full scale tsunami drill for city 
level) as part of commemoration to national disaster 26 December 2004, i.e. Padang 
in 2005, Denpasar-Bali in 2006, Cilegon in 2007, and simultaneous four cities in 2008 
at Banda Aceh, Manado and Gorontalo and Bantul. However, Padang city is selected 
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because of fulfillment of further selection criteria, i.e. level of tsunami hazard/threat, 
susceptibility and countermeasures implemented either by their own local government 
and/or external stakeholders such as national and international community. Figure 3.3 
shows location of the Padang as case study city among the national show case cities in 
Indonesian seismicity map. 
3.3.2 Profile of the City of Padang and Susceptibility 
Profile of tsunami hazard of Padang City are presented in this section, followed by the 
discussion on the level of susceptibility including capacity, coping ability and the 
disaster risk reduction countermeasures intervention. 
a. Geographical Situation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Administrative Boundary of Padang City (Sources: BNPB 2012, photo: H. Latief, 2007) 
 
Padang City is the capital of West Sumatera Provinces and the fastest growth city at 
the west coast of Sumatera - outer west of Indonesian archipelago. The administrative 
area is about 694.96 Km
2
, where 21.51% of area (149.50 Km
2
) is below 25 m. Most 
of central business districts – CBDs and densely populated area are located in this low 
land area along the ocean coastline area. Administratively, it consists of 11 sub-
districts with 104 sub-sub-districts (village level), see Figure 3.4. 
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b. Socio-economic vulnerability 
Padang is a melting pot city, people from several different ethnic group background 
come from surrounding, i.e. Solok, Padang Pariaman, and Pesisir. The Padang people 
are known as religious people with high respect on the norm and custom value. The 
religious ethnic factor seems to be the strong capacity factors to anticipate and 
respond to disaster threat such as tsunami; however this could also be antithesis unless 
the public education and public awareness dissemination handled carefully.  
In disaster situation, different ethnic group may not respond similarly to disaster 
threat, warning or sign depending on its historical experience and the cultural traits.  
As studied by J.C. Gaillard et al. (2008) on the correlation between ethnicity and 
experience to tsunami and the disaster subculture, it shows that the ethnic of Simeuleu 
which had historical experience to tsunami and made the disaster issues into 
subculture were 99.99% saved. Others ethnic who had experiences but not taking 
disaster as subculture have made wrong decision, washed away by tsunami while 
collecting fishes at the beach. The biggest lost were found at the people living in the 
urban area such as Banda Aceh who has no experience and no disaster subculture. 
With several experiences to historical major and even mega tsunami in Padang and/or 
West Sumatera region see Tsunami catalog (H. Latief, 2005); a disaster subculture is 
expected to be there leading to a sound existence of public awareness and 
preparedness.  
However by looking at the behavior of Padang City people in responding the event of 
2005, 2007, 2009 and 2010 earthquakes, this thought becomes one of several major 
questions to this study. Although causing only minor tsunami at Padang City, it 
seemed there was no awareness and no preparedness have been implemented. Is there 
any correlation between experience and the prior belief (disaster subculture) and the 
reaction of the people? 
Other socio-economic vulnerabilities are represented by several classical demographic 
vulnerability factors such as, i.e. population density per sub-district, total number of 
children below 15 year old, elderly with age above 60 years old and women. Figure 
3.4 shows that the bigest portion of population is about 58% of school children 
between 6 to 19 year old. Other vulnerable group is about 8% of infant < 5 year, and 
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4% of elderly above 60 year. It is also shown that the population ratio of men and 
women is almost the same, i.e. 51% to 49%. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Demographic Profile of Padang City in year 2009 (Sources: BPS 2009) 
 
 
Padang City is also known as an education city, the leading in Sumatera Island. There 
are 425 unit elementary school with approximately 94,566 students; 74 Junior High 
School with 36,243 students; 46 Senior High School with 26,571 students; 48 
Vocational School with 17,327 students; and 46 universities with 3 state universities 
with total student body about 55,137.  
The school building strength in Padang have been tested during 2009 earthquake, 
after being hit by a series of major earthquake in almost every two year, i.e. 2005, 
2007 and 2009. Many school building were devastated and collapsed. Tragically most 
of these schools have been designated under the local regulation, i.e. Perda 2007, as 
the vertical evacuation center. This big population of students which correlates with 
number of school building which are not seismic and tsunami resistant may put the 
students especially school children more at risk if tsunami occurred during school 
hours to contrast with the case of 2011 Tohoku tsunami. 
By year 2009, the 3 highest population density of sub-districts exceeded 8,800 people 
per km
2
. They are Padang Timur, Padang Barat, and Padang Utara with density of 
10,860; 8,859; and 9,593 consecutively; in which central bussiness districts for 
Padang city located.  Meanwhile from the total population per subdistricts, the biggest 
population are in subdistrict Koto Tangah with 166,033 while  Kuranji with 123,771 
and Lubuk Begalung with 109,793. From the population growth rate, Sub-district of 
Koto Tangah, Lubuk Begalung, dan Kuranji located at the outskirt of city were 
sharply increased in this past decade, see Figure 3.5 below.  
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No Sub-District 
Population  Total 
Population  
Population 
Density per Km2 Men Women 
1 Bungus Teluk Kabung 12,237 12,180 24,417 242 
2 Lubuk Kilangan  22,138 22,414 44,552 518 
3 Lubuk Begalung 55,869 53,924 109,793 3,552 
4 Padang Selatan 31,775 32,683 64,458 6,427 
5 Padang Timur 43,208 45,302 88,510 10,860 
6 Padang Barat 31,425 30,585 62,010 8,859 
7 Padang Utara 33,265 44,244 77,509 9,593 
8 Nanggalo 29,272 30,579 59,851 7,416 
9 Kuranji 60,559 63,212 123,771 2,156 
10 Pauh 27,815 27,031 54,846 375 
11 Koto Tangah 84,952 81,081 166,033 715 
Total  432,517 443,235 875,751 1,260 
 
Table 3.1 Population by Sub-districts for Gender and Population Density (Source: BPS, 2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Number of Population by Sub-District of Padang City in 1999, 2005 and 2009 (Source: BPS, 
2009)   
 
3. Critical Facilities 
In health services, there are health facilities consisting of 26 hospitals, 77 health 
center, 69 clinic, 159 pharmacies, 104 drug-stores, and 12 health laboratories (BPS, 
2009) In term of economic facilities, there are 26 bank, i.e. 13 public bank and 13 
private bank, 3 main markets with 71,374 m
2
 area and 44,298 building coverage, 8 
Supporting markets and 7 local markets. 
Due to such tsunami hazard and susceptibility factors, previous study (H.P. Rahayu 
and H. Latief, 2007) on assessing the time needed for evacuation in Padang City, 
described in next section of Padang Risk Profile, shows that about 30% of city were 
exposed to tsunami risk. The wide area of high tsunami risk zone and several natural 
obstacles for evacuation, such as rivers, has urged the Mayor of Padang issues a 
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mandate for all multistory public building designated as vertical tsunami shelters, no 
exclusion for schools, government office, hotels and many others. However, during 
the September 30, 2009 many of them were collapsed due to the strong shaking. Some 
examples of the critical facilities damages photo taken during reconnaissance survey 
are shown in Figure 3.6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Critical Facilities Damages due to September 30, 2009 tsunamigenic earthquake  
(Source: H.P. Rahayu Photo 2009) 
 
3.3.3 Tsunami Hazard Profile of Padang 
As it has been highlighted in Chapter 2 regarding the disaster trend, the location of 
Padang is highly exposed to the potential sources of tsunami hazard, which is located 
in front of tectonic sub-duction area of Java Trench. The map shown in Figure 3.7 
regarding the major and mega seismic activities since 1861 till 2002 states that a 
major or mega tsunamigenic earthquake is expected in the near future, bigger than the 
2009 or 2010 events.  The table in Figure 3.5 describes the History of Tsunami Event 
in West Coast of Sumatera. 
Several different tsunami hazard maps of Padang prepared by some national and 
international scientific communities, since Padang scientifically known as the highest 
tsunami risk in the world (National Geographic, 2005) with high potential of tsunami 
Hospital Hotel 
Government office School 
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occurrence in the near future. The maps consisted of inundation map with uniform 
roughness of land-use (soil, mangroves, street networks and infrastructures), 
inundation map with spatially distributed roughness, and inundation map that 
integrate real conditions (buildings, houses). The map recommended by the Mayor’s 
Regulation (Perwako) to be used for the revision of City Spatial Planning document 
(RTRW) and disaster risk reduction master plan – DRRMP can be seen in Figure 3.8.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7 Potential Tsunami Sources (Sources: D.H. Natawijaya, 2005 and H. Latief, 2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8 Example of Official Tsunami Inundation Map 
 
Aside from this controversial debate about the tsunami hazard map, for recognizing 
the tsunami risk profile of Padang City this study used the tsunami hazard map 
produced by H. Latief (2008) and Tsunami Hazard Index for all municipality in 
Indonesia issued by Ristek 2009 (I.W. Sengara and H. Latief, 2009). The index is 
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based on the criteria of tsunami height for each tsunami prone cities in Indonesia. 
Table 3.2 shows that the Padang city has very high tsunami risk level as well as very 
high seismic risk level among the 6 national show case cities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2 Tsunami Hazard Index of National Show Case Cities (sources: H. Latief et al 2009) 
 
3.3 Data Acquisition 
A comprehensive data acquired from Padang City was in the forms of primary data 
collected based on TKBLM methodology and secondary data needed to form the 
PBLM. Detailed methodology for both knowledge acquisition and types knowledge 
data obtained are described in Figure 3.9. 
3.3.1 Primary Data Acquisition: 
An in-depth primary data with wide range of data set are acquired from the target 
groups, i.e. government officials and people, from the case study city. Primary data 
acquisition in this study called as TKBLM data acquisition aims for recognizing all 
factors that hinder and/or supporting the people’s mind toward tsunami warning and 
toward natural events of tsunamigenic earthquake. There are 3 stages of acquisition 
with expected to able to recognize and structure both issue of locality such as 
potential tsunami hazards and its collateral threat as well as its physical and social 
vulnerability, and the issue of generality such as susceptibility and capacity of human 
being to cope with disaster combined with their attitude and mindset as regulator, 
executor (government officials) or general public (people) in appreciating the needs 
to save their life as well other people from tsunami.  
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Figure 3.9 Data Acquisition for both TKBLM and PBLM 
 
a. First Stage of Data Acquisition: 
The first data acquisition aims for structuring the preliminary problem issues from the 
affected people and studying from the damage affected by 2009 event. During this 
stage, two types of data collecting conducted as part of reconnaissance survey were at 
October 9 – 14, 2009 (9 days after the September 30, 2009 event). The data 
acquisitions were: vulnerability assessment and free style preliminary interview. 
These two acquisition method were needed as the basis to preliminary structuring 
problem. 
Vulnerability assessment conducted by recognizing the damages using visual and 
checklist method. The target assessment were: first was at all critical facilities such as 
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schools, hospitals, government offices, malls, markets, hospitals and some other multi 
stories buildings designated as vertical evacuation shelters; second was any type of 
collapsed houses including shop-houses in the area of highly dense population as well 
as the high tsunami risk area identified during previous study. 
Preliminary interview was conducted on several target groups among the victim of the 
2009 event, i.e. general people, fisherman, businessman, and government officials on 
duty or off duty during the event. A free style interview was used for recognizing any 
factors that hinder or support the people’s mind or thoughts regarding the threat they 
faced during the shaking and hearing tsunami siren wailing, what they thought and did. 
The people interviewed were 6 general public (fisherman, waitress of the hotel, taxi 
driver, office boy, students, and faculty members of University of Andalas), 1 
businessman (hotel owner); while the 7 officials included the Mayor of Padang city, 
head of planning department, head of fire brigades, doctors and medical staff of 
hospital, staff of civil defense, head of disaster management office, and ordinary staff 
from city hall. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.10 The Preliminary Interview and Cognitive Map of Government Officials 
 
Based on these two data types, a preliminary cognitive map was structured. Initially 
there are three type of preliminary cognitive map structured based on clustering the 
interviewee, i.e. general people, business man, and government officials, 
consecutively shown by Figure 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12. 
First free-style interview was conducted with government official who did not 
evacuate, i.e. Mr. Ardiansyah Ridwan from Economic Department of City Assistant II. 
The interview was in dual languages English and Bahasa and recorded (WS118370, 
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2009a). The EQ event occurred when he was on the way home about 500 m from 
home and about 3 minutes to reach home in normal condition. People were panic on 
the street due to strong shaking, then he decided to go immediately home in Juniarso 
Street which is in the red zone (very high risk). He checked the neighbor house (shop 
houses Pharmacies at the first floor and lodging for student at the second house) 
collapsed. His 2 stories home was remained firmed.  He ran to the top floor checking 
the natural sign for tsunami, i.e. flock of the birds flying from the coastline to the 
mainland. Nothing can be seen. He calmed the family not to evacuate with the 
decision since there was no sign for tsunami, no point for evacuation since the panic 
flock of the crowd of evacuee rushing with cars and many others vehicles. He is afraid 
the family could be killed. The two story house was still remaining strong. In front 
and the back side of his house there were two middle schools with 3 stories were 
remain, i.e. SMP Muhammadiyah and SMP Swasta. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.11 The Preliminary Interview and Cognitive Map of Businessman 
 
Second free-style interview was conducted at Hotel Inna Muara (Bahasa) with Hotel 
Duty Manager and his guest (WS118382, 2009b). Hotel guest was a City Government 
Officer who just describing the damages on hotel business, he was not in Padang 
during EQ. Second person is Hotel Duty Manager in charge during EQ. Mains shock 
was felt around 5 pm (fact 5:17pm), the first main shock was after 6 pm (fact on 5:25), 
then 9 pm. No siren was heard (fact: true). Electricity, phone (fix and mobile except 
XL), water and radio were cut off. After main shock, he did not run for tsunami 
evacuation because. When he ran to top floor to check water at the beach for tsunami 
sign, nothing seems unusual, the wave was calm. When he checked the street in front 
of hotel, it was chaotic and overcrowded by people, cars and anything. Then he 
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decided not to evacuate the guest (government officials from other cities in Sumatera 
regions). The male guests were stayed up at the roof top. The female guest stayed in 
the lobby due to afraid of following aftershocks which were frequently occurred 
(about 20 times within first 6 hours). There are 2 pregnant ladies. 
The third free-style interview conducted with Fisherman Community in Padang on 
October 9-15, 2009 (WS118365, 2009c). Reasons of several fisherman reactions not 
to evacuate during the 2009 event were due to some reasons described as follows. 
Immediate after strong shaking he and his wife just checked the water at the coast 
behind their ‘tsunami resistant housing’ as part of DKP (ocean and fishery 
department) project. Then they decided to remain at their second floor house, the 
decision is based on several judgment that no sign of tsunami, i.e. the back drop of 
water and the closes hill is very far.  Moreover, the family has joined tsunami drill 
once in 2007. If the tsunami occurred they were sure no one will lead them, they have 
to lead themselves. Before the EQ there were strange phenomena such as sky was 
dark since morning 10 a.m. the water was bad, so the fishermen could not go to the 
sea. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.12 The Preliminary Interview and Cognitive Map of General Public (Fisherman) 
 
These three preliminary cognitive maps combined with tacit knowledge gained from 
previous experiences is used to draft the questionnaires. Such previous experiences 
included experiences in coordinating two national tsunami drills in Depasar-Bali 2006 
and Cilegon-Banten in 2007. There were 2 types of questionnaires as the target for 
this study, i.e. for general public (people) and government officials. The first target is 
for developing the People Model (4
th
 Layer Model), while the second target is for 
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developing the Government Model (3
rd
 Layer Model). Example of both 
questionnaires can be seen at the Appendix A. 
Output of this stage was two types of questionnaires for general public and 
government officials. The first batch questionnaires were semi-open questionnaires 
which can be seen in the Appendix A of this dissertation. 
b. Second Stage of Data Acquisition called as RP1 and RG 
Second data acquisition aims for obtaining in-depth and holistic data set from people 
and government after 2009 event using the two questionnaires developed at the first 
stage. This stage was conducted during the period of July 21 to August 21, 2010. 
There were 3 activities involved in this stage of data acquisitions, i.e. pre-test 
questionnaires based interview, refinement of questionnaires and full questionnaires 
based interview. 
Before implementation of these activities, the targeted interviewees were outlined: 
 First target was the government officials represented institutions/agencies related 
with disaster and/or disaster management and mitigation. They were: Emergency 
Operation Center, Disaster Management Office – DMO, Planning Department, 
Fire Brigade, Civil Defense, Social Department, Health Department, public works 
department, and community empowerment department and GONGO – 
Government Owned NGO. Number of targeted interview was 30 officials. 
 Second target was people at risk, i.e. people who live in tsunami prone cluster or 
neighborhood, which are divided further based on their gender and social status 
suh as working people, house wife, students. They are representing 14 targeted 
clusters. These clusters have identified as the moderate to very high tsunami risk 
in terms of chance for evacuation in normal condition without any obstacles on 
the route for evacuation, see Figure 3.9 with number of targeted interviewee was 
50 respondents for the pre-test interviewed and 300 respondents for in-depth full 
data acquisition stage 1. The respondent expected to represented different gender, 
wide range of ages, education, and socio-economic status shown by the houses 
and salary. 
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The pre-test interview conducted aims to test the questionnaire developed and to train 
the surveyor to be able to fishing out more information which have not identified 
during the preliminary mapping. Number of respondent targeted for this pre-test was 
50 interviewees representing 14 targeted clusters; however it turned out only 48 
respondents available to be interviewed. The duration taken for this stage was about 1 
hour per respondent at the beginning, later about 40 minutes per respondent.  
Improving cognitive map and questionnaire were conducted based on the result of 
pre-test. The questionnaire was still semi-open question style to recognize more 
indelible knowledge or information of people’s mind. The final type of questionnaire 
can be seen in the Appendix A of this dissertation. Improved cognitive is presented 
and discussed in Chapter 5. 
Final activity of this stage was the full in-depth questionnaire-based interview, with 
target respondent about 300 representing people the 14 clusters and 30 government 
officials from targeted institutions. From the people respondent, it was expected each 
cluster represented by minimum 20 respondent. The interview for 300 respondents 
has taken about 2 weeks by 6 surveyors. Result of the final activity of second data 
acquisition is 487 observable factors with 39 un-observable (latent) variables. These 
factors were then used to base the detailing of the development of TKBLM of People 
model. While from the government officials, there were 502 observable factors with 
39 un-observable (latent) variables. 
c. Third Stage of Data Acquisition called as RP2 
During the study at the field, there was major 12m Mentawai tsunami occurred 
October 25, 2010 in the region. Even though, it has only affected Padang City with 
minor tsunami and with advisory tsunami warning, this event was windows of 
opportunity to conduct direct effect on the people from the case study area. This event 
lead this study to conduct another batch of data acquisition called as third stage data 
acquisition. 
This third data stage of acquisition aims for obtaining in-depth and holistic data set 
from people from the most prone cluster from the observed area following the 2010 
Mentawai tsunami using the same questionnaires used to for the assessment at the 
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second stage. This stage was conducted during the period of November 7 to 
November 14, 2010. 
Before implementation of the activity, the targeted interviewees were general public 
from 2 out of 14 observed clusters, i.e. cluster no 8, 11, 12, and 13. The rationale is 
these areas were the most densely central business districts. There were about 61 
people interviewed in this stage.  
Location and stages of data acquisition for primary data can be summarized by Figure 
3.13 below. This shows the location of data acquisition for RP1, RP2 and RG; as well 
as the location of each people respondent of data acquisition taken after 2009 event - 
RP1, people respondent of data acquisition taken after 2010 event - RP 2, and 
government official respondent of data acquisition taken after 2009 event - RG. The 
348 data RP1 covered randomly respondent from all 14 clusters, while 61 data RP2 
covered randomly respondent from cluster no 8, 12, 13 and 14; with some respondent 
of RP1 being re-interviewed for RP2. The 30 data RG location are the same location 
of their own office address, since the interview taken at their office. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.13 Data Acquisition and Example of GPS based Location for Respondents - RP1, RP2 and 
RG 
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No Cluster RP1 RP2 RG 
1 E – Reasoning for Evacuation 184 183 48 
2 V – Vulnerability & Capacity 87 86 84 
3 H – Hazard Perception & Disaster Experience 29 29 30 
4 T – Tsunami Knowledge 9 9 25 
5 CM – Countermeasures of DRR 118 118 223 
6 TEWS – Tsunami Early Warning System 60 60 92 
 T O T A L 487 485 502 
 
Table 3.3 Number of variables acquired for each type of data set.  
 
From the three types of data acquired, there are 487 variables and factors for RP1 and 
485 for RP2, 2 variables different each in reasoning for evacuation and vulnerability. 
Meanwhile there are 502 variables and factors acquired for the RG. The composition 
of RG and RP is different especially in component reasoning for evacuation, 
knowledge on tsunami, countermeasures of disaster risk reduction and appreciation to 
tsunami early warning system. These numbers of variables obtained from each data 
cluster can be summarized in Table 3.3. Paralel with the survey in the same location 
in Padang city, during this stage, a semi freestyle interviewed was also conducted at 
the people of Mentawai Island. Based on the recorded interview, a cognitive map is 
drawn to have a better picture as comparison how the direct victim of major tsunami 
responded the phenomena and warning. Figure 3.14 present the logic model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.14Cognitive Map of Mentawai People after Tsunami (Fisherman) 
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3.3.2 Secondary Data Acquisition: 
Secondary data are required for recognizing and structuring the problem issues and 
drafting the questionnaire for obtaining primary data. These included technical data 
obtained from city planning department, meanwhile socio-economic and socio-culture 
data obtained from 2010 City Statistical Data. In addition to that, previous and 
preliminary works were conducted at the beginning of the research study, i.e. 
reconnaissance investigation on physical and socio economic damage in Padang 
affected by September 2009 earthquake, previous works to coordinate the two 
national tsunami drill in Denpasar Bali 2006 and in Cilegon Banten 2007 during the 
development stage of Ina-TEWS as well as some related works on disaster 
management and mitigation. These previous works and data obtained at the field were 
influenced the depth of tacit knowledge in structuring problem of the phenomena of 
effective early warning system. 
Important secondary data or information obtained from the survey were many tall 
building/houses designated and mandated by local regulation (Mayor decree) as the 
vertical evacuation shelter were heavily damaged during the earthquake. These 
designated shelters were located in densely populated area, in which average 
estimated time for evacuation (ETE) was less than sufficient time for evacuation 
which is travel time of expected tsunami approaching the area minus the needed for 
tsunami warning dissemination.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.15 Evacuation Zone and Estimated Time for Evacuation in Padang city (H. Latie et al 2007) 
 
 
Figure 3.15 shows result of previous work done for Padang City on the 14 cluster with 
average ETE with obstacle during day time is 44.43 minutes and without obstacle is 
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17.77 minutes; meanwhile expected tsunami travel time approaching the land is 22 
minutes from the warning issued (H. Latief and Rahayu et al 2007).  
After 2004 event, Padang City has been the focus of international and national 
scientific community with wide range of research/project interest to study and to 
implement many countermeasures for anticipating the big tsunami which expected to 
occur at any time in the near future, as also discussed in section 1 of this paper. 
However, the 2009 event has tested that Padang City with population of one million 
was not really ready to cope with the expected tsunami.  
3.5 Profile of respondents 
Results of the survey in Padang City show the demographic condition of the 
samplesRP1, RP 2 and RG, as described in Figure 3.16.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.16 Profiles of Respondent RP1, RP2 and RG -Padang City 
 
RP1 sample population was dominated by 62% female between 19-50 years old, with 
high school as majority education level; majority of sample was housewife, followed 
by working in the informal sectors, labor/part-time worker, and microbusiness. 
Meanwhile RP2 sample population was dominated by female between 19-50 years 
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old, with high-school and university as majority education background, majority 
working in informal sectors and housewife.  
While the government officials RG sample population was dominated by male about 
75% between 40-50 years old, with university as majority of education background. 
From the household vulnerability shown by Figure 3.12, the number of children 
below 15 years old at households is dominant in RP2 compare to RP1 population; 
while number of elderly above 60 years old at households is dominant at the RP2 
compare to RP1 population. The number of total inhabitant at both RP1 and RP2 are 
almost similar between 5 to 10 people. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.17Profiles of Household Vulnerability of RP1, RP2 and RG - Padang City 
 
In terms of housing vulnerability shown by Figure 3.17, both RP1 and RP2 population 
house were dominantly concrete structure single house with one story, length of stay 
around 11-20 years in RP1 population while in RP2 around 6-10 years; and the house 
mostly owned by themselves/family at both RP1 and RP2. 
Meanwhile, people appreciation to the performance of dissemination device for 
conveying the message of warning based on their experience during the strong 
shaking can be seen in the Figure 4 that according to Padang people that radio 
transistor (44%) was the most effective device for this matter, followed by the mosque 
speaker (31%) and tsunami siren (31%), other devices were very low due to severe 
damaged from the earthquake, i.e. mobile phone, fix phone, and TV. 
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Figure 3.18Profiles of Housing Vulnerability of RP1, RP2 and RG - Padang City 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.19 Appreciations toward Warning Dissemination Device 
 
Meanwhile, people appreciation to the performance of dissemination device for 
conveying the message of warning based on their experience during the strong 
shaking can be seen in the Figure 3.19.  According to Padang people that radio 
transistor (44) was still effective device for conveying the warning, followed by the 
mosque speaker (31) and tsunami siren (31). Many telecommunication devices were 
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not functioning due to electricity cut off; they were TV (227), SMS (216), mobile 
phone (207), and fix phone (148). During the 2009 event, only two from 5 mobile 
phones provider was still functioning. 
 
3.6  Development of Integrated Layer Model Proposed 
As discussed in Chapter 1 that to better recognize, represent and structure the problem 
and phenomena of effective tsunami early warning system, an integrated logic model 
of effective early warning system is developed by this study. The model consists of 4 
layer model and 1 floating model.  
The system architecture of the model developed can be seen in Figure 3.20.  It 
consists of 4 layer models which includes Natural Phenomena model, Structural part 
of Ina-TEWS model, Government model, and People model; with 1 floating model 
which is the preparedness index model. The rationale to have this system for 
describing the recognized problem issues and description of methodology are as 
follows: 
 Each layer model has its variables and factors which has strong correlation among 
them before it influences the outcome of enhancing the goal of tsunami early 
warning system, i.e. reduce damages on lives.  
 The correlation between layer is two way, i.e. top-down and bottom-up. The top-
down correlation is performed if there is any trigger from natural phenomena, 
down to second layer ‘structure model’ in the form of ‘information’ and down to 
third layer ‘government model’ and fourth layer ‘people model’ in the form of 
damages/destruction. The bottom-up correlation is performed during the 
development of each layer model as well as in the increasing the preparedness, 
capacity and responsive ability to tsunami warning; through implementing right 
policy based on the right and sound problem structuring as explained in section 
3.2 and 3.3 of this Chapter 3.   
 The floating model has its own correlation among its variables and factors, as well 
as correlation with any layer.  
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 The floating model is representing more on the physical and tangible phenomena; 
as well as the Natural Phenomena model. The Structure model is representing a 
techno-center phenomenon. Meanwhile government model and people model are 
each representing the cognitive mapping of the human beings as regulators and/or 
executors and as the human being who is the subject to be saved in the phenomena 
of tsunami early warning system. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.20 Integrated Logic Model of Effective Early Warning System 
3.7 Summary 
Result of data acquisition and structuring problem issues of the phenomena of tsunami 
early warning system in Indonesia are used to develop the detailing of logic model 
holistically. The complexity and the nature of phenomena of TEWS with its 
associated problem are structured in the form of Layer Models and Floating Model 
(i.e. four models in layer forms and 1 floating model) called as Integrated Logic 
Model. The four layer models are: Natural Phenomena Model, Structure Model, 
Government Model, and People Model. The first two layer model were structured 
using the PBLM, meanwhile the last two, i.e. people model and government model 
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were developed using the TKBLM approaches using data RP1 and RP2, then TG. The 
floating model consists of exhaustive relation of physical susceptibility factors and 
capacity factors which includes the resilient factors of the city. The floating model is 
presented in this dissertation in the next Chapter 4 together with Layer Model 1 and 2. 
Meanwhile layer Model 3 and 4 are presented consecutively in Chapter 5 and 6. 
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Chapter 4 
Floating Factor Model and Physically Based Logic Model 
 
4.1  Introduction 
This Chapter 4 consists of the description and discussion of the development of the first two 
major component of Integrated Tsunami Early Warning System. They are the Floating Factor 
Model and Physically Based Logic Model. The process development of Floating Factor 
Model as part of Integrated Logic Model of Effective Early Warning System is described and 
discussed first. It starts from the problem recognition of the tsunami early warning system 
through identification of functioning and malfunction indicators of the component of Ina-
TEWS, i.e. Structure and Culture components. It is then followed by the process development 
of Preparedness Index. These are followed by presenting the two Physically Based Logic 
Model, i.e. Natural Phenomena System and Structural System. These two PBLM as discussed 
in Chapter 1 are the first two layers as part of Integrated Logic Model. 
4.2  Problem recognition of the performance Tsunami Early Warning 
System  
As it has been mentioned in Chapter one that the crucial problem issues investigated under 
this study was the chaotic phenomena shown during September 30, 2009 event. Eventhough 
the devatstated tsunamigenic earthquake has damaged almost 60 % of public building in the 
City of Padang, i.e. government office including town hall, banks, hotels, malls, schools, 
university, houses and central business districts – CBDs; the tsunami only stricken Padang 
City was only 50 cm. However, the panic and chaotic condition was happened.  
Many controversial issues were emerged, some blamed on the tsunami early warning system 
has created this chaotic condition, some has thought the tsunami early warning was perfectly 
did the job, but the local government and people were not following its standard operating 
procedures for evacauation which has been endorsed by local regulation. However, many 
people just ignored the warning either from the nature such as strong shaking and from the 
siren wailing. These peole were just tired with so many warning before but the tsunami 
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occurred very low and not as dramatic as the one they saw in TV which affected Aceh and 
North Sumatera Province during 2004 Sumatera Indian Ocean tsunami. They preferred 
continued their business, eventhough around 30% of population was rushed for evacuation.  
This can be imagined how chaotic the condition was that moment, with insufficient 
infratdructure of route for evacuation to accommodate almost 200,000 people at the same 
seconds. As example some people were trapped in traffic jam for 2 hours for driving one 
segment of 1 km road length. People do not follow the order for evacuation, they just used 
cars, motorcycles and whatever they have to evacuate. With fire occurred everywhere just 
within minutes afters the earthquake, and many people were scared and ran for evacuation. 
Padang city that time was in ferno, however no significant tsunami occurred. Then 
controversial debates following the event were emerged between the stakholders either at 
national level, or at the local level and both.  
Looking at this situation, the study attempted to initially recognize the real problem issues by 
investigating the performance of all the factors of both Structure and Culture components, 
during that event. For the structure component, the knowledge and information were acquired 
more from national government, in this case was from NTWC – National Tsunami Warning 
Center of BMKG, National Agency for Disaster Management – BNPB, BPPT, Ristek, 
Bakosturtanal and some national NGOs. These institutions are basically incharge in the 
operational of Ina-TEWS as well as during the development and deployment.  
Meanwhile for the culture component, information and knowledge were obtained from the 
city local government and the people. The interviewed and secondary data collecting were 
obtained. The city stakeholder interviewed were the Mayor, some head of deaprtemtn in the 
city government, such as head of planning department, head of City Disaster Management 
Office with its EOC – emergency operation center that incharge to convey the warning 
received from NTWC, see also Chapter 2 of this dissertation regarding the current status of 
Ina-TEWS. 
The findings are divided into 3, namely indicators related with Structure component, indiators 
related with interface agencies, indicators related with culture components. All the 
assessments were based on the time line starting from the earthquake occurrence. 
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The Structure component consists of a matrix of tsunami detection devices with the activities 
of tsunami warning at the structure component in time line bases. The component of 
structural devices consists of seismometer, accelerometer, dart buoy and tide gauge. 
The interface agency component consists of institution mandated by the president to help Ina-
TEWS in conveying the warning. See also rational of the liability sharing at the chapter 1. 
The interface agency consists of BNPB, Army, Police, and National Radio (which included 
RRI, Elshinta, and Trijaya), Newspapers, ORARI/RAPI (citizen-band radio association), 
INGOs, NGOs and Scientist (University). Meanwhile, the culture components consist of 
Policy, Institutional and Organizational Arrangement, Capacity of Government Officials, 
Infrastructure for Tsunami Early Warning System at local level, community preparedness, 
and City Stakeholder; where each sub component consists of several factors. The 
international assistance emphasize only on rescue and relief. 
The detail problems recognized are presented in Table 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 below: 
 
Table 4.1 Functioning and Malfunctioning indicators of TEWS STRUCTURE Component 
Time 
N
o 
I. Ina-TEWS Factors – STRUCTURE COMPONENT 
Review during and after 
earthquake event 
Obser-
vation 
Processing 
Disseminatio
n 
Stakeholders 
Func
tioni
ng 
Situation Description 
 1 Seismic 
monitoring 
system: 
BMKG (10 
RC + 1 NC) 
with 160 
Seismic 
Sensors and 
500 
Acceleromet
ers  
 
If magnitude < 5.0 
RS : 
1. To archives for 
historical records 
    
5 min   If magnitude 5.0 - 7.5  
RS: 
1. To disseminate EQ 
info 
 
2. To archives for 
historical records 
 Information 
of significant 
earthquake 
occurrence 
 
 to target 
recipient  
 
 with target 
time of 5 
minute after 
EQ 
occurrence 
Target 
Recipients: 
1. BPBD/Satlak
of : 
 potential 
city/regency 
 potential 
province 
 
2. Interface 
agencies: 
 BNPB 
 Army  
 Police 
 Radios 
 TVs 
 Scientist 
 others 
Y 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Y 
 
 
 
 
 Main Shock  with 
Magnitude of 7.6 R.S. 
Location 0.84 S – 99.65 E, 
Depth – 71 km, Time  
17:16:09 WIB 
 
 The magnitude recorded 
were fluctuated from 7.5 to 
8.3 at the first 16 seismic 
sensors cannot wait for all 
160 then decided for the 
dissemination to the public 
with magnitude of 7.6 RS. 
 
 Received by public individu 
9 minute  delay  4 min 
(tolerable) 
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 2 Tsunami 
data base 
and tsunami 
scenarios 
 
If the magnitude > 
7.5  RS: 
1. To make situation 
assessment and 
decision based on: 
 Tsunamigenic 
criteria: EQ 
depth <60 km 
and located in 
tsunami source 
zone 
 Risk and 
vulnerability 
modeling, which 
is based on: 
Tsunami 
database, 
tsunami scenario 
 Geospatial data 
repository 
 
2. Classification of 
warning if 
estimated tsunami 
height: 
 major warning: > 
3m 
 warning: 0.5-3 m 
 advisory: <0.5 m 
 cancel or all 
clear 
 
3. To disseminate 
Warning I and II 
 
4. To archives for 
historical records 
 
 Warning I: 
Occurrence 
of EQ with 
potential  
tsunami 
 
 to target 
recipient 1 
and 2 
Target 
Recipients: 
1. BPBD/Satlak 
of: 
 potential 
city/regency 
 potential 
province 
 
2. Interface 
agencies: 
 BNPB 
 Army  
 Police 
 Radios 
 TVs 
 Scientist, 
others 
N External Matters: No Tsunami 
Warning 
 acceptable since there was 
only very small tsunami 
occurrence (30 cm) and 
very local tsunami in 
Pariaman City coast line 
 did not worsen the chaotic 
condition in Padang City 
 
Internal Matters: No Tsunami 
Warning 
 Fail to comply with SOP 
(draft) due to: 
a. COD first have known 
not to issue the tsunami 
warning since it was 
outside the criteria then 
check the second step by 
checking the tsunami 
database. 
b.  Intervention of higher 
ranking officer to 24/7 
COD due to very 
significant EQ magnitude 
close to highly populated 
area in West Sumatera  
c. Prolong debate with 
German expert due to 
differences of model 
results in estimating the 
tsunami height (German 
15 m and Indonesian 4 
m). 
 Fail to reach target time, the 
debate taken up to 22 min. 
Noted if there were tsunami 
it has reached the shoreline 
already. 
     Warning II: 
Occurrence 
of EQ with 
potential  
tsunami 
height at 
certain cities 
and/or 
regencies 
 
 to target 
recipient 1 
and 2 
Target 
Recipients: 
1. BPBD/Satlak 
of: 
 potential 
city/regency 
 potential 
province 
2. Interface 
agencies: 
 BNPB 
 Army  
 Police 
 Radios 
 TVs 
 Scientist, etc 
  
 3 Oceanograp
hic 
monitoring 
system:  
 Dart Buoy 
(BPPT) 
Changing of water 
column reported: 
 To BMKG NC  
to be used to 
confirm tsunami 
occurrence for 
decision of issuing 
Warning II  
 
 To Buoy Data 
Center (BPPT) 
 Warning II: 
Occurrence 
of EQ with 
potential  
tsunami 
height at 
certain cities 
and/or 
regencies 
 
 to target 
recipient 1 
and 2 
Target 
Recipients: 
1. BPBD/Satlak 
of: 
 potential 
city/regency 
 potential 
province 
 
2. Interface 
agencies: 
 BNPB 
 Army  
 Police 
 Radios 
 TVs 
 Scientist, etc 
Y/N The tsunami data has been 
sent to both BMKG NC and 
BPPT Buoy Data Center 
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   Tide 
Gauge & 
GPS 
(Bakosurt
anal) 
Tsunami wave arrival 
reported to BMKG 
NC: 
1. to assure for 
decision of issuing 
Warning III 
regarding tsunami 
wave reaching 
coastline 
 Warning III: 
Tsunami with 
certain height 
has stricken 
Certain 
Cities/Regenc
ies 
 
 to target 
recipient 1 
and 2 
Target 
Recipients: 
1. BPBD/Satlak 
of: 
 potential 
city/regency 
 potential 
province 
 
2. Interface 
agencies: 
 BNPB 
 Army  
 Police 
 Radios 
 TVs 
 Scientist, 
others 
 
NA No information related with 
Tide Gauge detecting data. 
   2. to assure for 
decision of issuing 
Warning IV 
regarding last wave 
reaching coastline 
(tsunami over) 
 Warning IV: 
Last  
Tsunami 
wave has 
stricken 
Cities and/or 
Regencies 
 
 to target 
recipient 1 
and 2 
Target 
Recipients: 
1. BPBD/Satlak 
of: 
 potential 
city/regency 
 potential 
province 
 
2. Interface 
agencies: 
 BNPB 
 Army  
 Police 
 Radios 
 TVs 
 Scientist, 
others 
 
NA No information related with 
Tide Gauge detecting data. 
 4 Earth 
Observation 
To support 
situational 
assessment  
Tsunami 
impacts on 
coastal area 
 
 
 Y It has been used to support 
damage assessment 
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Table 4.2 Functioning and Malfunctioning indicators of TEWS Interface Agencies 
T 
N
o 
II. Ina-TEWS Factors – INTERFACE AGENCIES 
Review during and after 
earthquake event 
  Factors 
Expected Role in 
Ina-TEWS 
Expected Role in first 
24 hours 
Stakeholders 
Functi
oning 
Remark 
 a BNPB  To convey the 
warning to  BPBD 
Province and 
BPBD 
cities/regencies 
through fax, and 
phone 
 
 To convey the 
warning and 
damage impacts to 
public through 
BNPB website 
 To conduct closely 
monitoring and 
situational assessment 
at the affected region 
 
 To mobilize Quick 
Response Team to 
conduct quick damage 
and need assessment 
 
 To conduct 
coordination at national 
level to anticipate if 
escalation of disaster 
situation reaching 
province and/or 
national level 
 BMKG 
 Operational 
members of 
national 
taskforce: army, 
police and 
national 
departments 
related to 
disaster 
 Media 
 NGOs 
 Experts  
Y  closely monitor 
escalation situation in 
Padang, Pariaman  and 
other area of West 
Sumatera Province 
after receiving 7.6 RS 
earthquake info from 
BMKG 
 
 Having report from 
airport of Padang 
functioning after 3 
hours inspection 
 
 coordination meeting 
with Vice President 
and national disaster 
response and 
management task 
force at 8 pm 
 
 mobilized national 
first responder to 
Padang from air force 
based airport Jakarta 
by 6 a.m., met and 
coordinated with 
Australian army 
rescue and first 
responder  team 
 
 first 24 hours has set 
up national command 
post at the Governor 
Office 
 
 b Army   To convey all 
warnings to  
province and 
cities/regencies 
using army 
communication 
devices and 
technology 
 
Due to capability and 
field skill personnel, they 
are expected : 
 As the very first 
responder to conduct 
search and rescue 
 
 As the very first 
responder to conduct 
quick damage and need 
assessment 
 BMKG 
 BNPB national 
task force for 
response 
 Satkorlak - 
Disaster 
Management 
Coordinating 
Unit for  
Province level 
Y  The first 2 hours 
national army has 
mobilized the first 
responder team and 
rescue team to Padang 
to do rescue and quick 
damage and need 
assessment using the 
military  aircrafts 
(Hercules, Choppers) 
 
 Regional army has 
been helping to handle 
the chaos evacuation 
situation at the first 2 
hours, which is 
supposed to be 
handled by Police 
 
  Army has rescued 
some victim from the 
building ruin starting 
from the first 2 hours 
 
 The first 24 hours, the 
naval ship has moved 
from Navy base in 
Jakarta to Padang 
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harbor to be function 
as floating hospital 
 
 c Police  To convey all 
warnings to  
province and 
cities/regencies 
using police 
communication 
devices and 
technology 
 
Due to capability and 
field skill personnel, they 
are expected : 
 To guard the 
evacuation process 
 
 To maintain the public 
security in disaster 
location 
 BMKG 
 BNPB  
 Satkorlak or 
BPBD at 
Province level 
 Satlak or BPBD 
at City level 
N  National Police has 
conveyed information 
of 7.6 RS earthquake 
from BMKG to 
Province and 
Cities/Regencies using 
its communication 
networks 
 
 Regional Police did 
not performed to guard 
the evacuation 
process, no personnel 
were shown at the first 
2 hours of chaotic 
evacuation and traffic 
jam 
 
 No information 
regarding the theft 
during the first 2 hours 
 
 d Media TV 
: Metro 
TV, 
ANTV, 
Indosiar 
and 
Global 
TV 
 To broadcast all 
warnings to nation 
wide 
 
 To help broadcasting 
the information of 
escalation situation in 
affected area 
 BMKG 
 BNPB  
 Satkorlak or 
BPBD at 
Province level 
 Satlak or BPBD 
at City level 
 Other sources 
Y/N  broadcast 7.6 RS 
earthquake 
information 
 
 direct broadcast the 
situational condition 
within few hours after 
earthquake, however 
some have 
exaggerated the real 
situation  
 
 documenting and 
broadcast later the 
situation of evacuation 
taken by people and 
the traffic jam, as well 
as some chaotic 
condition such the 
condition of lifelines 
and infrastructure 
 
 e National 
Radio : 
RRI, 
Elshinta, 
Trijaya 
 To broadcast all 
warnings to nation 
wide 
 
 To help broadcasting 
the information of 
escalation situation in 
affected area 
 BMKG 
 BNPB  
 Satkorlak or 
BPBD at 
Province level 
 Satlak or BPBD 
at City level 
 Other sources 
Y  broadcast 7.6 RS 
earthquake 
information 
 
 direct broadcast the 
situational condition 
within few hours after 
earthquake, however 
some have 
exaggerated the real 
situation  
 
 documenting and 
broadcast later the 
situation of evacuation 
taken by people and 
the traffic jam, as well 
as some chaotic 
condition such the 
condition of lifelines 
and infrastructure 
 
 e Newspape
rs 
 To disseminate 
event information 
and situations  
condition at 
available time 
NA  Any  sources Y  Some journalist has 
made a lot of 
documentation on 
situation of first 2 up 
to 6 hours. 
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 f ORARI/R
API – 
Citizen 
Band 
Radio 
Associatio
n 
 To convey all 
warnings to  any 
stakeholders of 
province and 
cities/regencies 
using radio UHV 
or radio satellite 
communication  
Due to capability and 
field skill personnel, they 
are expected : 
 To guard the 
evacuation process 
 
 To maintain the public 
security in disaster 
location 
 BMKG 
 BNPB  
 Satkorlak or 
BPBD at 
Province level 
 Satlak or BPBD 
at City level 
Y  This communication 
was really helpful 
since the electricity 
shut down, many 
mobile phone 
providers not 
functioning (only 2 
from 5 providers were 
available), fix phone 
line was functioning 
but jammed by all 
people 
communication. 
 
 g INGOs, 
NGOs and 
Scientist 
(Universit
y) 
 To help for 
response and relief 
stage  
 
 To help for 
planning for the 
next stage: rehab 
and reconstruction 
NA  BMKG 
 BNPB  
 Satkorlak, 
Satlak or BPBD 
Y  UNOCHA working 
closely with BNPB at 
Command Post in 
Governor House to 
coordinate 
international assistant 
during the rescue and 
relief. It has able to do 
some screening for the 
unnecessary 
international assistant, 
such as  international 
rescue team without 
any proper equipment 
and coming in the 
wrong time (too late). 
 
 Local government 
officials and university 
has help identified the 
safe hotel to be used 3 
days after the 
earthquake, due to 
many national and 
international assistant 
coming to Padang and 
there were not many 
hotel available. 
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Table 4.3 Functioning and Malfunctioning indicators of TEWS Culture Component 
 No III. Ina-TEWS Factors – CULTURE  COMPONENT 
  Factors 
Reference and 
Recommended DRR 
Countermeasures 
DRR 
Countermeasure 
implemented in 
Padang 
DRR 
Outcome in 
Padang 
Funct
ionin
g 
Remark 
 1 Policy, Institutional and Organizational Arrangement :   
 a DM related 
Local Regulation 
 Local Regulation for 
Disaster Management and 
for Tsunami Early 
Warning System 
 
 Legal Framework 
o MOHA: Permendagri 
No 33/2006 Pedoman 
Mitigasi Bencana 
o DM Law: UU 24/2007 
 Drafting local 
regulation for  
Disaster 
Management 
for Padang City  
 
 Drafting local 
regulation for  
Disaster 
Management 
for West 
Sumatera 
Province  
 local 
regulation for  
Disaster 
Management 
for Padang 
City (Perda 
Kota Padang 
no. 3 tahun 
2008 
Penanggulan
gan Bencana) 
 
 local 
regulation for  
Disaster 
Management 
for West 
Sumatera 
Province 
(Perda 
Provinsi no 5 
tahun 2007) 
N  Need amendment 
for strengthening to 
be seismic resistant 
for all multi story 
public building 
designated for 
vertical evacuation 
shelter, since many 
of them were 
collapsed 
 
 Need enforcement  
 
At national level: 
RAN was endorsed 
by UN Resolution - 
Hyogo Framework 
of Action 2005-2015 
 
 b Existence of 
disaster 
management 
agency for local 
level : BPBD or 
Satlak PB 
 Existence of Satlak PB 
(current format of 
disaster management 
coordinating units for 
local level) 
 
 New form of BPBD were 
based on Legal 
Framework 
 MOHA: Permendagri 
No 33/2006 Pedoman 
Mitigasi Bencana 
 NDMO: Perka No 
3/2008 tentang BPBD 
 Govt Reg:  
 PP21/2008– 
Penyelenggaraan 
 PP22/2008 
Pendanaan 
 PP23/2008 Peran 
serta 
 DM Law: UU 24/2007 
 
 Establishment 
BPBD – a new 
format of 
disaster 
management 
agency for 
local level 
 BPBD of 
Padang City 
established at 
the beginning 
of 2009 
N  Not fully 
functioning at the 
critical stage of 
response first 24 
hours. 
 
 This is a very new 
format of DMO, 
which follows 
MOHA decree to 
implement 
Government 
regulation on 
establishment of 
new form of DMO 
(PP  
 c Establishment of 
Crisis center 
 SOP for operation and 
maintenance crisis center: 
 As a hub of receiving 
warning from BMKG 
 report to Mayor 
 As a hub for calling for 
coordination to back up 
Mayor 
 As Data Center 
 Previous form 
of crisis center, 
i.e. City Fire 
Department, 
has been 
equipped with 
the 
recommended 
all 3 functions; 
since Padang 
city is one of 6 
pilot model city 
for TEWS. 
 
 The new form 
 The new 
crisis center 
under BPBD 
Padang City 
is as division 
function as 
Data Center 
and 
Command 
Post 
N  Not functioning at 
the first critical 6 
hours, since the 
24/7 COD does not 
have sufficient 
responsive skills. 
Until the Mayor 
mobilized the crisis 
center to his 
residence. 
 
 This has replaced 
the old crisis center 
which previously 
belong under Fire 
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of crisis center 
only have the 
3rd function, 
since by design 
of the law, it is 
function as 
Information 
Data Center 
called Pusdatin. 
 
Department, now 
independence as 
sub-ordinate of 
BPBD 
 d Contingency 
Plan 
Integrate capacity of 
jurisdictional institution to 
response tsunami early 
warning, conduct 
emergency response and 
able to manage the evacuee 
 
Minimum requirements: 
1. SOP for Tsunami Early 
Warning System 
2. SOP for Emergency 
response 
3. SOP for camp 
management 
4. SOP for logistic 
Distribution 
 Contingency 
plan started to 
be drafted 
during the 
preparation of 
tsunami drill. 
 
 In the 
following 
years, many 
INGOs tried to 
make some 
version of 
contingency 
plan, this have 
enriched the 
capacity of 
officials. 
 
 SOP for 
Tsunami 
Early 
Warning 
System 
 
 SOP for 
Emergency 
response 
 
 SOP for 
logistic 
Distribution 
Y/N  Fire department the 
only institution 
which tried their 
best to comply with 
the SOP 2 at the 
first 6 hours for 
emergency response 
 
 Others did not 
performed 
 e Local Action 
Plan  
 MOHA: Permendagri No 
33/2006 Pedoman 
Mitigasi Bencana 
 National Action Plan 
(RAN) 
 DM Law 24/2007 
 
 Devloped local 
action plan 
(RAD) as a 
follow up of 
National 
Action Plan 
(RAN) 
 
 Local Action 
Plan (RAD) 
NA  
 f Risk Assessment  MOHA: Permendagri No 
33/2006 Pedoman 
Mitigasi Bencana 
 DM Law 
 As endorsed in 10 task of 
local government  
 
 Done in 2007 
as part of 
DRRMP 
Development  
 City Disaster 
Mitigation 
Plan  
NA  
 g Revised Spatial 
Plan to 
accommodate 
DRR 
countermeasures 
& Revised mid 
and long term 
development 
plan to 
accommodate 
DRR 
countermeasures 
 MOHA: Permendagri No 
33/2006 Pedoman 
Mitigasi Bencana 
 DM Law 24/2007 
 Spatial Plan Law 26/2007 
 As endorsed in 10 task of 
local government 
 Done in 2007 
as part of 
DRRMP 
Development  
 
 Under 
development of 
RPJM Padang 
City 
 RPJM 
Padang City 
(Midterm 
Development 
Planning) 
N  Not affected yet, 
the traffic 
congestion during 
evacuation were 
due to insufficient 
capacity of 
infrastructure. 
 
 The additional 
inland route are 
planned to be 
constructed in the 
next year budget of 
Public Department 
of Padang City. 
There are 9 road 
widening and 
lengthening 
program for main 
route toward inland. 
 
 i Integrate DRR 
countermeasures 
into education 
curriculum 
 MOHA: Permendagri No 
33/2006 Pedoman 
Mitigasi Bencana 
 DM Law 24/2007 
 Spatial Plan Law 26/2007 
 As endorsed in 10 task of 
local government 
 Many DRR 
education done 
by many GO, 
NGO or 
GONGO, 
University etc. 
 EQ tsunami 
drill endorsed 
by Mayor as 
school 
activity every 
2nd week at 
school  
Y/N 
 
 School children at 
home can save their 
life  
 
 40 school children 
taking private 
tutorial class (extra 
class) in the private 
buildings were 
95 
killed due to the 
collapsed of 
buildings and no 
safety counter 
measures since it 
only had 1 small 
exit doors. 
 
 2 Capacity of Government Officials   
 a Readiness of 24/7 
COD in Crisis 
Center 
 Skill personnel for 24/7 
COD to operate the 
communication device 
for TEWS 
 
 Responsive personnel 
to perform as SOPs of 
Crisis Center 
 Training for 
increasing 
knowledge 
and skill 
 TTS 
 Tsunami Drill 
 The wrong 
man and the 
wrong time 
and the wrong 
place due to 
establishment 
of new crisis 
center  
N  Trained and skill 
personnel were Fire 
Department 
personnel 
 
 Personnel of new 
Crisis Center have 
not been trained. 
Therefore they were 
not performed 
during the 
earthquake events.  
 
 Not functioning at 
the first critical 6 
hours, since the 
24/7 COD does not 
have sufficient 
responsive skills. 
Until the Mayor 
mobilized the crisis 
center to his 
residence. 
 
 This has replaced 
the old crisis center 
which previously 
belong under Fire 
Department, now 
independence as 
sub-ordinate of 
BPBD 
 
 b Readiness of 
officials of DM 
related agencies 
 Skill and responsive 
government officials to 
perform as SOPs of 
Disaster Management 
 Training for 
increasing 
skill 
 TTS 
 Tsunami Drill 
 Trained 
government 
officials  
Y/N  Fire department the 
only institution 
which tried their 
best to comply with 
the SOP 2 at the 
first 6 hours for 
emergency response 
 
 Others did not 
performed 
 
 
 
3 Infrastructure for Tsunami Early Warning System at local level   
 a Infra needed for 
Crisis Center 
Minimum standard of 
multi mode 
communication devices: 
 2 Fax number (in and 
out) 
 Fix Phone 
 Mobile Phone 
 Radio UHV 
 Internet 
 Ranet (Radio Internet) 
 Back-up power 
 
 
 Developed the 
crisis center 
infrastructure 
to meet the 
standard from 
national 
guidelines  
 New fully 
equipped crisis 
center  
N  Not functioning at 
the first critical 6 
hours, since the 
24/7 COD does not 
have sufficient 
responsive skills. 
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 b Facilities for 
disseminating order 
for evacuation 
 Radio station 
 Siren (smart and/or 
dumb) 
 Back up power 
 Indigenous devices: 
mosque speaker, 
kentongan (bamboo) 
 SOP for Siren 
maintenance 
 Optimizing 
the existence 
of regional 
radio station in 
Padang city, 
i.e. RRI 
 Deployed 
some smart 
sirens by 
national 
government 
 Deployed 
some dumb 
sirens by local 
government 
own funds 
  Optimize the 
function of 
indigenous 
devices such 
as mosque 
speaker, by 
distributing 
back up power 
to anticipate 
power cut off 
condition 
 SOP of sirens 
maintenance 
 
 RRI 
 Smart sirens  
 dumb sirens  
 mosque 
speaker 
Y/N  At the first critical 1 
hours, only RRI 
radio station and 
mosque speaker 
using back up 
power generator 
were functioning 
 
 Other device such 
as both sirens did 
not function due to 
electricity cut off 
and no back-up 
power available. 
 c Facilities for 
Evacuation 
 Evacuation Map 
 Evacuation route 
 Ristek Guide lines for: 
 evacuation route 
 evacuation map  
 evacuation sign 
boards 
 Developed 
and deployed 
during 
preparation of 
national 
tsunami drill  
 
 Evacuation 
Map 
 Evacuation 
route 
N  The evacuation 
maps though have 
been displayed in 
big screen size was 
effective. 
 
 No sign board for 
evacuation 
 
 People were 
disoriented, ran to 
the wrong direction 
due to traffic jam.  
 
 Evacuation route 
capacity was not 
able to 
accommodate the 
not orderly manner 
number of evacuee. 
This has been 
anticipated by many 
studies presented to 
the government. 
 
 d Escape buildings     Law 
enforcement 
of using multi 
story public 
building ad 
escape 
building 
N  Most designated 
building were 
collapsed during the 
earthquake 
 
 Need building 
review regulation 
and law 
enforcement 
 
 e Hospitals     N  Most designated 
building were 
collapsed during the 
earthquake 
 
 Need building 
review regulation 
and law 
enforcement 
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 4 Community Preparedness   
 a Community capacity   Awareness and 
preparedness of 
community are very 
high, since: 
 many 
intervention 
conducted at the 
after Aceh 
Tsunami 
 having direct 
experience of 
strong  
earthquake and 
potential tsunami 
in April 2005, 12 
September 2007 
and 16 August 
2009 
 
 Response to current 
earthquake : 
 City people 
trapped in traffic 
jam for 
evacuation, then 
ran to wrong 
direction 
 Rural people 
easily went to 
higher ground 
without any 
obstacle and 
without waiting 
for warning from 
government 
 
 
 
 
 
   Disaster experience Y 
   Availability of DRR info Y 
   Participation on DRR activity/training Y 
   Disaster risk perception on:   
    natural hazards Good 
    environment vulnerability 
Mode
rate 
    vulnerability of escape building and emergency facilities Bad 
   Disaster risk attitude toward disaster  Good 
 b Community commitment for disaster preparedness Good 
 c Community emergency response plan Done 
   emergency response plan Good 
   evacuation plan Good 
   search and rescue Mode
rate 
   first aid Good 
   public kitchen Good 
   camp management Good 
   survival kits/packages Good 
 d Community commitment for regular EQ and tsunami drill Good 
 e Having local champion or leader for DM Good 
 f Building partnership with government in DM Good 
 g Building partnership with private sectors in DM Good 
 
h Building partnership with I/NGOs, CBOs, GONGOs in DM Good 
 4 Vulnerability & Swift Recovery   
 a Population  to be recognize 
trhough rimary data 
acquisition during the 
logic model 
developmentn 
   number of children  
   number of elderly  
   number of working age  
 b Housing:  
   density  
   multi-story  
   seismic resistant structure  
 b Lifelines & utilities swift recovery  
   electricity   
   Water supply  
   Telecommunication  
 c Infrastructure  
   Airport  
   Harbor/Port  
   Road  
   Bridge  
 d Schools  
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 e Culture  
 5 City Stakeholder   
 a Private sectors  to be recognize 
trhough rimary data 
acquisition during the 
logic model 
development 
 
 b Industry  
 
Table 4.4 Functioning and Malfunctioning indicators of International Assistestance 
 IV INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE  
  
  Factors 
Recommended DRR 
Countermeasures 
DRR 
Countermeasur
e implemented 
in Padang 
DRR 
Outcome in 
Padang 
Functio
ning 
Remark 
 1 Rescue   Govt Reg:  
 PP21/2008– 
Penyelenggaraan 
 PP22/2008 
Pendanaan 
 PP23/2008 Peran 
serta 
 
 DM Law: UU 24/2007 
 
  Y  Create burden to 
local government, if 
it come with the 
wrong personnel and 
wrong time. 
 SEARAC 
 2 Relief  Govt Reg:  
 PP21/2008– 
Penyelenggaraan 
 PP23/2008 Peran 
serta 
 
 DM Law: UU 24/2007 
 
  Y 
 
4.3 Tsunami Preparedness Index – Floating Model  
There were several assessment indicators existed to be used to evaluate tsunami prone area in 
Indonesia. Prior the tsunami 2004, there was no existence of such assessment indicator for 
tsunami that can used to measure the level of tsunami threat. The assessment was mostly 
relying on the historical records and geodynamic position of the region in Indonesia. During 
the period of 2004 - 2009, the measurement of the level tsunami threat was relying on the 
Global Tsunami Hazard Map, which was based only the expected tsunami height which may 
occur in the certain tsunami prone region. This measurement tool was not sufficient to 
identify the level of tsunami risk of the coastal region in Indonesia. By the year 2009, a 
Global Tsunami Risk Index was developed by Ristek to assess global tsunami risk of 
cities/regencies of tsunami prone regions. However for having the effective tsunami early 
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warning system, a more detail indicators are needed to measure the level of tsunami 
preparedness of those tsunami prone cities/regencies is needed prior to the intervention of 
DRR countermeasures. 
To answer the research challenges due to the increase of the number of tsunami risk cities 
among high populated cities described in Chapter 1 and 2, this study assumes that there is 
need to restructure the existing tsunami risk index to be able to be used as tsunami 
preparedness index. The issues related with the needs for assessment indicator for high 
populated cities from tsunami prone area is decribed also in Figure 4.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Issues Related with the Needs for Assessment Indicators for Populated 
Cities from Tsunami Prone Area 
 
In this section, the development of Tsunami Preparedness Index is described in sub-section 
4.3.2 followinng the brief description of tsunami risk index developed by Ristek (2009) 
described in sub-section 4.3.1. 
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4.3.1 Tsunami Risk Index for Cities in Indonesia 
Tsunami Risk Index for Indonesian cities developed by Ristek (2010) is basically the 
attempts to make a tsunami risk zonation for coastal cities from tsunami prone area in 
Indonesia. Prior to this effort, people only assumes the tsunami risk prone area based on the 
location of the coastline in subduction area combined with tsunami catalog in Indonesia; 
except scientific research have done with more indepth with many parameter of tsunami in 
indentiying the tsunami risk.  
Tsunami risk seen from classical principal of disaster risk approach can be viewed as a 
function of hazard and vulnerability. Several parameters of tsunami hazard can be used to 
identify the level of hazard its self depending of the purpose of the assessment. The level of 
hazard may be represented by one or several of these: tsunami height, tsunami inundation, 
tsunami run-up, tsunami propagation at land, and tsunami arrival time. There is wide range of 
vulnerability from the preliminary up to advance one. 
For the tsunami risk index discussed in previous paragraph, level of hazard is represented by 
tsunami height which was obtained from precalculated tsunami database developed for Ina-
TEWS as shown in by Figure 4.2 (H. Latief and Harris, 2009).  
In this figure, the level of hazard categorized into 4: Low, Moderate, High dan Very High, by 
adapting Tsunami Intensity Scale into the tsunami height resulted from the precalculated 
tsunami data-base.  Low is for the area having expected tsunami height less than 1 m, 
Moderate for expected tsunami height of 1-2 m, High for expected tsunami height of 4-8m, 
and Very High for expected tsunami height greated than 8 m (Latief, Haris dan Natawidjaja, 
2009).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 4.2 Tsunami Hazard Level of 
Indonesian Coastline 
Figure 4.3 Tsunami Risk Levels of Indonesian 
Coastline Cities 
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Based on this level of tsunami hazard, it is further identified the level of tsunami risk using 
the formula of Tsunami Risk Index: TDRI = 0.4H + 0.25E + 0.2V + 0.05EC + 0.1R 
H is Hazard, a function of Tsunami and its Collateral Hazard, where tsunami hazard 
consisting of Tsunami Height and Tsunami Travel Time indicators and collateral hazards 
including population density, Floating Materials, Ratio doctor to population, and Number of 
School Building. 
E is Exposure which is a function of Physical Infrastructure exposure consisting of Total 
Population, Ratio GRDP (service and industry sector) to total, and number of households and 
Total Road Length (Km) of City/Regency indicators; Total Road Length (Km) of 
City/Regency; Population exposure consisting of total population; Economy exposure 
consisting of PDRB per capita of city / regency; and Topography which is less than 20 m 
V is Vulnerability which is a function of Physical Infrastructure vulnerability, Population 
vulnerability and Economic vulnerability. The Physical Infrastructure vulnerability consists 
of Tsunami indicator, City wealth indicator, Population density, and District/city 
development rate. The Population vulnerability includes % Population of vulnerable group of 
children and elderly, Education, People Access for communication, Age Life Expectancy, 
and Number of Disable; while Economic vulnerability consist of % Poverty Population and 
Dependency Ratio. 
EC is for External context which is location of the district. R is Capacity for Response and 
Recovery which is a function of Planning, TEWS, Resources, Mobility & Access, and 
Service Facility which includes Number of health facility, Ratio doctor to population and 
Number of School Building. 
All of these indicators described are based on the census indicators which used in census 
statistic conducted in every 5 years. The numbers represented in this index is very generic 
and global.  
Result of risk classification shows that about 146 coastal cities are prone to tsunami risk, 
ranging from moderate to very high risk. Here level of tsunami risk only counting on the 
tsunami height, see also Figure 4.3. Almost 30% of the Indonesian cities are prone to tsunami, 
see Figure 4.4, where about 24% with very high risk level, 40% with high risk level, 25% 
with moderate risk level and 12% with low risk level. 
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4.3.2 Tsunami Preparedness Index for City 
Looking at Figure 4.3 where the city of Padang is categorized as very high risk; however the 
index is not sufficient to be used to assess the level of risk prior to the implementation of 
disaster reduction countermeasures especially to tsunami.  
Based on the assessment of function and malfunction indicator developed by this study and 
described in Section 4.2, there is need to assess more in-depth but still generic compare to the 
level of that riskdicussed in Suc-section 4.3.1 above. The generic preparedness index is very 
useful prior to the implementation of tsunami disaster risk reduction countermeasure to 
increase the readiness of the city to response the warning and to evacuate, as to the goal of 
effective tsunami warning system where the accurate warning which is timely disseminated 
leaving with sufficient lead time for peole (including the government officials) to response by 
taking right judgment using the right belief or perception toward the risk and warning. 
In overall there is parameter to be included as primary information. In this study Tsunami 
Risk Index is seen from the preparedness level of the city, thus defined as Tsunami 
Preparedness Index which consists of basic preparedness parameter should have by the city. 
There is significant difference between index and indicators. Index is a composite 
representation of variable factors (indicators) that show level of disaster risk toward tsunami 
from one city at a specified time. It is used to measure the conditions and changes over time 
of a city and to benchmark a city over the other for a specific range of time. Meanwhile 
Indicators is variable factors that will significantly contribute to the risk of city toward 
tsunami.   
Figure 4.4 29.4% of Indonesian cities – 
prone to tsunami risk 
Figure 4.5 Level of tsunami risk of 
Indonesian coastal cities/regencies 
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For the needs for having Preapredness index, the restructuring assessment indicators can be 
described by expanding the tsunami risk index with 6 other paremetes. They are Policy, 
Institutional and Organizational Arrangement, Community Preparedness, Capacity of 
Government Officials, Vulnerability & Swift Recovery, City Stakeholder and Existence of 
International Assistant. Detail of these indicators can be seen in Figure 4.6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Restructure Assessment Indicators for Preparedness Index 
 
All of these indicators for assessing the preparedness level of a city/regency could be 
obtained prior to the implementation of the DRR countermeasures as well as in the interval 
time for the monitoring and evaluation the effectiveness of tsunami warning system 
especially at the culture component. 
For initial stage of floating factors (model), the Tsunami Preparedness was developed based 
on basic vulnerability and capacity information discussed in the section 4.3 above, however 
for the future works to elaborate the preparedness index from global to more specific is 
necessary as shown in below: 
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Figure 4.7 Formulations for Preparedness Index 
 
This Preparedness Index graphically can be represented as the floating model shown in 
Figure 4.8. The relationship among the variables represented by nodes is developed based on 
the physically based logic model. It means the information gathered from the physical 
condition not from the people cognitive information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8 Preparedness Index as the Floating Model 
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4.4 System 1: Natural Phenomena – PBLM 
The first floating model of integrated logic model developed by this study is natural 
phenomena model, which is constructed based on the problem structuring on the series of 
tsunami events occurred in Indonesia with different magnitude and impacts on the human 
being and built environment. The development of this model is also gain from the tacit 
knowledge improved during the development of tsunami disaster scenario for the preparation 
of implementing DRR countermeasures for national tsunami drill in Bali 2006 and Cilegon 
Banten 2007, as the best examples of the two different cities. The first Denpasar Bali is a 
tourist business city, while the second Cilegon Banten is a heavily industrial city. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9 Physically based logic model of layer 1 – Natural Phenomena 
 
However, under this study the model of natural phenomena is developed based on the 
physically based logic model, meaning the correlation among the variable was developed 
based on the secondary information of the city and tacit knowledge gain during the above 
activities described in above paragraph.  
Graphical representation of this model shown by Figure 4.9 consists of relationship among 
the primary hazard of the tsunami and its collateral hazard which affected the variables of 
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built environment. The primary hazard of tsunami consists of tsunamigenic earthquake as the 
main trigger and followed by tsunami variables which include: tsunami height, tsunami travel 
time, tsunami inundation. Among these tsunami variables only 3 variables shown in red 
nodes, which means as the most influential variables as primary hazards, which affect other 
collateral hazard variables and physical variables. While the physical variables consists of 
floating materials, contamination, fire, explosion, which are expected to be occurred in the 
industrial area of the city of Padang or Cilegon. Lesson learned from Tohoku tsunami where 
affected with these phenomena in the Ibaraki prefecture, Sendai City, Rikuzentakata and 
some other fishing port towns. 
The correlation of these variables (nodes) provides two informations to the next layer models, 
i.e. TEWS Structure Component – layer model and 2 as well as the next layer model 3 
(Government Model) and/or layer model 4 (People Model). The first information is the 
natural warning information in the form of shaking, chanign water column and other 
characteristic which can be detected by tsunami early warning system devices. The second 
information is the physical damage that can be estimated throught the intensity felt. The 
physical damage information due to earthquake can be used by the next layer model as the 
input for the expected damage of tsunami might occurs. 
Figure 4.9 also shows the relationship between the floating models to this Model of Natural 
Phenomena. 
4.5 System 2: Structure Component of Ina TEWS – PBLM 
In this second layer model called as the Model of TEWS Structure Component, the 
development is based on the physically based logic model approach. All the relation among 
the variables of structure component were structured based on the flow or mechanism of the 
structure component, which basically can be divided into monitoring and detecting the 
seismic, the changing of warter column, the evaluating for the potential tsunami based on the 
information directly observed, or information from the data base, or information obtained 
from the natural phenomena such report on intensity etc. See also Figure 4.10. 
Ouput of this layer model is tsunami warning, as explained in Chapter 2 for progress 
performace of Structure Component able to disseminate the tsunami warning within less than 
5 minutes. The information basically consists of information ralted with estimated tsunami 
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heigh, tshunami travel time, tsunami affected area and tsunami cancellation. However, the 
most important is that the output of this warning information should be understood and 
responded by the the third layer government model and fourth layer people model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.10 Physically based logic model of layer 2 – Structure Component 
4.6 Summary 
About 30% of coastal cities in Indonesia are exposed to tsunami risk, from low to very high, 
where Padang City the case study city is exposed to very high tsunami risk interm of 
expected tsunami height and tsunami arrival time. 
From the List if functioning and malfunction indicators, it is found by this study that most of 
the malfunction indicators were at the Culture component of Ina-TEWS. The structure 
component was perfectly functioning. These trigger the need for developing the Tsunami 
Preparedness Index by this study. 
For initial stage of floating factors (model), the Tsunami Preparedness was developed based 
on basic vulnerability and capacity information discussed above, however for the future 
works to elaborate the preparedness index from global to more specific is necessary as the 
function of hazard, exposure, vulnerability, layer model 2, layer model 3 and layer model 4. 
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The first two layer model developed using physically based logic model is very fruitful to 
describe the relation among the tangible and intangible of physical and technological 
phenomena. These combined with floating factor model are very important as the input for 
the layer model 3 and model 4 to find how is relation among those coginitive factors 
structured using the combination of tacit knowledge and heuristic knowledge. 
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Chapter 5 
People Model 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This Chapter 5 presents and discusses detail process development of Logic Model and 
Numerical Logic Model for people. It starts from problem recognition on people, 
problem structuring which includes a multi stage of in-depth knowledge acquisition 
and its cognitive mapping, developing logic model in the format of logic model tree, 
and developing numerical analysis. 
People's behavior in large-scale environments can be explained completely through 
cognitive map, which is the basis for deciding upon and implementing any strategy of 
spatial behavior and as basic component of human adaptation. This leads to cognitive 
map as requisite both for human survival and for everyday environmental behavior 
(R.M. Kitchin, 1994). Ability to plan and execute movement in a familiar 
environment requires possession of a cognitive representation of that environment. 
Cadwallader (1976) suggests that the cognitive maps affect at least three types of 
decisions: the decision to stay or go, the decision of where to go, the decision of 
which route to take, and the decision of how to get there. 
This shows that knowledge acquisition takes significant role in the development of 
logic model for people, prior to cognitive mapping and constructing the logic model 
then its numerical modeling.  It is recognized under this study that Padang City 
historically stricken by 4 tsunamis which were generated by earthquake with 
magnitude up to 9.0 in 1797, 1833, 1861, and 1864 thousand people were lost 
according to Tsunami catalog Indonesia (Hamzah, 2005). In addition to that Padang 
was the first national show case city during the development of Ina-TEWS meaning 
intensive DRR countermeasures have been implemented. Not only that, international 
community interest due to ‘expected another mega tsunami’ in Padang has boosted 
the DRR countermeasures implementation. During 2005, 2007 and 2009 event no 
impact were seen on the people behavior. This issue has triggered the study to 
recognize and structure the problem further, since all natural and make-up 
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‘experiences’ were expected to influence the prior belief or perception of people to 
tsunami threat and its impact as well as their appreciation to the countermeasures 
intervention such as tsunami warning. 
In overall, the process development for People Logic Model described in Figure 5.1 
consists of 8 stages, which are described and discussed in the next section of this 
Chapter 5.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Process Development of People Logic-Model 
In this scheme, the problem structuring of Logic Model defined in Chapter 3 covers 
the stage no 1 to 6. This multi stage of knowledge recognition and cognitive mapping 
are expected to be better method in acquiring and mapping holistic cognitive of 
people toward tsunami threat and its impact; as well as their behavior in responding 
whether deciding to stay or go, where to go for saving their lives, which route to take, 
and how to get to there. Since the problem recognition has been discussed in this 
introduction and in the Chapter 1, therefore the discussion in this chapter is started 
from problem structuring (stage 2 to 6) then followed by development of logic-model 
tree (stage 7), and development of numerical model (stage 8). 
For the development of People Logic Model as integrated part of effective tsunami 
warning system logic model, it requires a sound problem structuring using knowledge 
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acquisition and cognitive mapping. A holistic data set should be acquired through 
exhaustive identification process for acquiring the human being perception and 
response to tsunami threat, its impact, and tsunami warning before taking any decision.  
This study views that these human behavior are influenced by prior belief gained 
through many factors or variables, such as knowledge, skills or experiences. Many of 
these factors or variables are intangible, unseen or indelible inside the people’s mind 
as well as people’s understanding concerning their exposure, meaning hazard threat, 
disaster impact on himself and his environment, his vulnerability, capacity and coping 
ability to tsunami disaster; and their trust to the existence of tsunami warning 
including willingness to evacuate. To obtain holistic and exhaustive information from 
the people, therefore a multilevel questionnaires based interview is used in knowledge 
acquisition, described in Section 5.2 and 5.3 of this chapter. 
5.2 Preliminary knowledge acquisition and cognitive mapping 
The preliminary interview was conducted on several target groups among the victim 
of the 2009 event and people living at tsunami high risk zone. A free style interview is 
used for recognizing any factors that hinder or support the people’s mind or thoughts 
regarding the shaking and hearing the siren wailing, and their heuristic judgment. 
Number of recorded respondent is 15 representing the urban community, fishermen, 
government officials, and government officials in charged with emergency response 
(i.e. crisis center, fire brigade), as well as other agencies and the mayor/regent and 
vice governor. The survey conducted from October 7 to 16, 2009 under collaboration 
between ITB with EERI and UPitt. 
There were 3 category of people interviewed, i.e. general public included fisherman, 
waitress of the hotel, taxi driver, office boy, students, and faculty members local 
university; and businessman - hotel owner; and government officials. The last target is 
used to develop the government logic model described and discussed in Chapter 6. 
For example from ordinary people interview conducted with Fisherman Community 
in Padang on October 9-15, 2009 (WS118365, 2009c), see also Figure 5.2. The 
reasons of these fisherman reactions not to evacuate during the 2009 event were due 
to some his rationale and judgment described as follows. Immediate after strong 
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shaking the fisherman and his wife just checked the sea water level behind their 
‘tsunami resistant housing’ built by DKP ocean and fishery department project. They 
decided to remain at their second floor house based on two judgments, i.e. no sign of 
tsunami such as withdrawn water and very far to the closest hill.  In addition the 
family joined 2007 tsunami drill, thus they were sure no one will lead them if tsunami 
were occurred, they have to lead themselves. Before the earthquake, strange 
phenomena such as sky was dark since morning and sea water rough were noticed by 
them, which made him did not go to the sea.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 The Preliminary Interview with Fisherman  
 
The simple cognitive behavior and the heuristic decision making of single human 
being, in this case is the fisherman are mapped and can be seen in Figure 5.3. In this 
mind structure, the decision for evacuating the whole family is directly relied upon 
three primary factors, i.e. checking the natural sign at the beach, the location of the 
house is in the tsunami risk zone, and very far from the hill. Each of these factors are 
directly influenced by several factors, i.e. no radio and no TV for monitoring the 
warning of potential tsunami due to electricity cut off, not hearing any siren wailed by 
the mayor, very strong shaking was felt, and strange atmosphere prior to the event.  
For the DRR capacity of the family, they have not joined any tsunami drill though 
they heard the activity conducted in the neighborhood. They have strong house, since 
it was the pilot project of tsunami safer house from Ministry of Ocean and Fishery. 
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Figure 5.3 Cognitive Maps of People (Fisherman) 
 
Other example of people mind is second target group interviewed was conducted at 
Hotel Inna Muara in Bahasa Indonesia with Hotel Duty Manager and his guest 
(WS118382, 2009b), see also Figure 5.4. Hotel guest was a City Government Officer 
who just describing the damages on hotel business, he was not in Padang during EQ. 
Second person is Hotel Duty Manager in charge during EQ.  
The chronological factors obtained from the freestyle interview were the mains shock 
was felt around 5 pm (fact 5:17pm), the first main shock was after 6 pm (fact on 5:25), 
then 9 pm. No siren was heard (fact: true). Electricity, phone (fix and mobile except 
XL), water and radio were cut off. After main shock, he did not run for tsunami 
evacuation because. When he ran to top floor to check water at the beach for tsunami 
sign, nothing seems unusual, the wave was calm. When he checked the street in front 
of hotel, it was chaotic and overcrowded by people, cars and anything. Then he 
decided not to evacuate the guest (government officials from other cities in Sumatera 
regions). The male guests were stayed up at the roof top. The female guest including 2 
pregnant ladies stayed in the lobby due to afraid of following aftershocks which were 
frequently occurred (about 20 times within first 6 hours).  
The cognitive mapping of the businessman and the hotel guest is presented in Figure 
5.5. This figure shows significant different between fisherman and hotel manager in 
their disaster risk perception and their heuristic judgment for evacuation. The hotel 
manager showed pragmatic attitude compare to fisherman showing simple mindset. 
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Figure 5.4 The Preliminary Interview with Businessman  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5 Cognitive Map of Businessman 
 
5.3 Primary knowledge acquisition  
As discussed in the Chapter 3, there are two target groups of people used to develop 
the People Logic-Model. They are respondent interviewed prior to 2010 Mentawai 
tsunami event called in this study as RP1 (Respondent 1), which was about 448 
people. While other target group of respondent interviewed after 2010 Mentawai 
tsunami event called by this study as RP2 (Respondent 2), which was about 61. 
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First drafted questionnaire for people is developed based on: preliminary cognitive 
map, preliminary interview survey conducted 7 days after the September 30, 2009 
earthquake in Padang City and Pariaman Regency, and tacit knowledge. The tacit 
knowledge obtained were from the in-depth survey conducted under collaboration of 
CDM ITB with AUSAID (4,000 data) and the prior knowledge obtain based on the 
secondary data during activities conducted from 2005 to 2009 during and after 
coordinating national tsunami drill in 2006 in Denpasar Bali and 2007 in Cilegon 
Banten as well as observation during 2005 and 2007 event on this national show case 
city. 
The final questionnaire for people is developed based on the further refined and 
reviewed the draft based on the followed up interview survey on focus target group, 
i.e. community and government officials involved in the emergency response. This 
survey conducted on June 2010. The number of respondent was 9. 
The pre-test interview survey was conducted by 6 student surveyors from Economic 
Department of UNAND on the zone red zone area (zone 8 and 9) the first day. About 
50 respondents were interviewed. Result of the survey was evaluated and used to 
refine the final questionnaire. With total numbers of targeted samples about 300 
respondents, there were about 10 students from Economic Department and Civil 
Engineering Department of UNAND. 
The focus of 300 target group representing cluster/zone no 1 to 14 of tsunami risk 
zone with criteria of respondents as stakeholders of community representatives. They 
were adult man/women, formal/informal worker, residence/worker/trader, DRR 
countermeasure trained/untrained, and students of school located in zone 1 to 14. 
Population of students was limited to max 20% from total respondents, since there 
was previous survey conducted prior this study was focused on the school community. 
It has been mentioned to every interviewee by the surveyors that any personal data 
collected through this survey are confidential, strictly used for the study analysis only 
and will never be disclosed. 
This semi-open questionnaire based interview consists of 3 part of assessment. First is 
the vulnerability and capacity of respondent. Second is hazard perception, disaster 
experiences and DRR countermeasures. Third is appreciation to tsunami early 
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warning system and its associated factors. The questionnaires can be seen in the 
appendix of this dissertation. 
The first part questionnaires consists of the socio economic vulnerability and capacity 
of the respondent, such as the age, education, job, income, number of households, the 
house conditions, and some other information gathered during the interview through 
the semi-open questionnaires. 
The second part of questionnaires includes the perception of people toward the hazard 
threat, the tsunami threat, its impact, their understanding of disaster risk reduction 
countermeasures and their heuristic judgment to protect him-self and the family, 
including to fishing out all hindrance and supporting factors to their judgment. 
The third part of questionnaires covers the heuristic judgment of the people when they 
felt the strong shaking from the earthquake and when hearing the tsunami siren 
wailing, all hindrance and supporting factors that influenced their judgments, and 
their knowledge and appreciation toward tsunami early warning system, its 
infrastructures, and the government in charge. 
As described in Chapter 3, the number of factors and parameters of both respondent 
shown in Figure 5.6 describes the variables and factors that influenced the heuristic 
judgment as in reasoning for evacuation (Ei) is the biggest number, i.e. 184 variables, 
and having most complicated relation among variables in its own cluster as well as 
with other clusters in the cognitive mapping. This is followed by variables and factors 
of DRR Countermeasures (CMi), i.e. 118, with its all hindrance and supporting 
factors. The socio economic susceptibility factors (Vi) takes the third biggest, i.e. 87; 
then followed by appreciation to tsunami early warning system, i.e. 60, where it 
includes the appreciation to indigenous knowledge or devices to support the early 
warning system to be effective in reaching the all the people at risk including the last 
mile. The smallest number of variables and factors acquired from the respondents are 
from variables and factors that influence people understanding toward the hazard 
threat, especially tsunami including its impact. There is 1 variables difference 
between RP1 and RP2 in cluster Ei and Vi. The relation of all of these variables and 
factors are analyzed and mapped in the cognitive map, which is discussed in the next 
section. 
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No Cluster RP1 RP2 
1 Ei – Reasoning for Evacuation 184 183 
2 Vi – Vulnerability & Capacity 87 86 
3 Hi – Hazard Perception & Disaster Experience 29 29 
4 Ti – Tsunami Knowledge 9 9 
5 CMi – Countermeasures of DRR 118 118 
6 TEWS – Tsunami Early Warning System 60 60 
 T O T A L 487 485 
 
Table 5.1 Number of variables acquired for RP1 and RP2  
 
5.4 Cognitive Mapping of People Mind and Behavior  
The 487 of holistic and exhaustive data set obtained from primary data acquisition 
discussed in Section 5.3 which is an integration of RP1 and RP2 are analyzed and 
structured based on its cognitive relationship.  
The direct relationship of these variables was structured following the people logical 
thinking flow and their behavior in disaster situation which were recognized from the 
sample was structured as shown in Figure 5.7.  The mindset of the people of Padang 
in disaster situation and the way in responding natural phenomena (strong shaking) 
and tsunami warning before their decision to evacuate, to delay evacuation or never to 
evacuate were presented in this diagram.  
Some important variables that assisting or hindrance the people’s willingness was 
shown by the high and low capacity of people in terms of socioeconomic and socio-
culture factor are: knowledge and skill regarding tsunami preparedness 
countermeasures obtained from the public education or training.  
Meanwhile the ability to cope disaster in terms DRR countermeasures intervention 
participated by the people, as well as their knowledge and appreciation toward 
existence of the infrastructure for evacuation and emergency purposes, such as 
warning siren and other device, route for evacuation, evacuation shelters and many 
other factors, their trust to the government or community leader, last but not least is 
the indelible factors to base their rationale for making decision before taking action to 
evacuate. 
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Figure 5.6 Structuring the problem and the people’s mind in tsunami disaster situation 
 
5.5 Development of logic model of people’s mind toward tsunami 
early warning 
Based on the previous diagram shown in Figure 5.7, then the logic model is 
constructed by simplifying the relationship among those variables (both observable 
and unobservable/latent variable), in the form of data structure. Example of some part 
of data structure is shown by Figure 5.8, while the complete data structure for people 
can be seen in the Appendix. Through the logic model, these two type variables can 
be easily recognized and the relationship between and among those variables are best 
presented. 
The 448 observable factors derived from the primary data acquisition are structured in 
the form of logic model tree with 39 latent variables as intermediate layers in the logic 
model tree. The relationships among these 448 observable factors as shown in Figure 
5 were structured further in simplified format as the nodes of children-parents order 
like a family tree, in this study called as logic model tree as shown in Figure 5.8 and 
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Figure 5.9. Figure 5.8 shows a complete Logic Model Tree of People’s Mind toward 
Tsunami Early Warning, while Figure 5.9 is the core model of the Logic Model 
showing relationship among latent variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7 Data Structure of People 
 
In Figure 5.8, the logic model is represented many different nodes characterized by 
some identity of the node’s shape, color and with and without ID number or not. An 
oval shape is upper layered latent variables; a round shapes with ID number are 
second and/or third layered latent variables. Meanwhile the observable variables are 
characterized in solid round shape nodes at the leaves of logic model’s tree; here 
leaves are called as children nodes which belong to one parent’s node. The parents’ 
nodes belong to a grandparent’s node and so on. Since the characteristic of variables 
in one cluster family is different with other cluster family, then the number of family 
branches is different from one to another cluster, see Figure 5.8. 
Moreover, the color of nodes shows the substantial relationship among nodes in one 
family cluster which are needed to represent their role in the scenario analysis of this 
numerical model. The grey nodes are recognized as external factors to the people’s 
mind that become assisting and/or hindrance factors to the peoples’ mindset for taking 
decision in the disaster situation. For example the socio-economic factors which 
influenced the level of people’s susceptibility then implicitly will affect their coping 
ability and/or perception toward any disaster; then these will contribute to the 
people’s decision making for responding the disaster situation whether to immediately, 
delay or never evacuate.  
 
120 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8 Logic Model Tree of People’s Mind toward Tsunami Early Warning
 
Figure 5.8 Logic Model Tree of People’s Mind toward Tsunami Early Warning 
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Figure 5.9 Core relationship diagram (Latent Variable) of Logic model of People’s Mind toward 
Tsunami Warning 
 
These grey nodes always considered in the numerical analysis of every scenario of 
numerical logic model that will be described and discussed in the section 5.4. To 
compare, the color nodes characterized as internal factors which indelible in people 
mind strongly influenced the people’s decision process to response to any 
emergency/critical situation. These factors emerged mainly based on some direct or 
indirect experiences in any disaster situation, or from makeup experience such as 
through DRR countermeasures training. This shows there is correlation between grey 
nodes to color nodes. These colorful variables show a unique contribution to analysis 
in each scenario of numerical logic model. In this paper, to better describe the color 
based relationship of the nodes, the logic model consists of two constellation of 
relationship among all factors which influence the peoples’ mind toward tsunami 
warning system. 
The first layer of latent variables shown in colorful nodes consists of 3 variables, i.e. 
evacuation mode of transportation which consists of transportation mode used to 
evacuate by plan and transportation mode used to spontaneously evacuate; 
evacuation route which consists of spontaneous route and designated route (official 
route in city master plan); reason for evacuation which consists of earthquake based 
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reasoning and combination of earthquake and tsunami warning based reasoning, 
where each of these two variables is divided further into reasoning for immediate 
evacuation, to delay evacuation and never evacuation.  
The grey nodes consists of 7 variables, i.e. tsunami triggering event which consists of 
assuming tsunami following the strong shaking and feeling toward tsunami stricken; 
knowledge for tsunami and its risk which consists of knowledge on impact of tsunami 
and certainty of tsunami might stricken their house; DRR countermeasures which 
consists of tsunami safe house countermeasures, structural tsunami mitigation 
countermeasures, and nonstructural tsunami mitigation countermeasures; 
appreciation to TEWS which consists of trust to government, appreciation to the 
capacity of government officials, appreciation for communication devices for 
conveying warning;  vulnerability and capacity which consists of vulnerable group 
containing gender, ages, households, then capacity containing of education, income, 
occupations, and housing vulnerability; disaster direct experience and perception 
which consist of experienced to disaster, perception to natural disaster threat and 
impact, perception to any disaster and impacts; and GPS based location of the 
respondents. 
Then, all relationship of the 487 observable variables was hierarchically and/or 
horizontally and vertically structured in the forms logic model tree with two 
constellation relationship. The variables having similar characteristic were clustered 
into one family node, they are treated as children nodes with its siblings under one 
parent node. 
5.6 Development of Numerical logic model 
As discussed in Section 4 of this paper, to accommodate the unique and common 
relationship contribution among those observable and latent variables, the numerical 
model analysis is designed to use a scenario based analysis. There are seven scenario 
designed to develop the numerical logic model, as shown in Figure 5.10. The seven 
scenarios basically consists of two natural situation prior to tsunami events for the city 
has had the tsunami early warning deployed, i.e. the earthquake based decision 
process and the combination of earthquake and tsunami early warning based decision. 
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Then they are further described in three type of outcome decision scenario, i.e. 
immediate, delay and never.  
However, the immediate evacuation can be represented further for the situation and 
condition of the City readiness to expected tsunami, i.e. plan and spontaneous 
evacuation procedure. Plan procedure here means that the procedure taken will follow 
the City Emergency Action Plan prepared for Tsunami and other expected disaster, 
which consist of the designated route for evacuation and procedure of evacuation not 
using cars or vehicles in high populated area/clusters as well as other factors such as 
the official in charged “who is doing what” in emergency situation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.10 Sixth Scenario of Numerical Analysis of the Numerical Logic Model 
 
Each scenario represents each nature of relationship among all assisting, hindrance, 
indelible and latent factors which influence in decision making process of the people. 
The formula derived from the 6 scenario based numerical analysis can be presented as 
follows (Figure 5.11).  
Due to the characteristics of scenario of the logic model, each scenario is unique. All 
the grey nodes have contribution to each scenario; therefore all grey nodes are 
represented by the top node of each cluster, i.e. Vi, Hi, Ti, CMi, and TEWS. 
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Meanwhile the color node have unique contribution to the scenario, hence the color 
nodes is represented by either by top node and/or mid layer node. The color nodes is 
representing the cognitive and heuristics judgment, which related with reason why, 
how and where to go for evacuation either triggered by natural phenomena and/or 
combination of both natural phenomena and tsunami warning. This division just to 
help visually easy to understand the structure of the logic model tree. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.11 Formula of Sixth Scenario used to develop Numerical Logic Model Tree 
 
Numerical modeling is required for this logic model to know the degree of correlation 
among the variables in every node of branches, up to sub-cluster, cluster and the 
scenario of judgment (decision). Looking at the appropriateness of statistical methods 
to the nature of this model, then the numerical model is better developed by 
integrating the principal component analysis (PCA) into the logic model. However, in 
this study principal component analysis is used to find out the correlation among the 
variables member of each node of branches, then up-scaling to the next level until 
reaching the stem of the tree. Then the decision scenario conducted at the bottom of 
the tree with 6 scenario of decision making. 
E = f  E1, E2  
E = f  E11, E12, E13, E14, E21, E22, E23  
E11 = f  E111,𝑉𝑖 ,𝐻𝑖  ,𝑇𝑖  ,𝐶𝑀𝑖  ,𝑇𝐸𝑊𝑆𝑖  
E12 = f  E114, E113, E112,𝑉𝑖 ,𝐻𝑖  ,𝑇𝑖  ,𝐶𝑀𝑖  ,𝑇𝐸𝑊𝑆𝑖  
E13 = f  E12, E112,𝑉𝑖 ,𝐻𝑖  ,𝑇𝑖  ,𝐶𝑀𝑖  ,𝑇𝐸𝑊𝑆𝑖  
E14 = f  E13, E112,𝑉𝑖 ,𝐻𝑖  ,𝑇𝑖  ,𝐶𝑀𝑖  ,𝑇𝐸𝑊𝑆𝑖  
E21 = f  E21, E112,𝑉𝑖 ,𝐻𝑖  ,𝑇𝑖  ,𝐶𝑀𝑖  ,𝑇𝐸𝑊𝑆𝑖  
E22 = f  E22, E112,𝑉𝑖 ,𝐻𝑖  ,𝑇𝑖  ,𝐶𝑀𝑖  ,𝑇𝐸𝑊𝑆𝑖 
E = f  E , E ,𝑉 ,𝐻  ,𝑇  ,𝐶𝑀  ,𝑇𝐸𝑊𝑆  
Scenario I (1 to 4) – EQ based Evacuation (E1) : 
Scenario II (1 to 3) – EQ & TEWS based Evacuation (E2)  
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Principal component analysis (PCA) is a mathematical procedure that uses an 
orthogonal transformation to convert a set of observations of possibly correlated 
variables into a set of values of uncorrelated variables called principal components. It 
is further described as the simplest of the true eigenvector-based multivariate 
analyses. Currently, it is mostly used as a tool in exploratory data analysis and for 
making predictive models.  
While orthogonal matrix is a square matrix with real entries whose columns and rows 
are orthogonal unit vectors. Methodology for numerical modeling of the Logic Model 
for People’s Mind is adapted from PCA method where Main Component obtained 
through the analysis can be assumed as “latent variable” (variable which were not 
observed) with linear combination of some observed variables (x1, …… xk).  
As discussed in Chapter 3 that for the People Logic Model that the stage of analysis 
do not include the final stage of reducing variable, see also Chapter 1 and Chapter 3 
of this dissertation. Meanwhile basic principle of PCA is to structure the main 
component, which is a linear combination of some observed variables. The numerical 
analysis was used the PCA facilitated by SPSS 19 program.  
Summary of the final result of numerical modeling for all 6 decision scenarios of both 
RP1 and RP2 are presented in the following formula shown in Table 5.2.  
In this summary it shows there is significant different cognitive and behavior of 
people to make judgment to respond the warning from natural phenomena and 
combination of both natural and tsunami warning system. The differences are shown 
between data assessed prior and post of Mentawai tsunami (RP1 and RP2 
consecutively) at the parents’ node. These differences were basically as the result of 
correlation contribution of children, grandchildren and great grandchildren nodes 
from each family cluster of each data set. 
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Table 5.2 Summary of the final result of numerical modeling for all 6 decision scenarios of both RP1 
and RP2 
 
No Variables 
RP1 RP2 
Coeff % Coeff % 
 
Evac
1.1
 = f (E
1.1.1
, H
i
, V
i
, T
i
, CM
i
, TEWS
i
) 
1 
E1.1.1 How did you evacuate when immediate evacuate 
after strong shaking? 
1.04 17.94 1.58 22.45  
2 H Hazard and Disaster Perception and Experiences 0.98 16.98  -1.72 24.45  
3 V Social Vulnerability and Capacity 1.23 21.28  1.37 19.50  
4 T Knowledge on Tsunami Risk and Triggering Event -1.19 20.65  -0.53 7.51  
5 CM Disaster Risk Reduction Countermeasures 0.29 5.10  -0.75 10.66  
6 TEWS Appreciation to Tsunami Early Warning System 1.04 18.05  1.09 15.43  
 
Evac
1.2
 = f (E
1.1.2
, E
1.1.3
, E
1.1.4
, H
i
, V
i
, T
i
, CM
i
, TEWS
i
) 
1 
E1.1.2  What was the reasons not to follow the route when 
immediate evacuate after strong shaking? 
0.58 7.86  1.45 19.69  
2 
E1.1.3 What alternative route did you take when 
immediate evacuate after strong shaking? 
0.82 11.23  1.77 24.12  
3 
E1.1.4 How did you evacuated when immediate evacuate 
after strong shaking? 
-0.46 6.30  0.02 0.26  
4 H Hazard and Disaster Perception and Experiences 1.50 20.44  1.55 21.11  
5 V Social Vulnerability and Capacity 1.16 15.75  -1.65 22.47  
6 T Knowledge on Tsunami Risk and Triggering Event -1.23 16.78  -0.21 2.90  
7 CM Disaster Risk Reduction Countermeasures 1.07 14.57  0.70 9.45  
8 TEWS Appreciation to Tsunami Early Warning System 0.52 7.08  1.45 19.69  
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Table. 5.2. Continued. 
NO 
 
VARIABLES 
RP1 RP2 
Coeff. % Coeff. % 
 
Evac
1.3
 = f (E
1.2
, H
i
, V
i
, T
i
, CM
i
, TEWS
i
) 
1 
E1.2 What was your reasons not to evacuate immediately 
after strong shaking? 
1.52 22.49  1.50 21.84  
2 H Hazard and Disaster Perception and Experiences 1.31 19.37  -0.67 9.81  
3 V Social Vulnerability and Capacity 0.76 11.23  -0.21 3.03  
4 T Knowledge on Tsunami Risk and Triggering Event -1.41 20.84  1.17 17.00  
5 CM Disaster Risk Reduction Countermeasures 0.67 9.93  1.59 23.13  
6 TEWS Appreciation to Tsunami Early Warning System 1.09 16.13  -1.73 25.18  
 
Evac
1.4
 = f (E
1.4
, H
i
, V
i
, T
i
, CM
i
, TEWS
i
) 
1 
E1.3 What were your reasons for never evacuated after 
strong shaking? 
0.84 16.11  1.01 14.12  
2 H Hazard and Disaster Perception and Experiences -1.12 21.43  -1.16 16.20  
3 V Social Vulnerability and Capacity 0.21 3.94  1.97 27.49  
4 T Knowledge on Tsunami Risk and Triggering Event 1.04 19.95  -1.84 25.69  
5 CM Disaster Risk Reduction Countermeasures 1.14 21.91  -0.32 4.40  
6 TEWS Appreciation to Tsunami Early Warning System 0.87 16.65  0.87 12.10  
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Table. 5.2. Continued. 
No Variables 
RP1 RP2 
Coeff. % Coeff. % 
 
Evac
2.1
 = f (E
2.1
, H
i
, V
i
, T
i
, CM
i
, TEWS
i
) 
1 
E2.1 What is your consideration when immediate 
evacuate after receiving/hearing tsunami warning? 
1.20 22.49  0.94 14.61  
2 H Hazard and Disaster Perception and Experiences 1.48 27.78  -0.44 6.82  
3 V Social Vulnerability and Capacity 0.33 6.18  0.04 0.63  
4 T Knowledge on Tsunami Risk and Triggering Event -1.18 22.15  1.04 16.20  
5 CM Disaster Risk Reduction Countermeasures 0.55 10.25  2.03 31.46  
6 TEWS Appreciation to Tsunami Early Warning System 0.59 11.16  -1.95 30.29  
 
Evac
2.2
 = f (E
2.2
, H
i
, V
i
, T
i
, CM
i
, TEWS
i
) 
1 
E2.2 What is your consideration for never evacuate after 
receiving/hearing tsunami warning? 
-0.17 3.15  1.19 16.95  
2 H Hazard and Disaster Perception and Experiences -0.94 17.51  -1.29 18.27  
3 V Social Vulnerability and Capacity 0.59 11.08  1.64 23.25  
4 T Knowledge on Tsunami Risk and Triggering Event 1.28 23.94  -1.35 19.21  
5 CM Disaster Risk Reduction Countermeasures 1.32 24.71  -0.59 8.36  
6 TEWS Appreciation to Tsunami Early Warning System 1.06 19.63  0.98 13.96  
 
 
This summary shows how the cognitive and behavior of people obtained at the time of 
prior and post 2010 tsunami event have influenced the decision to respond the natural 
warning and tsunami warning system. From the immediate response for evacuation 
plan or spontaneously, up to the never evacuation at all. 
To be argued, example taken for the scenario of Evac 1.1, the people cognitive and 
behavior toward the natural warning, i.e. strong shaking of tsunamigenic earthquake, 
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was different between RP1 and RP2. For the RP1, the strong correlation shown by 
coefficient above 1.0 was contributed by Vi – Social Vulnerability and Capacity, Ti – 
knowledge on Tsunami Risk and Triggering Event, TEWS – Appreciation to Tsunami 
Early Warning System, E1.1.1 – How did you evacuate when immediate evacuate 
after strong shaking. In this RP1, CM – Disaster Risk Reduction Countermeasures and 
H – Hazard and Disaster Perception and Experiences showed the small correlation in 
the scenario Evac 1.1.  
To contrast, the H – Hazard and Disaster Perception and Experiences showed the 
highest correlation in the same scenario. In total in RP2, the strong correlation was 
contributed by H – Hazard and Disaster Perception and Experiences, E1.1.1 – How 
did you evacuate when immediate evacuate after strong shaking, Vi – Social 
Vulnerability and Capacity, and TEWS – Appreciation to Tsunami Early Warning 
System. 
Further discussion for Evac 1.1 , it can be seen how each of this parent nodes (cluster 
node) influenced by its children node, and how the children node correlation with its 
siblings node.  
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1. Vulnerability and Capacity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.12  Logic Model Tree of Social Vulnerability and Capacity  
Income
V1Gender Male
Female
1. Vulnerability & 
Capacity
< 18 yr
> 60 yr
V2
Age
40-50 yr
30-40 yr
19-30 yr
50-60 yr
0
V4
< 1.0 M. IDR
1.0 - 2.0 M. IDR
 2.0 - 5.0 M. IDR
> 5.0 M. IDR
V5
Occupation
permanent worker
entrepreneur
part time worker
informal sector
house wife
unemployment
government officials
public servants
retirement
student
Households 
Vulnerability
V6.2 Total Inhabitants
V6.1.1 Children (<15 yr)
V6.1.2 Elderly (> 60 yr) 
V6
Between 1-2
Between 3 - 4
More than 5
No Child
Between 1-2
Between 3 - 4
More than 5
No Elderely
Elementary School
V3
Education
University
High School
Middle School
Post Graduate
V7
V71
House 
Type I
Residential house
Shop house
Office
V73
Length 
of Stay
5 – 10 yr
1 – 5 yr
New (<1 yr)
10 – 30 yr
> 30 yr
V74
Ownership
Shared houses
(Govt. Owned) Official house
Rented
Family owned
Rented room (lodging)
Company housing
V75
House 
Size
120-160 m2
80-120 m2
40-80 m2
< 40 m2
160-200 m2
> 200 m2
V76
Structure 
Type
Steel Structure
Timber structure
Concrete structure with brick wall
Semi Permanent
Masonry
Housing 
Vulnerability
House 
Type II
Single house_1 story
Apartment/flat
V72
Single house_2 story
Shop house_1 story
Shop house_2 story
Shop house_3 story
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V  = 0.463324(V1) + 0.0070420 (V2) + 0.649657(V3) + 1.236039(V4) +   
  0.958223(V5) + 1.22002(V6) + 1.200953(V7) 
  
 V1 = 2.00 (V1.1) - 2.00 (V1.2) 
 
 V2  = 0.901704(V2.1) - 1.634164 (V2.2) + 0.92376(V2.3) - 1.068256(V2.4) +   
   0.916095(V2.5)  + 1.331971(V2.6) 
 
 V3 = 1.424882(V3.1) +  1.131861(V3.2) - 1.60302(V3.3) -  
                    0.077411(V3.4) + 1.004934(V3.5) 
 
 V4 = 1.342913(V4.1) +  0.034564(V4.2) - 1.942214(V4.3) +  0.138549(V4.4) +  
   1.039616(V4.5) 
 
V5 =  1.071168 (V5.1) - 0.014728(V5.2) + 1.37328(V5.3) - 1.58036 (V5.4) + 0.615288(V5.5) +  
0.2128(V5.6)  - 1.329546 (V5.7) + 1.111368(V5.8) + 0.882428(V5.9) + 0.735284(V5.10) 
 
 V6 = 2.00 (V6.1) - 2.00 (V6.2) 
 
  V6.2 =  - 1.90236(V6.2.1) + 1.24869(V6.2.2) +  0.979374(V6.2.3) +  1.693922(V6.2.4)  
 
  V6.3 = 1.660464(V6.3.1) - 2.082392(V6.3.2) +  1.070928(V6.3.3)  
 
 V7  = 1.223043(V7.1) + 0.723564(V7.2) + 1.039242(V7.3) + 1.066752 (V7.4) +  
   0.508734(V7.5) - 0.282255(V7.6)  
 
  V7.1 =  - 1.891495 (V7.1.1) +  0.826799(V7.1.2) +  1.937267(V7.1.3)  
 
  V7.2 =  - 1.84932(V7.2.1) + 0.726707(V7.2.2) +  1.930133(V7.2.3) +  0.59621(V7.2.4) 
      + 1.20878(V7.2.5)  
 
  V7.3 = 1.042862(V7.3.1) +  0.080222(V7.3.7.3) - 0.275571(V7.3.3) - 1.899914(V7.3.4) 
      +  1.657857(V7.3.5) + 0.443281(V7.3.6)  
 
  V7.4  =  - 1.986783(V7.4.1) +  1.245282(V7.4.2) +  1.309481(V7.4.3) +  0.00 (V7.4.4) 
      +  1.284862(V7.4.5) + 0.689501(V7.4.6)  
 
  V7.5  =  - 0.41206 (V7.5.1) +  0.060169(V7.5.2) - 1.91783(V7.5.3) +  1.062822 (V7.5.4) 
      +  1.186536(V7.5.5) + 1.136558(V7.5.6)  
 
  V7.6 =  - 1.811724 (V7.6.1) +  1.95027(V7.6.2) + 0.548791(V7.6.3) +  1.001992(V7.6.4)  
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2. Disaster Experience and Perception  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.13  Logic Model Tree of Hazard and Disaster Experience and Perception  
 
H  = 1.147818(H1) + 1.309193(H2) - 1.947506(H3) 
 
 H1  = 3.570876(H1.1) + 2.440566(H1.2) + 4.354604(H1.3) + 4.374807(H1.4) +  
   3.927448(H1.5) +  4.092085(H1.6) + 2.399272(H1.7) + 1.833258(H1.8) 
    + 2.35212(H1.9) + 2.40292(H1.10)  
 
H2  = 1.046952(H2.1) + 1.80692(H2.2) + 1.061872(H2.3) - 3.077239(H2.4) + 1.013(H2.5)  + 
1.02(H2.6) +  1.007(H2.7) + 1.003(H2.8) + 1.029(H2.9)  
 
 H3  = 1.147818(H3.1) + 1.309193(H3.2) - 1.947506(H3.3) +  1.002596(H3.4) +  
   1.581553(H3.5) +  0.910374(H3.6) -  0.322846(H3.7)  
 
From the disaster perception experience and perception aspect (Hi), Figure 5.13 
shows the logic model tree and numerical analysis result at those levels. 
This shows that for Padang people that the most contributable relationship among the 
observable variables to model of decision making is that at the upper level of Hi, 
direct experience toward any disaster including the man-made disaster was the most 
H1
Disaster 
Experience
H1.6 Riot
Intensity
H1.5 Accident
H1.4 Volcanic Eruption
H1.3 Tsunami
H1.2 Earthquake
H1.1 Flood
H1.7 Domestic Fire
H1.8 Storm/Tidal Surge
H1.9 Burglary
H1.10 Typhoon
H2
Disaster 
affected their 
life most
H2.5 Civil War, Riot
H2.4 Natural Disaster
H2.3 Accident
H2.2 Diseases
H2.1 Unemployment
H2.6 Hunger
H2.7 Domestic Fire
H2.8 Family Conflict
H2.9 Combination of it
Explosion of domestic gas
Unclassified 
Causes
H3
Natural Disaster 
affected their life 
most
H3.4 Tsunami
H3.3 Earthquake
H3.2 Landslide
H3.1 Flood
H3.5 Typhoon
H3.6 Others
2. Disaster Experience  
& Perception
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influence to the model followed by the people perception toward disaster impact, and 
the lowest contribution was from the direct experience toward natural disaster 
including tsunami and earthquake which is supposed to be threat for them.  
From the aspect of impact of the countermeasures, i.e. tsunami drill, to the model can 
be described in Figure 5.14 and 5.15. Result analysis shows in Figure 5.15 that there 
is 0 coefficient relationship shown by CM123, i.e. effectiveness of tsunami drill to 
their decision. This is because the numerical analysis described as sample for 
discussion is the analysis based on the data acquisition prior to Mentawai tsunami, 
called as data phase 1 and 2 only. At the analysis of Data phase 3, i.e. data collected 
after Mentawai tsunami from the same cluster show some significant coefficient 
relationship for this factor. 
 
3. Tsunami Knowledge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.14  Logic Model Tree of People Knowledge on Tsunami Risk and 
Triggering Event 
 
T  = 1.30592(T1) +  1.49632(T2) + 1.99808(T3) +  1.81888(T4) 
T2  = 2.15232(T2.1) +  2.113408(T2.2) + 1.911552(T2.3) +  1.281664(T2.4) 
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4. Countermeasures  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.15  Logic Model Tree of Disaster Risk Reduction Countermeasures 
 
CM  = 0.71514(E1) -  1.095256(E2) + 1.351902(E3) +  1.04143(E4) 
 
 CM1 =  0.465915(CM1.1) -  0.057365 (CME1.2) + 0.728397(CM1.3) +  
    2.082983(CM1.4) +  2.108085(CM1.5) + 1.047337(CM1.6) +  
    1.311341(CM1.7) -  1.675371(CM1.8)  +  0.853992(CM1.9) +   
    1.031063(CM1.10) 
 
  CM1.1.2  = 0.75268(E1.1.2.1) -  0.91636(E1.1.2.2) + 0.70928(E1.1.2.3) 
  CM1.1.2  =  -  0.728686(E1.1.2.1) -  0.79618(E1.1.2.2) + 0.697822(E1.1.2.3)  
       + 1.219936(E1.1.2.4) 
  CM1.1.3 =    -  1.2531(CM1.1.3.1) + 1.526211(CME1.1.3.2) +  0.573193(CM1.1.3.3) -   
     0.312542(CM1.1.3.4 + 1.160935(CM1.1.3.5) + 0.991858(CM1.1.3.6) 
      + 0.790268(CM1.1.3.7) + 1.64627(CM1.1.3.8) + 1.120238(CM1.1.3.9) 
      -  0.123036(CM1.1.3.10) 
 
   CM1.1.3.7  = 1.496779(E1.1.3.7.1) +  0.056471(E1.1.3.7.2) -   
       0.448038(E1.1.3.7.3) -  0.787336(E1.1.3.7.4) 
   CM1.1.3.8  = 0.300308(E1.1.3.8.1) -  1.015402(E1.1.3.8.2) +  0.882516(E1.1.3.8.3) 
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 CM1.2  = 1.51666(E1.2.1) + 0.82363(E1.2.2)   +  0.823926(E1.2.3) +  1.00(E1.2.4) 
 
  CM1.2.2 = 0.726852(E1.2.2.1) -  0.726852(E1.2.2.2) 
 
  CM1.2.3  =   1.54938(CM1.2.3.1) + 1.32906(CME1.2.3.2) + 1.447612(CM1.2.3.3) +   
     1.136564(CM1.2.3.4) -  0.532061(CM1.2.3.5) + 1.16334(CM1.2.3.6) 
     + 1.136729(CM1.2.3.7) + 1.178795(CM1.2.3.8) + 1.184922(CM1.2.3.9) 
     -  0.247858(CM1.2.3.10) 
 
   CM1.2.3.7  = 1.460671(E1.2.3.7.1) -  0.444026(E1.2.3.7.2) +   
       0.175828(E1.2.3.7.3) -  0.787336(E1.2.3.7.4) 
 
 CM1.3  = 1.214(E1.3.1) + 0.964(E1.3.2) + 0.822(E1.1.3.8.3) 
 
  CM1.3.2 = 1.227301(E1.3.2.1) -  0.305425(E1.3.2.2) + 0.00(E1.3.2.3) +   
     0.788655(E1.3.2.4) 
 
   CM1.3.2.1  = 1.04364(E1.3.2.1.1) -  1.313828(E1.3.2.1.2) +  0.475629(E1.3.2.1.3) +   
       0.118952(E1.3.2.1.4) 
   CM1.3.2.1  = 0.852327(E1.3.2.1.1) -  0.951559(E1.3.2.1.2) -   
       0.20461(E1.3.2.1.3) + 1.215638(E1.3.2.1.4) +  0.826084(E1.3.2.1.5) 
   CM1.3.2.3  = 0.726852(E1.3.2.3.1) -  0.726852(E1.3.2.3.2) 
 
  CM1.3.3  =   1.215655(CM1.3.3.1) -  0.057365 (CME1.3.3.2) + 1.239947(CM1.3.3.3) +   
      0.093820(CM1.3.3.4) + 0.574528(CM1.3.3.5) + 1.31833(CM1.3.3.6) 
       + 1.183265(CM1.3.3.7) -  0.145673(CM1.3.3.8) -  0.157363(CM1.3.3.9) 
       -  0.274797(CM1.3.3.10) 
 
 CM1.3.3.1 =  -  0.990879(E1.3.3.1.1) -  0.49221(E1.3.3.1.2) +  0.137744(E1.3.3.1.3) +  
    0.686962(E1.3.3.1.4) +  1.557992(E1.3.3.1.5) +  0.801995(E1.3.3.1.6) 
   CM1.3.3.3 =  -  0.183963(E1.3.3.3.1) +  0.876603(E1.3.3.3.2) -  1.181622(E1.3.3.3.3) 
       -  0.0327539 (E1.3.3.3.4) +  1.387494(E1.3.3.3.5) 
   CM1.3.3.5  = 1.139538(E1.3.3.5.1) +  1.129192(E1.3.3.5.2) + 0.808466(E1.3.3.5.3) 
 
 CM1.6 =   0.69246(CM1.6.1) +  1.343529 (CME1.6.2) -  .487899(CM1.6.3) 
     + 0.17527(CM1.6.4) -  1.449845(CM1.6.5) + 1.414629(CM1.6.6) -   
    0.005618(CM1.6.7) 
 
 CM1.7 = 0.893091(E1.7.1) +  0.093564(E1.7.2) -  1.036985(E1.7.3) +   
    1.510183 (E1.7.4) +  0.089935(E1.7.5) 
 
CM3  = 1.435004(E3.1) +  1.54456(E3.2) + 1.160216(E3.3) 
 
CM4  =  -  0.271944(E4.1) +  1.148304(E4.2) -  0.79395(E4.3) 
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5. TEWS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.16  Logic Model Tree of People Appreciation to TEWS 
7. TEWS Appreciation
6.  Appreciation to TEWS
TEW1
TEW1 
Capability of COMMUNICATION 
DEVICES conveying TEW at Local 
Level (City)
TEW110 
EFEFECTIVENESS 
of tsunami drill
TEW1101 even though evacuated, but still not sure whether 
they were safe if real tsunami would have been occurred.
TEW1102 INNOVATIVE tsunami survival kits to include life jacket TEW110
TEW
11
11 SIREN
less functioning
moderately functioning
highly functioning
fully functioning
not functioning
Don’t know
TEW1111 no definite SOP (standard operating procedure) to 
respond siren used in many tsunami simulation conducted so far
TEW1112 not heard any tsunami warning siren that day
TEW1113 heard a little but not sure whether it was tsunami siren 
TEW
111
TEW111 
REASONS LOW 
APPRECIATION
TEW
12
12 MOSQUE’S 
SPEAKERS
less functioning
moderately functioning
highly functioning
fully functioning
not functioning
Don’t know
TEW1311 car radio is more reliable than electrical radio at home
TEW1312 because no radio signal in the area
TEW
121
TEW121 
REASONS LOW 
APPRECIATION
TEW13
13 RADIO
less functioning
moderately functioning
highly functioning
fully functioning
not functioning
Don’t know
TEW
17
17 Text 
Message 
(SMS)
less functioning
moderately functioning
highly functioning
fully functioning
not functioning
Don’t know
TEW
16
16 MOBILE 
PHONE 
PROVIDER
less functioning
moderately functioning
highly functioning
fully functioning
not functioning
Don’t know
TEW1611 many mobile phone tower collapsed by EQ, 
thus only 2 out of 5 provider in function  
TEW1612 jammed in communication using the remaining 
available mobile phone provider 
TEW
161
TEW161 
REASONS LOW 
APPRECIATION
TEW
15
15 LIFE 
LINE 
PHONE
less functioning
moderately functioning
highly functioning
fully functioning
not functioning
Don’t know
TEW1511 not using fix phone at home, mobile phone more practical, 
since the life line phone was easily affected by any EQ
TEW
151
TEW151 
REASONS LOW 
APPRECIATION
TEW
14
less functioning
moderately functioning
highly functioning
fully functioning
not functioning
Don’t know
14 TV
TEW1411 in disaster situation, many people was 
afraid of watching TV 
TEW
141
TEW141 
REASONS LOW 
APPRECIATION
TEW18 Reliable 
communication 
devices TEW1.8.1 Radio communication (HT)TEW1.8.2 Satellite based mobile phone
TEW1.8.3 CDMA mobile phone
TEW
18
TEW191 total no communication: no radio; Lifeline and mobile phone off
TEW 19 Poor 
communication 
device for TEW TE1194 supporting siren (telkomsel siren) nearby not functioned
TE193 people very rare listening to the radio 
TEW192 lifeline affected: electricity, fix phone, and water supply
TEW195 siren not reaching last mile – siren Installed in Asrama Haji 
Tabing Therefore unaBle to reach Lubuk Buaya neighborhood  
TEW
19
TEW2
TEW2 CAPACITY of 
GOVERNMENT 
OFFICIALS and 
STAKEHOLDERS
TEW
211
211 REASONS: 
Low appreciation 
on Police 
performance
2115 Police did not manage traffic for evacuation
2113 Road was overcrowded
2112 Chaotic condition
2111 Total traffic jammed
2114 Police saved their family first
21 POLICE (POLRI) 
in handling 
evacuation process
TEW
21 less functioning
moderately functioning
highly functioning
fully functioning
not functioning
Don’t know
TEW
22
22 ARMY (TNI) in 
handling 
evacuation process less functioning
moderately functioning
highly functioning
fully functioning
not functioning
Don’t know
TEW
221
221 REASONS: 
Good 
appreciation on 
performance of 
Army
have ability in handling the disaster situation by 
overcome the gap left by police and fire brigade
TEW
23
23 FIRE BRIGADES in 
managing disaster 
situation caused by fire 
followed after 
earthquake
less functioning
moderately functioning
highly functioning
fully functioning
not functioning
Don’t know
TEW
231
231 REASONS: Low 
appreciation for the 
performance of fire 
brigade
2312 too much to handle by the fire brigade, because many houses and shopping mall on fire
2311 Fire brigade came late for fire containment
TEW
241
24 GENERAL 
REASONS: low 
performance of the 
personnel due to 
241 mental attitudes of the officials
242 in disaster situation, people not relying on performance of these stakeholders anymore, they just believe in God 
243 Some people did not notice these stakeholders performance, because:
2431 because of panic, so did not notice the existence of these officials 
2432 not being out from home
2435 not in Padang City during that day
TEW3TEW3LEVEL OF TRUST 
TO GOVERNMENT
31 ability of 
local govt. in 
issuing order 
for evacuation TEW
31 A little lower
High
Quite high
Very-high
Low
Don’t know
TEW
32
32 Ability of central 
govt. (BMKG) in 
disseminating TEW A little lower
High
Quite high
Very-high
Low
Don’t know
TEW
3434 REASONS: Low appreciation due 
to low trust 
341 people doubts their ability, because they  
did not know about evacuation route
342 since these institutions are barely new, 
general public has not known them
TEW
3333  Ability of central 
govt. (BNPB) in 
conveying TEW
A little lower
High
Quite high
Very-high
Low
Don’t know
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TEW =  1.1222(TEW1) + 1.24744(TEW2) + 1.376876(TEW3) + 0.932108(TEW4) 
    + 1.12342(TEW5) + 0.589052(TEW6) 
 
 TEW1  = 1.896882(TEW1.1) + 2.144994(TEW1.2) + 1.846254(TEW1.3) +  
   1.931382(TEW1.4) + 1.38648(TEW1.5) + 1.18254(TEW1.6) +  
   1.190544(TEW1.7) 
 
 TEW2  = 0.9999(TEW2.1) -  1.681276(TEW2.2) + 1.825096(TEW2.3) +  
    1.848119(TEW2.4) 
 
  TEW2.1  = 0.781337(TEW2.1.1) -  0.44132(TEW2.1.2) -  1.210621(TEW2.1.3) +  
     0.869601(TEW2.1.4) 
  TEW2.3  =  -  0.250932(TEW2.3.1) + 1.169316(TEW2.3.2) -  0.774383(TEW2.3.3) 
  TEW2.6  = 1.29577(TEW2.6.1) + 0.00(TEW2.6.2) + 1.29577(TEW2.6.3)  
 
 TEW3  =  -  0.801146(TEW3.1) -  0.762156(TEW3.2) + 0.658092(TEW3.3) 
     + 1.178649(TEW3.4) 
 
 TEW4 = 2.198268(TEW4.1) + 2.174058(TEW4.2) + 2.128059(TEW4.3) +  
    0.326835(TEW4.4) 
 
 TEW5  = 1.684683(TEW5.1) + 1.725823(TEW5.2) + 1.699082(TEW5.3) 
 
 TEW6  = - 0.808416 (TEW6.1) + 0.651689(TEW6.2) – 0.768559(TEW6.3) +  
    1.172246(TEW6.4) 
 
  TEW6.1  =  -  0.808416(TEW6.1.1) + 0.651689(TEW6.1.2) -  0.768559(TEW6.1.3) +  
     1.172246(TEW6.1.4) 
  TEW6.3  = 0.711836(TEW6.3.1) -  0.711836(TEW6.3.2) 
  TEW6.4  =  -  0.288864(TEW6.4.1) +  1.116339(TEW6.4.2) + 1.399488(TEW6.4.3)  -   
     0.820454(TEW6.4.4) + 1.397912(TEW6.4.5) 
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5.7 Result and Discussion  
For the discussion of the result of numerical model of People Model, in this section 
one scenario for logic model’s decision for evacuation is selected, i.e. scenario of 
Evacuation 1.2. This scenario represent the decision is taken based on the immediate 
response, based on the natural warning only since not hearing the siren wailed, and 
the evacuation was conducted spontaneously due to several reasoning that can be 
explored from the logic model. Figure 5.17 shows the path of the scenario analysis, 
which is “immediately” from the urgency for evacuation aspect, “natural warning” 
selected over TEWS mechanism and with the circumstances of “un-plan”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.17 The Scenario Analysis for Evac1.2 
This scenario Evacuation 1.2 is a function of E114, E113, E112, Hi, Vi, Ti, CMi, and 
TEWSi, which graphically shown in the logic model in Figure 5.17. The function 
involved three different conditional variables from reasoning (Ei), vulnerabilities (Vi), 
countermeasures (CMi), knowledge on tsunami phenomena and impacts (Ti), 
appreciation to tsunami warning (TEWS), and hazard perception (Hi). Numerical 
analysis was conducted using the bottom up approach. 
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Figure 5.18 Logic model for Analysis for Evac1.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.19 Logic model for Analysis for Evac1.1.2 
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Result analysis of E112 can be seen in Figure 5.19. From the model of prior tsunami, 
the most dominant reasoning for not to follow the designated route for the evacuation 
are due to several factors, i.e. E1125 because on the way home when the strong 
shaking occurred, E1128 because of afraid of evacuee behavior who is panic and 
uncontrolled, E1127 because the road was jammed by the evacuee, E1122 because the 
government order is troublesome to follow, E1123 because of panic and never think 
clearly for taking what route, and E1129 because of unfamiliar route for evacuation.  
For the model of post tsunami there is increased contribution for E1127 traffic 
jammed by evacuee and unfamiliar route for evacuation. Other factors have never 
been considered as reason. Figure 5.20 shows stages results of Principal Component 
Analysis for E112. For the prior tsunami people model, it shows that at the primary 
component that factors E1123 and E1128 are the most dominant, where the two 
factors exhibiting the human factors of fear. Meanwhile at the second component, the 
factors of E1124 Family matter and traffic jammed by evacuee were the most 
dominant. These two factors show circumstances of external factors. For the post 
people model, the first component shows that E1127 traffic jammed by evacuee and 
E1129 unfamiliar route for evacuation were the most dominant found. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.20 Principal Component Analysis for E112 
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Figure 5.21 Logic model for Analysis for Evac1.1.3 
Meanwhile for the E113 regarding what evacuation route taken for this scenario, 
Figure 5.21 shows that E11310 Following the crowd is the most significant followed 
by E1135 Taking the route directly home, 1134 Taking the main road, E1131 finding 
empty route even passing the beach, and E1137 to the closest open field from house. 
The main factor E 11310 following the crowd is similar with the case of Japan during 
the 2011 Tohoku tsunami. 
As shown in Figure 5.22, the PCA for E113, it show in the first component that 
E11310 following the crowd is the most significant showing the passive behavior. 
This is followed by E1133 by pass/trespassing other’s property and E1132 finding 
closest route and E1135 taking the rout directly home, which are active behavior but 
guided or limited by the physical factors in second component. 
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Figure 5.22 Principal Component Analysis for E113 
Figure 5.23 show the comparison analysis result from numerical analysis. For the 
scenario Evacuation 1.2 for the three model developed, i.e. people model prior to 
tsunami RP1, people model post tsunami RP2 and the government model RG, there is 
significant differences of perception of the people which influenced by its 
circumstances and capacity they have, leading to the influence of their mind to their 
heuristic behavior in terms of decision to evacuate.  
To compare for the RP1 model the most significant contribution above 20% for the 
decision making is Disaster Perception (Hi), while in RP2 there is 2 other factors such 
as E113 alternative route taken for immediate evacuation and Vi social vulnerability 
beside the beside Disaster Perception (Hi). In RG the most significant is the 
knowledge on tsunami (Ti) beside Disaster Perception (Hi). 
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Figure 5.23 Comparison of Mind of RP1, RP2 and RG on Scenario Evac 1.2 
5.8 Summary  
Result of the numerical analysis for people of Padang based on Prior and Post 
Mentawai tsunami occurred during the data acquisition show, there were many 
hindrance factors that was not effective in the implementation. For example the 
national tsunami drill and many other scale of drill performed starting from school 
level, neighborhood level until city level has not covered the community at risk. There 
are still many people being left out from the countermeasures, which mean there is a 
need for bridging mechanism for these countermeasures to be able to reach majority 
of people at risk. 
Thus this numerical logic model can be used as the basis to develop the right policy 
for creating the tsunami safe city for solving the right need for people of Padang at 
this moment. It is recommended this assessment should be conducted in periodic 
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interval, i.e. prior to the development of five yearly master plan of the city, using the 
logic model tree developed. 
The logic model tree is very useful not only for the reassessment of case study city, i.e. 
Padang City, but also could be used to asses other tsunami prone area in Indonesia. 
To have more global logic model of people mind in the regional or international level 
toward the tsunami early warning system and their readiness to tsunami threat, it is 
the challenge for this study to be tested in other country. The more the tested, the 
more complete the model set and the better to be used for the assessment tools and for 
the basis for the policy analysis and policy development. 
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Chapter 6 
Government Model 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This Chapter 6 presents and discusses process development of Government Logic 
Model and its Numerical Modeling. Almost at the similar methodology to People 
Logic Model discussed in Chapter 5, this Chapter 6 starts from problem recognition, 
problem structuring which includes a multi stage of in-depth knowledge acquisition 
and its cognitive mapping, developing logic model in the format of logic model tree, 
and developing numerical analysis. 
As the first national show case city for tsunami preparedness, Padang government 
official is expected to be more responsive to tsunami early warning. Under leadership 
of the two term mayor, since 2004 till now, alot of DRR countermeasures have been 
implemented as well as endorsement of local regulation for tsunami evacuation 
shelters, tsunami education at school and many others; especially after Padang city 
has been stricken by several tsunamigenic earthquakes in 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2010. 
Even though only minor tsunami occurred, less than 50 cm in the city but the 
devastated shaking have damaged many city infrastructure and strategic building 
designated for vertical evacuation especially in 2007 and 2009 events.  
However, aside from the damage and fire due to the devastated  event,  during 2005, 
2007 and 2009 event no impact of any DRR countermeasure were seen on the people 
and the government official behavior. No official handling the situation during 
evacuation, no officer on duty in EOC of DMO Province and City level doing their 
task to convey the tsunami warning received. They left the duty as shown on some 
recorded information, such CCTV and media. Only the mayor as before was taking all 
responsibility. This issue has triggered the study to recognize and structure the 
problem further, since all natural, make-up ‘experiences’ and many countermeasures 
implemented by the government together with national and international community 
were expected to influence the prior belief or perception of people to tsunami threat 
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and its impact as well as their appreciation to the countermeasures intervention such 
as tsunami warning. 
In overall, the process development for Governmen Logic Model described in Figure 
6.1 consists of 8 stages, which are described and discussed in the next section of this 
Chapter 6.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Process Development of Government Logic-Model 
 
6.2 Preliminary knowledge acquisition and cognitive mapping 
The preliminary interview was conducted on several target groups among the victim 
of the 2009 event and people living at tsunami high risk zone. A free style interview is 
used for recognizing any factors that hinder or support the people’s mind or thoughts 
regarding the shaking and hearing the siren wailing, and their heuristic judgment. 
Number of recorded respondent is 15 representing the urban community, fishermen, 
government officials, and government officials in charged with emergency response 
(i.e. crisis center, fire brigade), as well as other agencies and the mayor/regent and 
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vice governor. The survey conducted from October 7 to 16, 2009 under collaboration 
between ITB with EERI and UPitt. 
First interview was conducted with government official who did not evacuate, i.e. Mr. 
Ardiansyah Ridwan from Economic Department of City Assistant II. The interview 
was in dual languages English and Bahasa and recorded (WS118370, 2009a), see also 
Figure 6.2. The EQ event occurred when he was on the way home about 500 m from 
home and about 3 minutes to reach home in normal condition. People were panic on 
the street due to strong shaking, then he decided to go immediately home in Juniarso 
Street which is in the red zone (very high risk). He checked the neighbor house (shop 
houses Pharmacies at the first floor and lodging for student at the second house) 
collapsed. His 2 stories home was remained firmed.  He ran to the top floor checking 
the natural sign for tsunami, i.e. flock of the birds flying from the coastline to the 
mainland. Nothing can be seen. He calmed the family not to evacuate with the 
decision since there was no sign for tsunami, no point for evacuation since the panic 
flock of the crowd of evacuee rushing with cars and many others vehicles. He is afraid 
the family could be killed. The two story house was still remaining strong. In front 
and the back side of his house there were two middle schools with 3 stories were 
remain, i.e. SMP Muhammadiyah and SMP Swasta. The logic model tree and 
mapping of cognitive behavior of government official is presented in Figure 6.3 and 
Figure 6.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 The Preliminary Interview with Government Officials 
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Figure 6.3  Logic Model Tree of Government’s  Mind toward Tsunami Early Warning System 
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Figure 6.4 The Preliminary Cognitive Map of Government Officials 
 
6.3 Primary knowledge acquisition  
As discussed in the Chapter 3, for the government official due to limited number of 
officials compare to people, the questionnaire based interview was limited to 20 
respondent who were exclusively selected from the department or agencies related 
closely with the tsunami and disaster matter, including planning department, fire 
brigade, DMO, and social department. 
First drafted questionnaire for government is developed based on: preliminary 
cognitive map, preliminary interview survey conducted 7 days after the September 30, 
2009 earthquake in Padang City and Pariaman Regency, and tacit knowledge. The 
tacit knowledge obtained were from the in-depth survey conducted under 
collaboration of CDM ITB with AUSAID (4,000 data) and the prior knowledge 
obtain based on the secondary data during activities conducted from 2005 to 2009 
during and after coordinating national tsunami drill in 2006 in Denpasar Bali and 
2007 in Cilegon Banten as well as observation during 2005 and 2007 event on this 
national show case city. 
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The final questionnaire for government is developed based on the further refined and 
reviewed the draft based on the followed up interview survey on focus target group, 
i.e. community and government officials involved in the emergency response. This 
survey conducted on June 2010. The number of respondent was 9.  No pretest for 
final questionnaire developed was conducted for the government. 
This semi-open questionnaire based interview consists of 4 part of assessment; the 
questionnaire format is different from the people. The questionnaires was designed for 
semi open questionnaire, aiming to absorbed his cognitive and behavior as officials 
and as human being to judge and respond toward natural warning and tsunami 
warning system; beside it needs to assess what has been done by his office in term of 
DRR countermeasures and many other government DRR initiatives structurally or 
nonstructural. Detailed of the questionnaire can be seen in Apendix. 
As described in Chapter 3, the number of factors and parameters of government 
respondent shown in Figure 6.6 describes the variables and factors that influenced the 
heuristic judgment as in DRR Countermeasures (CMi) is the biggest number, i.e. 223 
variables, and having most complicated relation among variables in its own cluster as 
well as with other clusters in the cognitive mapping. This is followed by variables and 
factors of appreciation to TEWS, i.e. 92, with its all hindrance and supporting factors. 
The socio economic susceptibility factors (Vi) takes the third biggest, i.e. 84, which 
not much different with people; then followed by Hazard perception and disaster 
expereince, i.e. 30,. The smallest number of variables and factors acquired from the 
respondents are from variables and factors that influence people understanding toward 
the hazard threat, especially tsunami including its impact. 
No Cluster RG 
1 Ei – Reasoning for Evacuation 48 
2 Vi – Vulnerability & Capacity 84 
3 Hi – Hazard Perception & Disaster Experience 30 
4 Ti – Tsunami Knowledge 25 
5 CMi – Countermeasures of DRR 223 
6 TEWS – Tsunami Early Warning System 92 
 T O T A L 502 
 
Table 6.1 Number of variables acquired for RG  
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The relation of all of these variables and factors are analyzed and mapped in the 
cognitive map, which is discussed in the next section. 
 
6.4 Cognitive Mapping of People Mind and Behavior  
The 502 of holistic and exhaustive data set RG obtained from primary data acquisition 
discussed in Section 6.3 are analyzed and structured based on its cognitive 
relationship. The direct relationship of these variables was structured following the 
logical thinking flow as human being as well as the official that have duty in disaster 
situation which were recognized from the sample was structured as shown in Figure 
6.7.  Not only the way in responding natural phenomena (strong shaking) and tsunami 
warning before their decision to evacuate, to delay evacuation or never to evacuate, 
the information gathered on their thinking about their duty also what done in 
countermeasures were presented in this diagram.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5 Structuring the problem and the people’s mind in tsunami disaster situation 
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6.5 Development of logic model of people’s mind toward tsunami 
early warning 
Based on the previous diagram shown in Figure 6.7, then the logic model is 
constructed by simplifying the relationship among those variables (both observable 
and unobservable/latent variable), in the form of data structure. Example of some part 
of data structure is shown by Figure 5.8, while the complete data structure for people 
can be seen in the Appendix. Through the logic model, these two type variables can 
be easily recognized and the relationship between and among those variables are best 
presented. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6 Data Structure of Government 
 
The 502 observable factors derived from the primary data acquisition are structured in 
the form of logic model tree with 39 latent variables as intermediate layers in the logic 
model tree. The relationships among these 502 observable factors were structured 
further in simplified format as the nodes of children-parents order similar pattern as 
the people model. Figure 6.7 shows the core model of the Logic Model showing 
relationship among latent variables. 
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Figure 6.7 Core relationship diagram (Latent Variable) of Logic model of People’s Mind toward 
Tsunami Warning 
 
Moreover, the color of nodes shows the substantial relationship among nodes in one 
family cluster which are needed to represent their role in the scenario analysis of this 
numerical model. The grey nodes are recognized as external factors to the people’s 
mind that become assisting and/or hindrance factors to the peoples’ mindset for taking 
decision in the disaster situation. For example the socio-economic factors which 
influenced the level of people’s susceptibility then implicitly will affect their coping 
ability and/or perception toward any disaster; then these will contribute to the 
people’s decision making for responding the disaster situation whether to immediately, 
delay or never evacuate.  
These grey nodes always considered in the numerical analysis of every scenario of 
numerical logic model that will be described and discussed in the section 6.4. To 
compare, the color nodes characterized as internal factors which indelible in people 
mind strongly influenced the people’s decision process to response to any 
emergency/critical situation. These factors emerged mainly based on some direct or 
indirect experiences in any disaster situation, or from makeup experience such as 
through DRR countermeasures training. This shows there is correlation between grey 
nodes to color nodes. These colorful variables show a unique contribution to analysis 
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in each scenario of numerical logic model. In this paper, to better describe the color 
based relationship of the nodes, the logic model consists of two constellation of 
relationship among all factors which influence the peoples’ mind toward tsunami 
warning system. 
The first layer of latent variables shown in colorful nodes consists of 3 variables, i.e. 
evacuation mode of transportation which consists of transportation mode used to 
evacuate by plan and transportation mode used to spontaneously evacuate; 
evacuation route which consists of spontaneous route and designated route (official 
route in city master plan); reason for evacuation which consists of earthquake based 
reasoning and combination of earthquake and tsunami warning based reasoning, 
where each of these two variables is divided further into reasoning for immediate 
evacuation, to delay evacuation and never evacuation.  
The grey nodes consists of 7 variables, i.e. tsunami triggering event which consists of 
assuming tsunami following the strong shaking and feeling toward tsunami stricken; 
knowledge for tsunami and its risk which consists of knowledge on impact of tsunami 
and certainty of tsunami might stricken their house; DRR countermeasures which 
consists of tsunami safe house countermeasures, structural tsunami mitigation 
countermeasures, and nonstructural tsunami mitigation countermeasures; 
appreciation to TEWS which consists of trust to government, appreciation to the 
capacity of government officials, appreciation for communication devices for 
conveying warning;  vulnerability and capacity which consists of vulnerable group 
containing gender, ages, households, then capacity containing of education, income, 
occupations, and housing vulnerability; disaster direct experience and perception 
which consist of experienced to disaster, perception to natural disaster threat and 
impact, perception to any disaster and impacts; and GPS based location of the 
respondents. 
Then, all relationship of the 487 observable variables was hierarchically and/or 
horizontally and vertically structured in the forms logic model tree with two 
constellation relationship. The variables having similar characteristic were clustered 
into one family node, they are treated as children nodes with its siblings under one 
parent node. 
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6.6 Development of Numerical logic model 
To accommodate the unique and common relationship contribution among those 
observable and latent variables, the numerical model analysis is designed to use a 
scenario based analysis. There are seven scenario designed to develop the numerical 
logic model, as shown in Figure 6.8. The six scenarios basically consists of two 
natural situation prior to tsunami events for the city has had the tsunami early warning 
deployed, i.e. the earthquake based decision process and the combination of 
earthquake and tsunami early warning based decision. Then they are further described 
in three type of outcome decision scenario, i.e. immediate, delay and never.  
However, the immediate evacuation can be represented further for the situation and 
condition of the City readiness to expected tsunami, i.e. plan and spontaneous 
evacuation procedure. Plan procedure here means that the procedure taken will follow 
the City Emergency Action Plan prepared for Tsunami and other expected disaster, 
which consist of the designated route for evacuation and procedure of evacuation not 
using cars or vehicles in high populated area/clusters as well as other factors such as 
the official in charged “who is doing what” in emergency situation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8 Sixth Scenario of Numerical Analysis of the Numerical Logic Model 
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Each scenario represents each nature of relationship among all assisting, hindrance, 
indelible and latent factors which influence in decision making process of the people. 
The formula derived from the 6 scenario based numerical analysis can be presented as 
follows (Figure 6.9). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.9 Formula of Sixth Scenario used to develop Numerical Logic Model Tree 
 
Due to the characteristics of scenario of the logic model, each scenario is unique. All 
the grey nodes have contribution to each scenario; therefore all grey nodes are 
represented by the top node of each cluster, i.e. Vi, Hi, Ti, CMi, and TEWS. 
Meanwhile the color node have unique contribution to the scenario, hence the color 
nodes is represented by either by top node and/or mid layer node. The color nodes is 
representing the cognitive and heuristics judgment, which related with reason why, 
how and where to go for evacuation either triggered by natural phenomena and/or 
combination of both natural phenomena and tsunami warning. This division just to 
help visually easy to understand the structure of the logic model tree. 
Numerical modeling is required for this logic model to know the degree of correlation 
among the variables in every node of branches, up to sub-cluster, cluster and the 
scenario of judgment (decision). Looking at the appropriateness of statistical methods 
to the nature of this model, then the numerical model is better developed by 
E = f  E1, E2  
E = f  E11, E12, E13, E14, E21, E22, E23  
E11 = f  E111,𝑉𝑖 ,𝐻𝑖  ,𝑇𝑖  ,𝐶𝑀𝑖  ,𝑇𝐸𝑊𝑆𝑖  
E12 = f  E114, E113, E112,𝑉𝑖 ,𝐻𝑖  ,𝑇𝑖  ,𝐶𝑀𝑖  ,𝑇𝐸𝑊𝑆𝑖  
E13 = f  E12, E112,𝑉𝑖 ,𝐻𝑖  ,𝑇𝑖  ,𝐶𝑀𝑖  ,𝑇𝐸𝑊𝑆𝑖  
E14 = f  E13, E112,𝑉𝑖 ,𝐻𝑖  ,𝑇𝑖  ,𝐶𝑀𝑖  ,𝑇𝐸𝑊𝑆𝑖  
E21 = f  E21, E112,𝑉𝑖 ,𝐻𝑖  ,𝑇𝑖  ,𝐶𝑀𝑖  ,𝑇𝐸𝑊𝑆𝑖  
E22 = f  E22, E112,𝑉𝑖 ,𝐻𝑖  ,𝑇𝑖  ,𝐶𝑀𝑖  ,𝑇𝐸𝑊𝑆𝑖  
E23 = f  E23, E112,𝑉𝑖 ,𝐻𝑖  ,𝑇𝑖  ,𝐶𝑀𝑖  ,𝑇𝐸𝑊𝑆𝑖 
Scenario I (1 to 4) – EQ based Evacuation (E1) : 
Scenario II (1 to 3) – EQ & TEWS based Evacuation (E2)  
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integrating the principal component analysis (PCA) into the logic model. However, in 
this study principal component analysis is used to find out the correlation among the 
variables member of each node of branches, then up-scaling to the next level until 
reaching the stem of the tree. Then the decision scenario conducted at the bottom of 
the tree with 6 scenario of decision making. 
Principal component analysis (PCA) is a mathematical procedure that uses an 
orthogonal transformation to convert a set of observations of possibly correlated 
variables into a set of values of uncorrelated variables called principal components. It 
is further described as the simplest of the true eigenvector-based multivariate 
analyses. Currently, it is mostly used as a tool in exploratory data analysis and for 
making predictive models.  
While orthogonal matrix is a square matrix with real entries whose columns and rows 
are orthogonal unit vectors. Methodology for numerical modeling of the Logic Model 
for People’s Mind is adapted from PCA method where Main Component obtained 
through the analysis can be assumed as “latent variable” (variable which were not 
observed) with linear combination of some observed variables (x1, …… xk).  
As discussed in Chapter 3 that for the Government Logic Model that the stage of 
analysis do not include the final stage of reducing variable, see also Chapter 1 and 
Chapter 3 of this dissertation. Meanwhile basic principle of PCA is to structure the 
main component, which is a linear combination of some observed variables. The 
numerical analysis was used the PCA facilitated by SPSS 19 program.  
Summary of the final result of numerical modeling for all 6 decision scenarios of 
government data set RG are presented in the following formula shown in Table 6.2.  
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Table 6.2 Summary of the final result of numerical modeling for all 6 decision scenarios of RG 
 
No Variables 
RG 
Coeff. % 
 
Evac
1.1
 = f (E
1.1.1
, H
i
, V
i
, T
i
, CM
i
, TEWS
i
) 
1 
E1.1.1 How did you evacuate when immediate evacuate after strong 
shaking? 
-1.29 18.08 
2 H Hazard and Disaster Perception and Experiences 1.03 14.46 
3 V Social Vulnerability and Capacity 2.09 29.26 
4 T Knowledge on Tsunami Risk and Triggering Event 1.12 15.66 
5 CM Disaster Risk Reduction Countermeasures 1.61 22.53 
6 TEWS Appreciation to Tsunami Early Warning System -1.29 18.08 
 
Evac
1.2
 = f (E
1.1.2
, E
1.1.3
, E
1.1.4
, H
i
, V
i
, T
i
, CM
i
, TEWS
i
) 
1 
E1.1.2  What was the reasons not to follow the route when immediate 
evacuate after strong shaking? 
0.60 6.42 
2 
E1.1.3 What alternative route did you take when immediate evacuate 
after strong shaking? 
0.63 6.74 
3 
E1.1.4 How did you evacuated when immediate evacuate after strong 
shaking? 
-1.96 0.00 
4 H Hazard and Disaster Perception and Experiences 0.90 20.87 
5 V Social Vulnerability and Capacity 2.56 9.53 
6 T Knowledge on Tsunami Risk and Triggering Event 1.57 27.27 
7 CM Disaster Risk Reduction Countermeasures 1.18 16.65 
8 TEWS Appreciation to Tsunami Early Warning System 0.60 12.53 
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Table 6.2 Continued 
No Variables 
RG 
Coeff. % 
 
Evac
1.3
 = f (E
1.2
, H
i
, V
i
, T
i
, CM
i
, TEWS
i
)   
1 
E1.2 What was your reasons not to evacuate immediately after strong 
shaking? 
2.14 23.94 
2 H Hazard and Disaster Perception and Experiences -1.00 11.22 
3 V Social Vulnerability and Capacity 1.59 17.80 
4 T Knowledge on Tsunami Risk and Triggering Event 2.21 24.68 
5 CM Disaster Risk Reduction Countermeasures 0.93 10.39 
6 TEWS Appreciation to Tsunami Early Warning System 1.07 11.98 
 
Evac
1.4
 = f (E
1.4
, H
i
, V
i
, T
i
, CM
i
, TEWS
i
) 
1 E1.3 What were your reasons for never evacuated after strong shaking? 2.18 26.38 
2 H Hazard and Disaster Perception and Experiences -0.59 7.07 
3 V Social Vulnerability and Capacity 1.21 14.58 
4 T Knowledge on Tsunami Risk and Triggering Event 2.21 26.71 
5 CM Disaster Risk Reduction Countermeasures 0.30 3.65 
6 TEWS Appreciation to Tsunami Early Warning System 1.79 21.62 
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Table 6.2 Continued 
No Variables 
RG 
Coeff. % 
 
Evac
2.1
 = f (E
2.1
, H
i
, V
i
, T
i
, CM
i
, TEWS
i
) 
1 
E2.1 What is your consideration when immediate evacuate after 
receiving/hearing tsunami warning? 
1.32 16.60 
2 H Hazard and Disaster Perception and Experiences -1.56 19.57 
3 V Social Vulnerability and Capacity 1.05 13.19 
4 T Knowledge on Tsunami Risk and Triggering Event 2.16 27.09 
5 CM Disaster Risk Reduction Countermeasures 1.09 13.73 
6 TEWS Appreciation to Tsunami Early Warning System 0.78 9.82 
 
Evac
2.2
 = f (E
2.2
, H
i
, V
i
, T
i
, CM
i
, TEWS
i
) 
1 
E2.2 What is your consideration for never evacuate after 
receiving/hearing tsunami warning? 
-1.61 18.17 
2 H Hazard and Disaster Perception and Experiences -0.79 8.90 
3 V Social Vulnerability and Capacity 1.71 19.26 
4 T Knowledge on Tsunami Risk and Triggering Event 2.33 26.22 
5 CM Disaster Risk Reduction Countermeasures 0.57 6.43 
6 TEWS Appreciation to Tsunami Early Warning System 1.86 21.01 
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V = 2.136365(V1)   +   1.164818(V2)   +   1.171924(V3)  -  0.576438(V4)   +     
  0.709552(V6) – 1.448208(V7) 
 
 V1  = 2.00 (V1.1)  -  2.00 (V1.2) 
 V2 = 1.510082 (V2.2)   +   1.486032(V2.3)  -  1.609158(V2.4)  -  0.491468(V2.5) 
 V3  =   -  0.491468(V3.3)  -  1.609158(V3.4)   +   1.510082(V3.5)   +   1.486032(V3.6) 
 V5  =  1.382576 (V5.1)   +   1.382576(V5.2) 
 
  V5.1  =   -  1.82292(V5.1.1)   +    0.209792(V5.1.2)   +   0.553116(V5.1.3)   +   
0.876202(V5.1.4)   +   2.079966(V5.1.5)  
  V5.2  = 1.177457(V5.2.1)   +    1.291053(V5.2.2)  -  2.060128(V5.2.3) 
 
 V6  =  0.731445 (V6.1)  -  0.731445(V6.2) 
 
  V6.1 = 1.581431(V6.1.1)   +    0.004037(V6.1.2)   +   1.371242(V6.1.3) –  
     1.755155(V6.1.4)   +   0.63708(V6.1.5) 
  V6.2  = 0.630249(V6.2.2)   +   0.507843(V6.2.3)  -  1.864134(V6.2.4)   +    
     2.157099(V6.2.5) 
 
 V7  = 2.020278 (V7.1)  -  1.056201(V7.2)   +    2.029023(V7.3)   +    0.898843 (V7.4) –  
   2.133635(V7.5)   +   1.786553(V7.6) 
 
  V7.1 = 2.00 (V7.1.1)  -   2.00(V7.1.2)  
  V7.2 =   -  1.993791(V7.2.1)   +   0.421219(V7.2.2)  -  0.439258(V7.2.3)   +     
     1.660823(V7.2.4)   +    1.364726(V7.2.6)   +    0.133973(V7.2.7)  
  V7.3  = 1.15136(V7.3.1)  -  1.78927(V7.3.7.2)   +   0.365132(V7.3.3)   +   
0.103649(V7.3.4)  
       +    1.891982(V7.3.5)  
  V7.4  = 2.00(V7.4.1)  -  2.00(V7.4.2) 
  V7.5 = 1.510082(V7.5.3)   +    1.486032 (V7.5.4)  -  0.491468(V7.5.5)  -   
     1.609158(V7.5.6)  
  V7.6 = 2.00 (V7.6.1)  -  2.00(V7.6.5) 
 
H  = 1.572(H1)  +  0.889(H2)  +  0.539(H3) 
 H1  = 2.292967(H1.1)  +  2.861667(H1.2)  +  3.445832(H1.3)  +  4.280346(H1.4)  +   
   4.062981(H1.5)  + 2.995413(H1.6)  +   0.219955(H1.7)  +  2.93718(H1.8)  +   
   2.35212(H1.9)  +  1.546432(H1.11) 
 
 H2  = 1.919643(H2.2) - 1.929(H2.4)  +  0.937884(H2.9) 
 
 H3  = 1.968896(H3.1) - 1.667(H3.3)  +   1.496721(H3.4) - 0.317542(H3.5) –  
   0.334207(H3.7) 
 
T  =   -  0.788088(T1)  -  0.293048(T2)  +  1.648816(T3)  +   1.885448(T4)  +    
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  0.659232(T5)  +  1.09616(T6) 
 
 T2  = 2.522844(T2.1)  +   2.769228(T2.2)  +  3.08184(T2.3)  +   2.29443(T2.4) –  
   2.447884(T2.5)  +   3.400182(T2.6)  -  0.574976(T2.7) 
 T5  =   -  1.01103(T5.1)  -  1.185336(T5.2)  +  2.571167(T5.3)  +   0.257974(T5.4) –  
   1.064344(T5.5)  +   2.489974(T5.6)  +  0.290827(T5.7) 
 
 T6 = 1.47816(T6.1)  +  1.297496(T6.2)  +  1.47816(T6.3)  +   1.47816(T6.4)  -   
   0.646695(T6.5) 
 
CM  = 1.446947(E1)  +  1.357403(E2)  -  1.557717(E3)  +   1.585818(E4) 
 CM1 =   1.256706(CM1.1)  +  1.33755(CME1.2)  -  1.53159(CM1.3)  +   0.0073340(CM1.4)   
    +   1.831145(CM1.5)  +  1.799814(CM1.6)  +  1.405632(CM1.7) 
 
 CM1.1  = 2.392292(CM1.1.1)  +  2.424352(CM1.1.2)  -  0.267886(CM1.1.3)  +    
    2.261778(CM1.1.4)  +  1.88021(CM1.1.5)    -  0.698852(CM1.1.6)  +   
    2.010336(CM1.1.6) 
 
  CM1.1.3   = 1.435374(CM1.1.3.1)  -  0.36861(CM1.1.3.2)  +  0.358329(CM1.1.3.3)  -   
      1.520622(CM1.1.3.4)  +  1.02492(CM1.1.3.5) 
  CM1.1.3.3 =   -  0.946682(CM1.1.3.3.1)  -  0.181925(CM1.1.3.3.2)  +   
      1.344925(CM1.1.3.3.3) 
  CM1.1.4  =   -  1.470813(CM1.1.4.1)  +  1.076103(CM1.1.4.2)  +  0.415059(CM1.1.4.3) 
  CM1.1.5  = 0.822817(CM1.1.5.1)  +  0.336911(CM1.1.5.2)  +  1.724395(CM1.1.5.3)  +    
      0.739453(CM1.1.5.4)  +  1.430609(CM1.1.5.5)    -  1.805564(CM1.1.5.6) 
  CM1.1.5.1  = 1.351224(CM1.1.5.1.1)  -  0.013540(CM1.1.5.1.2)  +   
      2.057961(CM1.1.5.1.3)  +   2.630773(CM1.1.5.1.4)  +   
      2.385244(CM1.1.5.1.5)  +  2.123645(CM1.1.5.1.6) 
  CM1.1.5.5  = 2.00598(CM1.1.5.5.1)  +  2.00598(CM1.1.5.5.2)  -  0.763425(CM1.1.5.5.3)   
      +  0.763425(CM1.1.5.5.4) 
  CM1.1.6   = 0.469378(CM1.1.6.1)  +  1.172766(CM1.1.6.2)  -  1.261442(CM1.1.6.3) 
  CM1.1.7  = 1.0248(CM1.1.7.1)  -  1.0248(CM1.1.7.2) 
 
 CM1.2 = 2.60395(CM1.2.1)  +  2.312725(CM1.2.2)  +  0.517214(CM1.2.3)  +   
    0.323(CM1.2.4)  +  0.514254(CM1.2.5)  +   0.45867(CM1.2.6)  +   
    1.255353(CM1.2.7) 
 
  CM1.2.3  =  -  1.05158(CM1.2.3.1)  +  0.11516(CME1.2.3.2)  +  0.661817(CM1.2.3.3)   
      +   1.801499(CM1.2.3.4)  -  0.857098(CM1.2.3.5)  +  2.188667(CM1.2.3.6) 
  CM1.2.4  =      -  1.815378(CM1.2.4.1)  -  0.288528(CME1.2.4.2)  +  1.27053(CM1.2.4.3)   
      +   0.740028(CM1.2.4.4)  +  0.271668(CM1.2.4.5)  
  CM1.2.5  =    1.828102(CM1.2.5.1)  +  2.50863(CME1.2.5.2)  +  0.451573(CM1.2.5.3) –  
      1.597259(CM1.2.5.4)  +  2.50863(CM1.2.5.5)  +  0.044407(CM1.2.5.6) 
  CM1.2.5.1 =      -  0.555486(CM1.2.5.1.1)  -  0.639738(CME1.2.5.1.2)  +   
      1.994742(CM1.2.5.1.3) – 0.344055(CM1.2.5.1.4)  +   
      2.060456(CM1.2.5.1.5)  +  2.188667(CM1.2.5.1.6) 
  CM1.2.6  = 1.383148(CM1.2.6.1)  +  0.273014(CM1.2.6.2)  -  1.094214(CM1.2.6.3) 
  CM1.2.7  = 1.130509(CM1.2.7.1)  -  1.130509(CM1.2.7.2) 
 
 CM1.3 =  1.25452(CM1.3.1)  +  1.25452(CM1.3.2)  +  3.12496(CM1.3.3)  +  2.46158  
    (CM1.3.4)  +  2.751796(CM1.3.5)  +  3.142486(CM1.3.6) 
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  CM1.3.3  = 0.963536(CM1.3.3.1)  +  0.963536(CM1.3.3.2) 
  CM1.3.4  = 0.996408(CM1.3.4.1)  +  1.02804(CM1.3.4.2)  -  0.490296(CM1.3.4.3) 
  CM1.3.5   = 1.032923(CM1.3.5.1)  -  0.100206(CM1.3.5.2)  +  1.426644(CM1.3.5.3) 
  CM1.3.6  = 1.050714(CM1.3.6.1)  -  1.050714(CM1.3.6.2) 
 
 CM1.4  =   -  1.007014(CM1.4.1)  +  1.42738(CM1.4.2)  +  1.535536(CM1.4.3)  +   
    0.216632(CM1.4.4) 
 
  CM1.4.3  = 0.02212799(CM1.4.3.1)  -  0.166448(CM1.4.3.2)  -  1.537137(CM1.4.3.3) –  
      0.166448(CM1.4.3.4)  -  0.77648(CM1.4.3.5)  -  0.010287(CM1.4.3.6)  +   
      0.669159 (CM1.4.3.7)  +  0.669159(CM1.4.3.8)  +   0.118952(CM1.4.3.9)  +    
      4.521953(CM1.4.3.10)  +   4.521953(CM1.4.3.11) 
  CM1.4.4  = 1.081505(CM1.4.4.1)  -  1.081505(CM1.4.4.2) 
 
 CM1.5 =   0.51608(CM1.5.1)  -  1.956325(CM1.5.2)  +  0.310663(CM1.5.3)  +  1.683102  
    (CM1.5.4)  +  2.219173(CM1.5.5) 
 
  CM1.5.3  =  -  0.491038(CM1.5.3.1)  +  2.736739 (CME1.5.3.2)  +   
      2.901403(CM1.5.3.3)  +   2.574504(CM1.5.3.4)  -  0.106747(CM1.5.3.5)  -   
      1.595785(CM1.5.3.6)  +  0.555494(CM1.5.3.7)  -  0.698629(CM1.5.3.8) 
  CM1.5.4  =    1.221209(CM1.5.4.1)  +  0.457941 (CME1.5.4.2)  +  0.626455(CM1.5.4.3)  
      – 1.426759(CM1.5.4.4) 
  CM1.5.5  =    1.697971(CM1.5.5.1)  -  1.697971 (CME1.5.5.2) 
  CM1.5.6  =    0.743446(CM1.5.6.1)  -  0.743446 (CME1.5.6.2) 
 
 CM1.6 =   2.04(CM1.6.1)  +   0.96 (CME1.6.2)  -  3.7E  -  17(CM1.6.3) 
 
  CM1.6.3  =     -  0.904056(CM1.6.3.1)  -  0.235225(CME1.6.3.2)  +  1.291625(CM1.6.3.3) 
 
 CM1.7 =     -  1.204632(CM1.7.1)  +   0.322218 (CME1.7.2)  +  0.882414(CM1.7.3) 
 
 CM2 =   2.398356(CM2.1)  +  1.739412(CM2.2)  +  1.13337(CM2.3)  +   0.888984(CM2.4) –  
    0.145656(CM2.5)  +  2.194506(CM2.6)  +  0.811044(CM2.7) 
 
 CM2.1  = 2.30204(CM2.1.1)  +  2.777593(CM2.1.2)  +  2.477722(CM2.1.3)  -   
    1.768936(CM2.1.4)  +  2.347475(CM2.1.5) 
 
  CM2.1.3  = 1.832529(CM2.1.3.1)  +  0.139432(CM2.1.3.2)  +  3.091305(CM2.1.3.3) –  
      1.686015(CM2.1.3.4)  +  2.624536(CM2.1.3.5)  -  3.0085(CM2.1.3.6)  +   
      1.252632 (CM2.1.3.7)  +  0.01831499(CM2.1.3.8)  -  0.122093(CM2.1.3.9)   
      +   0.517851(CM2.1.3.10) 
  CM2.1.4  =     -  1.023(CM2.1.4.1)  -  0.107465 (CM2.1.4.2)  +  1.419385(CM2.1.4.3) 
  CM2.1.5   = 1.537232(CM2.1.5.1)  +  1.698672(CM2.1.5.2)  +  2.671904(CM2.1.5.3) –  
      1.540425(CM2.1.5.4)  -  0.013575(CM2.1.5.5)  +  2.175704(CM2.1.5.6)  +  
       2.671904 (CM2.1.5.7) 
 
 CM2.2 =   1.959832(CM2.2.1)  +  2.256452(CM2.2.2)  -  1.123806(CM2.2.3)  +   
    1.066973(CM2.2.4) 
 
  CM2.2.3  =   0.836095(CM2.2.3.1)  +  0.80028 (CM2.2.3.2)  -  0.737295(CM2.2.3.3) 
  CM2.2.4  =   2.473149(CM2.2.4.1)  +  0.403044(CM2.2.4.2)  -  1.123806(CM2.2.4.3)  +   
      2.687727(CM2.2.4.4)  +  2.687727(CM2.2.4.5) 
 
 CM2.3 =   2.18828(CM2.3.1)  +  2.18828(CM2.3.2)  +  1.23488(CM2.3.3)  +   
    0.77634(CM2.3.4) 
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  CM2.3.3  =    1.181312(CM2.3.3.1)  -  1.181312(CME2.3.3.2) 
  CM2.3.4  =     -  1.292907(CM2.3.4.1)  +  0.372021(CM2.3.4.2)  +  1.322214(CM2.3.4.3)   
      + 1.228275(CM2.3.4.4) 
 
 CM2.6 =   0.0625530(CM2.6.2)  +  0.14776(CM2.6.3)  +  1.589403(CM2.6.4)  +   
    0.423893(CM2.6.6) – 1.656224(CM2.6.7) 
 
 CM2.7 =   1.564692(CM2.7.2)  +  0.206381(CM2.7.3)  +  0.558024(CM2.7.4)  -   
    0.593958(CM2.7.5) – 1.395486(CM2.7.6) 
 
CM4  = 1.300256(CM4.1)  +  1.659824(CM4.2)  -  0.79395(CM4.3)  +  0.00(CM4.4) 
 
 CM4.4 =   1.2571(CM4.4.1)  -  0.888615(CM4.4.2)  -  0.26975(CM4.4.3) 
 
TEW  = 1.637124(TEW1)   -   1.318604(TEW2)   +   0.321842(TEW3)   +   1.974454(TEW4)   +    
   0.769844(TEW5)  +    2.363664(TEW6) 
 
 TEW1  = 2.222448(TEW1.1)   +   2.644427(TEW1.2)   +   2.690601(TEW1.3)   +    
    2.41238(TEW1.4)   +   2.148675(TEW1.5)   +   0.741645(TEW1.6)   +    
    1.304868(TEW1.7) 
 
 TEW2  =    -   0.10287(TEW2.1)   +   0.090086(TEW2.2)   +   1.868899(TEW2.3)   +    
    3.146597(TEW2.4)   +   3.146597(TEW2.5)   +   0.532187(TEW2.6) 
 
 TEW2.1  =    -   0.303213(TEW2.1.1)   +    2.834327(TEW2.1.2)   +    2.834327(TEW2.1.3)   -    
    0.217923(TEW2.1.4)  -   0.217923(TEW2.1.5) 
 
 TEW2.2  = 0.851264(TEW2.2.1)   -   0.851264(TEW2.2.2) 
 
 TEW2.3  =    -   1.144973(TEW2.3.1)   +   1.214457(TEW2.3.2)   +   0.232371(TEW2.3.3) 
 
 TEW2.5  = 2.00(TEW2.5.1)   -   2.00(TEW2.5.2) 
 
 TEW2.6  = 1.240262(TEW2.6.1)   -   1.240262(TEW2.6.2) 
 
 TEW3  = 2.338007(TEW3.1)   +    0.623628(TEW3.2)   +   0.742312(TEW3.3)   +    
    2.338007(TEW3.4)   -   0.42228(TEW3.5) 
 
 TEW4  = 2.592224(TEW4.1)   +    2.644398(TEW4.2)   +   2.647144(TEW4.3) 
 
 TEW5  = 0.842268(TEW5.1)   +    1.408116(TEW5.2)   +   1.26828(TEW5.3) 
 
 TEW5.1 = 0.988699(TEW5.1.1)   +   0.227355(TEW5.1.3)   -   1.433923(TEW5.1.4)   +    
    0.704959(TEW5.1.5)   +   1.245612 (TEW5.1.6)   -   0.337047(TEW5.1.7)   -    
    0.961557(TEW5.1.8)   -   0.961557(TEW5.1.9)   +   3.427148(TEW5.1.10)   +    
   3.427148(TEW5.1.11)   +   0.28307(TEW5.1.12)   +   3.568918(TEW5.1.13)   +    
   0.005078(TEW5.1.14)   +   0.397947(TEW5.1.15)   -   1.624478(TEW5.1.16)   -    
   2.063579(TEW5.1.17)1.556532(TEW5.1.18) 
 
 TEW5.2  = 3.530988(TEW5.2.1)   +   4.51638(TEW5.2.2)   +   4.51638(TEW5.2.3)   +    
    4.51638(TEW5.2.4)   -   0.306768(TEW5.2.5)   +     4.51638(TEW5.2.6)   +    
    1.33854(TEW5.2.7)   +   1.33854(TEW5.2.8) 
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TEW5.2.7  = 4.536(TEW5.2.7.1)   +    0.464(TEW5.2.7.2)   +   (2.684E   -   16)(TEW5.2.7.3)   
-   (4.76E   -   33)(TEW5.2.7.4)   -   (2.82E   -   16)(TEW5.2.7.5) 
 TEW5.2.8  = 1.551272(TEW5.2.8.1)   +   1.551272(TEW5.2.8.2) 
 
 TEW5.3  = 1.651431(TEW5.3.1)   +   0.423199(TEW5.3.2)   +   3.928482(TEW5.3.3)   +    
    3.928482(TEW5.3.4)   -   0.155779(TEW5.3.5)   +    2.222856(TEW5.3.6)   -    
    0.155779(TEW5.3.7)   +   0.109507(TEW5.3.8)     +   2.222856(TEW5.3.9)     +    
    3.928482(TEW5.3.10) 
 
 TEW6  = 1.469358(TEW6.1)   +   1.469358(TEW6.2) 
 
 
Evac 1.1  = 1.03525(E1.1.1) + 0.980266(H) + 1.228022(V) - 1.191704(T) + 0.294421(CM) +   
    1.042065(TEWS) 
 
Evac 1.2  = 0.57724(E1.1.2) + 0.824712(E1.1.3) - 0.46242(E1.1.4) + 1.501194(H) + 1.156557(V)  
    – 1.23216(T) + 1.070411(CM) +  0.520371(TEWS) 
 
Evac 1.3  = 1.524423(E1.2) + 1.312855(H) + 0.761002(V) - 1.412381(T) + 0.673033(CM) +   
    1.093189(TEWS) 
 
Evac 1.4  = 0.841219(E1.3) - 1.118966(H) + 0.20584(V) + 1.041528(T) + 1.144105(CM) +   
    0.86943(TEWS) 
 
Evac 2.1  = 1.198446(E1.1.1) + 1.480426(H) + 0.329104(V) - 1.180598(T) + 0.546179(CM) +   
    0.594646(TEWS) 
 
Evac 2.2  =  - 0.168594(E2.2) - 0.938497(H) + 0.593755(V) + 1.283106(T) + 1.324307(CM) +  
    1.052126(TEWS 
 
 
6.7 Result and discussion  
Result of the numerical analysis for government model occurred during the data 
acquisition show, there were many hindrance factors that was not effective in the 
implementation. For example the national tsunami drill and many other scale of drill 
performed starting from school level, neighborhood level until city level has not 
covered the community at risk. There are still many people being left out from the 
countermeasures, which mean there is a need for bridging mechanism for these 
countermeasures to be able to reach majority of people at risk. 
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Thus this numerical logic model can be used as the basis to develop the right policy 
for creating the tsunami safe city for solving the right need for people of Padang at 
this moment. It is recommended this assessment should be conducted in periodic 
interval, i.e. prior to the development of five yearly master plan of the city, using the 
logic model tree developed. 
The logic model tree is very useful not only for the reassessment of case study city, i.e. 
Padang City, but also could be used to asses other tsunami prone area in Indonesia. 
To have more global logic model of people mind in the regional or international level 
toward the tsunami early warning system and their readiness to tsunami threat, it is 
the challenge for this study to be tested in other country. The more the tested, the 
more complete the model set and the better to be used for the assessment tools and for 
the basis for the policy analysis and policy development. 
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Chapter 7 
Research Findings and Future Works  
 
7.1 Research Findings 
The complexity of the phenomena of effective tsunami early warning system is 
defined by this study as the integration of natural, socio, technical and physical 
phenomena, aiming to save people as many as possible by alerting the people at risk 
with sufficient lead time to make decision for evacuation. To understand better the 
phenomena, the study has proved to be able describe the phenomena in total in the 
forms of integration of layer models and floating indicators.   
The layers models represent the phenomena of natural phenomena system as the first 
model, the phenomena of detecting, analyzing and disseminating the warning of 
potential tsunami as the second model, the phenomena of government cognitive 
representation model as the third model, and the phenomena of people cognitive 
representation model as the fourth model. The floating indicators consist of the 
indicators representing preparedness level of the city and the stakeholders including, 
physical and socio vulnerability and capacity indicators. Total model can be seen also 
in Figure 7.1. 
The study is not only able to prove the knowledge representation of tsunami early 
warning phenomena in total, but also it is able to prove the methodology of 
structuring the problem in the form of relation among factors and variables of each 
phenomena, see Figure 7.2. 
The use of new approach of logic model, i.e. PBLM - physically based logic model 
and TKBLM - tacit knowledge based logic model, is very fruitful findings which 
enables the process of problem structuring and acquiring all related variables and 
factors in total and holistic.  These new approach of logic model is able to bridge the 
limitation in data acquisition. Meanwhile the use of non-reduction factors approach of 
Principal Component Analysis - PCA is very useful to have a complete and holistic 
model structure of the logic model. 
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Figure 7.1 Integrated Logic Model of Effective Tsunami Early Warning System 
 
The numerical logic model developed using the Principal Component Analysis - PCA 
is proved the ability of the model to analyze the people mind, by showing the 
numerical correlation between variables and factors, also among factors in the 
integrated model.  
Meanwhile the occurrence of Mentawai tsunami in 2010 during the study was 
valuable windows of opportunity to model people’s mind for before and after the 
tsunami phenomena. Two people model were developed, i.e. prior tsunami model and 
post tsunami model, to complement with the ability to develop government model. 
Detailed result of numerical model developed in this study is very useful to recognize 
how the people minds are influenced by their social status (job position), prior 
perception/belief to tsunami early warning system triggered by past experience and 
past information, and heuristic belief triggered by current external factors. The study 
also finds that prior belief based risk perception of the people toward disaster 
experience has limitation, as shown by the correlation among factors/elements 
between different group and different timeline of data acquisition.  
 
169 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2 Research Methodologies for the Development of Integrated Logic Model of Effective 
Tsunami Early Warning System 
 
This numerical analysis performed is confirming the correlations among 
variables/factors in every level of the tree and in each cluster, as well as in the 
decision scenario.  Then keeping all factors (no reduction), is conforming the holistic 
logic model. There are 487 variables structured for prior tsunami people model and 
485 variables for post tsunami people model and 502 variables of government models, 
see Figure 7.3 for the summary of variables and Figure 7.4 for graphical 
representation of the people model and Figure 7.5 for government model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3 Number of variable (acquired through Questionnaire based Interview) for People Prior 
Tsunami (RP1), People Post Tsunami (RP2) and Government Officials (RG) 
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Figure 7.4 People Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.5 Government Model 
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To conclude that the outcome of the study is proving two original findings, i.e. the 
integrated logic model developed and the new methodology for the process 
development of logic model which is a new theory as a gate for better methodology in 
policy making. It is expected that the model developed by this study will be a useful 
policy making tool for the city managers from tsunami prone area in Indonesia as well 
as in other region for achieving effective tsunami early system.  
7.2 Future Works 
In the future, the more frequent the model used, the more exhaustive the model. Some 
basic people perception toward disaster threat (tsunami) found in the study, no matter 
region, nationality or intensity of DRR countermeasures implemented, i.e. responses 
of people during 2009 Padang City and 2011 Tohoku tsunami cases and the factors 
related with family important and following the mass evacuation.  
For future works, implementation can be two schemes, i.e. for cities level tsunami 
prone cities in Indonesia or other cities in other region. For tsunami prone cities 
(Indonesia) – this model is useful for policy making tool for the city managers in 
achieving effective TEW through assessing the level of tsunami risk, assessing the 
allocation needs for implementing tsunami DRR countermeasures and monitoring and 
evaluation the effectiveness of tsunami early warning.  
For the regional level the model can be up-scaled for regional policy making tool 
through comparison analysis between cities from tsunami prone area for policy 
development and policy review at regional and national level. 
Other future work is that the research methodology can be applied not only in disaster 
area but also to other area of works, such as any area related with public management, 
health management. 
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A1 –  System Architecture of Integrated Logic Model of    
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3. WS118365 interview with Fisherman Community in 
Pariaman Regency
Fisherman  1:  reaction not to evacuate
 Immediate after strong shaking he and his wife just 
checked the water at the coast behind their ‘tsunami 
resistant housing’ as part of DKP (ocean and fishery 
department) project
 Then they decided to remain at their second floor house, 
the decision is based on:
 No sign of tsunami, i.e. the back drop of water
 The closes hill is very far
 The family has joined tsunami drill once in 2007
 If the tsunami occurred they were sure no one will lead 
them, they have to lead themselves.
 Before the EQ there were strange phenomena such as sky 
was dark since morning 10 a.m. the water was bad, so the 
fishermen could not go to the sea.
1. WS118370 interview with government official who did not 
evacuate (English and mix recorded interview)
 Name: ArdiansyahRidwan ,  from Economic Department of City Assistant II
 Email/Facebook:  ArdiansyahRidwan
 The EQ event occurred when he was on the way home about 500 m from home 
and about 3 minutes to reach home in normal condition.
 People were panic on the street due to strong shaking  he decided to go 
immediately home in Juniarso Street which is in the red zone (very high risk).
 He checked the neighbor house (shop houses Pharmacies at the first floor and 
lodging for student at the second house) collapsed. His 2 stories home was 
remained firmed. 
 He ran to the top floor checking the natural sign for tsunami, i.e. flock of the birds 
flying from the coastline to the mainland. Nothing can be seen.
 He calmed the family not to evacuate with the decision:
 No sign for tsunami
 No point for evacuation since the panic flock of the crowd of evacuee rushing 
with cars and many others vehicles  he is afraid the family could be killed.
 The two story house was still remain strong
 In front and the back side of his house there were two middle schools with 3 
stories were remain, i.e. SMP Muhammadiyahand SMP Swasta
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2. WS118382 at Hotel Inna Muara( Bahasa ) with Hotel Duty 
Manager and City Government officials
Person 1:  City Government Officer
 Just describing the damages on hotel business, he was not in Padang during 
EQ
Person 2:  Hotel Duty Manager in charge during EQ
 Mains shock was felt around 5 pm (fact 5:17pm), the first main shock was 
after 6 pm (fact on 5:25), then 9 pm
 No siren was heard (fact: true)
 Electricity, phone (fix and mobile except XL), water and radio were cut off
 After main shock, he did not run for tsunami evacuation because:
 When he ran to top floor to check water at the beach for tsunami 
sign, nothing seems unusual, the wave was calm. 
 When he checked the street in front of hotel, it was chaotic and 
overcrowded by people, cars and anything 
 Then he decided not to evacuate the guest (government officials 
from other cities in Sumatera regions)
 The male guest were stayed up at the roof top
 The female guest stayed in the lobby due to :
 afraid of following aftershocks which were frequently 
occurred (about 20 times within first 6 hours)
 there are 2 pregnant ladies
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9. Disaster 
experienced
Flood
Earthquake
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V
3. Gender
Men
Women
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Very afraid
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Not afraid
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On foot
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P
Finding empty route (even 
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P
to save family first by going home
searching info tsunami from government
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Waiting for tsunami warning from siren
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On duty
Others
P
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Praying
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21. Consideration to 
delay the evacuation
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14.2 tsunami drill
C
No
C
14.6 To move to 
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Still in plan
ASAPC
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Still in plan
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P
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22. If that day you heard 
tsunami warning, do people 
immediately EVACUATE
No
Yes P
Info: trusted, reliable
Info: taken for granted
Refection: experience/learn
Reflection: needs to save lives 
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22.1 Reasons for 
immediate evacaution
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Info: not trusted, unreliable
Info: taken for granted
Refection: experience/learn to 
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19.2(a) Reason not to use the 
designated evacuation route
Structuring People’s Mind vs. Tsunami Warning & Tsunami Phenomena 
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     Evacuation = f (Evacuation Mode, Evacuation Route, Reasons, Perception on Tsunami Risk, DRR  
                             Countermeasures, Appreciation to TEWS, Disaster Experience, Vulnerability and Capacity) 
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6. Appreciation 
to TEWS
TEW4.3 Fire 
brigades_performance 
in handling disaster 
situation caused by fire 
due to earthquake
TEW4.1 Police 
(POLRI)_performa
nce in handling 
evacuation 
process
TEW
4
TEW4 First 30 minutes 
after EQ, how the 
performance of 
government officials 
and its stakeholders
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Government
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Reason: Immediate Ev cuate - af er 
EQ and TEW
1. Ei - Reasoning 
2. Vi - Vulnerabilities 
1. TEWSi – Tsunami Warning Sys
1. Hi – Hazard & Disaster 1. Ti - Tsunami 
1. CMi – DRR Countermeasures 
E1 2 
E1  
E113 
V 
T H 
TE  
C  
Evac 1.2 = f (E112, E113, E114, Hi, Vi, Ti, CMi, TEWSi) 
3/16/2012 
2 
E1.1.2 What was the reasons not to follow the designated 
evacuation route?  
E112
E1124 Family matter
E1125 on the way home
E1122 govt. order for evacuation troublesome to follow
E1123 panic
E1126 cautious for landslide at the hill after the EQ
E1121 dark and no light due to electricity cut off after EQ
E11210 no reason
E1129 unfamiliar/not known evacuation route
E1127 traffic jam of evacuee’s mixed vehicle 
E1128 afraid of other evacuee behavior
E1.1.2=0.284944(E1.1.2.1)+1.172599(E1.1.2.2)+1.162726(E1.1.2.3)+0.872157(E1.1.2.4)+ 
             1.57079(E1.1.2.5)−0.724074(E1.1.2.6)+1.195278(E1.1.2.7)+1.41669(E1.1.2.8)−0.986338(E1.1.2.9) 
                −0.360927(E1.1.2.10) 
PERCENTAGE  OF CORRELATION 
CONTRIBUTION 
RP1 RP2 
E1.1.2.1  Dark and no light due to no electricity 2.92% 
E1.1.2.2  Troublesome government order for 
evacuation 
12.03% 
E1.1.2.3  Panic 11.93% 
E1.1.2.4  FAMILY MATTER_Family agreement to 
wait for parents before evacuate 
8.95% 
E1.1.2.5  On the way home 16.12% 
E1.1.2.6  Cautious for landslide following EQ 7.43% 
E1.1.2.7 traffic jammed by evacuee 12.26% 50.00% 
E1.1.2.8 afraid of evacuee behavior 14.54% 
E1.1.2.9 unfamiliar route for evacuation 10.12% 50.00% 
E1.1.2.10 no reason 3.70% 
𝐄𝟏. 𝟏. 𝟐 = −𝟎. 𝟖𝟓𝟕𝟐𝟗𝟖 𝐄𝟏. 𝟏. 𝟐. 𝟕 +  𝟎. 𝟖𝟓𝟕𝟐𝟗𝟖 𝐄𝟏. 𝟏. 𝟐. 𝟗  
COMPONENT 
RP 1 RP 2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 
E1.1.2.1  Dark and no light due to no electricity .227 .302 .473 -.721 
E1.1.2.2  Troublesome government order for evacuation .227 .302 .391 .656 -.410 
E1.1.2.3  Panic .866 -.182 
E1.1.2.4  FAMILY MATTER_Family agreement to wait for 
parents then evacuate 
.741 
E1.1.2.5  On the way home .227 .302 .191 .843 
E1.1.2.6  Cautious for landslide following EQ .227 .302 -.787 -.126 -.34 
E1.1.2.7 traffic jammed by evacuee .201 .744 -.754 
E1.1.2.8 afraid of evacuee behavior .891 
E1.1.2.9 unfamiliar route for evacuation -.160 -.787 
.754 
 
E1.1.2.10 no reason all .432 .432 
RP1 RP2 
Fear 
(human Factor) 
Circumstances 
(External Factor) 
3/16/2012 
3 
E1.1.3 What evacuation route taken? (Q19.2.2) 
E1139 to tsunami safe area (hill, higher area, further inland)
E1135 take the route directly toward home
E1136 toward Critical Facilities (i.e. hospital)
E11310  following the crowd
E1131 finding empty route (even longer & via beach)
E1132 to find the closest route
E1133 bypass/trespassing other's property
E1134 take the main road
E1137 toward closest open field/space from house
E113
E1138 Assembly at the house front yard
E1.1.3 = −1.231975 𝐸1.1.3.1 + 0.05739 𝐸1.1.3.2 + −0.005788 𝐸1.1.3.3 + 1.59979 𝐸1.1.3.4 +
1.680948 𝐸1.1.3.5 +  0.179542 𝐸1.1.3.6 + 0.693166 𝐸1.1.3.7 + 0.0093659 𝐸1.1.3.8 +
0.349148 𝐸1.1.3.9 + 1.709513 𝐸1.1.3.10   
PERCENTAGE  OF CORRELATION 
CONTRIBUTION 
RP1 RP2 
E1.1.3.1  Finding empty route even though passing 
by beach 
16.39% 39.01% 
E1.1.3.2  Finding closest route 0.76% 
E1.1.3.3  Bypass/trespassing other's property 0.08% 56.33% 
E1.1.3.4  Taking main road 21.28% 
E1.1.3.5  Taking route directly to home 22.36% 
E1.1.3.6  To Critical Facilities (i.e. hospital) 2.39% 
E1.1.3.7  To closest open field from the house 9.22% 
E1.1.3.8 Assembly at house front yard 0.12% 
E1.1.3.9  To tsunami safe area - Hill, Higher ground 4.65% 
E1.1.3.10  Following the crowd 22.74% 4.66% 
𝐄𝟏. 𝟏. 𝟑 = −𝟎. 𝟖𝟓𝟑𝟐𝟕𝟓 𝑬𝟏. 𝟏. 𝟑. 𝟏 + 𝟏. 𝟐𝟑𝟐𝟏𝟗𝟑 𝑬𝟏. 𝟏. 𝟑. 𝟑 + 𝟎. 𝟏𝟎𝟏𝟗𝟔𝟔 𝑬𝟏. 𝟏. 𝟑. 𝟏𝟎  
Similar case with Japan 
COMPONENT 
RP 1 RP 2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 
E1.1.3.1  Finding empty route even though passing 
by beach 
  -0.126 -0.781 -0.153 -0.107     
-.672 -.393 
E1.1.3.2  Finding closest route -0.556 0.628           
E1.1.3.3  Bypass/trespassing other's property -0.581 0.609             .902 
E1.1.3.4  Taking main road     0.129   0.151 0.604 0.708 
E1.1.3.5  Taking route directly to home 
0.534 0.486 -0.235 0.455       
E1.1.3.6  To Critical Facilities (i.e. hospital) 
    0.129   0.151 0.604 -0.708 
E1.1.3.7  To closest open field from the house 
    0.231 0.172 0.741 -0.460   
E1.1.3.8 Assembly at house front yard 
    0.385 0.458 -0.619 -0.221   
E1.1.3.9  To tsunami safe area - Hill, Higher ground 
0.336 0.258 0.343 -0.727 -0.116     
E1.1.3.10  Following the crowd 0.650 0.543           .796 -.259 
RP1 RP2 
Passive behavior 
Physical Factor 
3/16/2012 
4 
E1.1.4 How did you evacuate (Unplanned/spontaneously)?  
E1.1.4 =0.71497(E1.1.4.1)−0.71497(E1.1.4.3) 
PERCENTAGE  OF CORRELATION CONTRIBUTION RP1 RP2 
E1.1.4.1  On foot 50.00% - 
E1.1.4.3  By motor cycle 50.00% - 
E1111 On foot
E1112 Using bicycle
E1113 Using motorcycle
E1114 Using own car
E1115 Using public transport
E1116 Joining neighbor’s car
E114
E1117 Others
H1. Disaster experienced and awareness (multiple answer) 
 
H1
Experience
H1 H1.6 Riot
H1.5 Accident
H1.4 Volcanic Eruption
H1.3 Tsunami
H1.2 Earthquake
H1.1 Flood
H1.7 Domestic Fire
H1.8 Storm/Tidal Surge
H1.10 Burglary
H1.9 Typhoon
𝐇𝟏 = 𝟑. 𝟓𝟕𝟎𝟖𝟕𝟔 𝑯𝟏. 𝟏 + 𝟐. 𝟒𝟒𝟎𝟓𝟔𝟔 𝑯𝟏. 𝟐 + 𝟒. 𝟑𝟓𝟒𝟔𝟎𝟒 𝑯𝟏. 𝟑 + 𝟒. 𝟑𝟕𝟒𝟖𝟎𝟕 𝑯𝟏. 𝟒
+ 𝟑. 𝟗𝟐𝟕𝟒𝟒𝟖 𝑯𝟏. 𝟓 + 𝟒. 𝟎𝟗𝟐𝟎𝟖𝟓 𝑯𝟏. 𝟔 + 𝟐. 𝟑𝟗𝟗𝟐𝟕𝟐 𝑯𝟏. 𝟕 + 𝟏. 𝟖𝟑𝟑𝟐𝟓𝟖 𝑯𝟏. 𝟖
+ 𝟐. 𝟑𝟓𝟐𝟏𝟐 𝑯𝟏. 𝟗 + 𝟐. 𝟒𝟎𝟐𝟗𝟐 𝑯𝟏. 𝟏𝟎  
PERCENTAGE  OF CORRELATION 
CONTRIBUTION 
RP1 RP2 
H1.1  Flood 11.25% 14.34% 
H1.2 Earthquake 7.69% 13.86% 
H1.3 Tsunami 13.72% 19.69% 
H1.4 Volcanic Eruption 13.78% 19.66% 
H1.5 Accident  12.37% 12.23% 
H1.6 Riot 12.89% 13.71% 
H1.7 Domestic Fire 7.56% - 
H1.8 Storm / Tidal Surge 5.77% 6.50% 
H1.9 Typhoon 7.41% - 
H1.10 Burglary  7.57% - 
𝐇𝟏 = 𝟐. 𝟏𝟏𝟎𝟒𝟑𝟕 𝑯𝟏. 𝟏 + 𝟐. 𝟎𝟒𝟎𝟕𝟖𝟑 𝑯𝟏. 𝟐 + 𝟐. 𝟖𝟗𝟗𝟏𝟒 𝑯𝟏. 𝟑 + 𝟐. 𝟖𝟗𝟒𝟏𝟐𝟒 𝑯𝟏. 𝟒 + 𝟏. 𝟖𝟎𝟎𝟑𝟖𝟕 𝑯𝟏. 𝟓
+ 𝟐. 𝟎𝟏𝟖𝟖𝟑𝟐 𝑯𝟏. 𝟔  −  𝟎. 𝟗𝟓𝟔𝟖𝟔𝟐 𝑯𝟏. 𝟖   
Similar case  with  Japan 
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COMPONENT MATRIX 
RP 1 RP 2 
1 2 3 1 2 
H1.1  Flood .517 .408 .364 .483 .486 
H1.2 Earthquake .186 .381 .822 .388 .679 
H1.3 Tsunami .829 .364 -.212 .916   
H1.4 Volcanic Eruption .846 .352 -.247 .821 .247 
H1.5 Accident  .703 .336   .750 -.479 
H1.6 Riot .732 .444 -.181 .802 -.434 
H1.7 Domestic Fire .729 -.559 .108 
H1.8 Storm / Tidal Surge .543 -.447 .186 -.249 -.141 
H1.9 Typhoon .730 -.530   
H1.10 Burglary  .746 -.542   
RP1 RP2 
H2 Q10. Disaster that affected or will affect your life the most (1 answer) 
 
H2
All Disaster
H2 H2.5 Civil War, Riot
H2.4 Natural Disaster
H2.3 Accident
H2.2 Diseases
H2.1 Unemployment
H2.6 Hunger
H2.7 Domestic Fire
H2.8 Family Conflict
Explosion of domestic gas
Unclassified Causes
H2.9 others
𝐇𝟐 = 𝟏. 𝟎𝟒𝟔𝟗𝟓𝟐 𝑯𝟐. 𝟏 + 𝟏. 𝟖𝟎𝟔𝟗𝟐 𝑯𝟐. 𝟐 + 𝟏. 𝟎𝟔𝟏𝟖𝟕𝟐 𝑯𝟐. 𝟑 − 𝟑. 𝟎𝟕𝟕𝟐𝟑𝟗 𝑯𝟐. 𝟒 + 𝟏. 𝟎𝟏𝟑 𝑯𝟐. 𝟓
+  𝟏. 𝟎𝟐 𝑯𝟐. 𝟔 +  𝟏. 𝟎𝟎𝟕 𝑯𝟐. 𝟕 + 𝟏. 𝟎𝟎𝟑 𝑯𝟐. 𝟖 + 𝟏. 𝟎𝟐𝟗 𝑯𝟐. 𝟗  
PERCENTAGE  OF CORRELATION 
CONTRIBUTION 
RP1 RP2 
H2.1 Unemployment 8.68% 
H2.2 Diseases 14.98% 
H2.3 Accident 8.80% 50.00% 
H2.4 Natural disaster 25.51% 
H2.5 Civil war, riot, commotion 8.40% 
H2.6 Hunger 8.45% 
H2.7 domestic fire 8.35% 
H2.8 family conflict due to personal reason 8.31% 50.00% 
H2.9 None 8.53% - 
𝐇𝟐 = 𝟐. 𝟎𝟎 𝑯𝟐. 𝟑 − 𝟐. 𝟎𝟎 𝑯𝟐. 𝟖   
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COMPONENT 
 RP 1 RP 2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 
H2.1 Unemployment .396 .323 .758 -.379 -.107       
H2.2 Diseases .528 -.819 -.107 -.173         
H2.3 Accident .427 .513 -.674 -.290         1.000 
H2.4 Natural disaster -1.000               
H2.5 Civil war, riot, commotion .193     .176 .175 .923 -.196   
H2.6 Hunger .239     .327 .841 -.322 -.112   
H2.7 domestic fire .135         .119 .961 -.169 
H2.8 family conflict             .137 .981 
-1.000 
 
H2.9 None .279 .110   .788 -.500 -.162     
RP1 RP2 
H3 Q11.Natural disaster that have affected or will affect your life the 
most. (1 answer) 
H3
Natural 
Disaster
H3 H3.4 TsunamiH3.3 Earthquake
H3.2 Landslide
H3.1 Flood
H3.5 Typhoon
H3.6 Others
𝐇𝟑 = 𝟏. 𝟏𝟒𝟕𝟖𝟏𝟖 𝑯𝟑. 𝟏 + 𝟏. 𝟑𝟎𝟗𝟏𝟗𝟑 𝑯𝟑. 𝟐 − 𝟏. 𝟗𝟒𝟕𝟓𝟎𝟔 𝑯𝟑. 𝟑 +  𝟏. 𝟎𝟎𝟐𝟓𝟗𝟔 𝑯𝟑. 𝟒
+ 𝟏. 𝟓𝟖𝟏𝟓𝟓𝟑 𝑯𝟑. 𝟓 +  𝟎. 𝟗𝟏𝟎𝟑𝟕𝟒 𝑯𝟑. 𝟔 −  𝟎. 𝟑𝟐𝟐𝟖𝟒𝟔 𝑯𝟑. 𝟕  
PERCENTAGE  OF CORRELATION 
CONTRIBUTION 
RP1 RP2 
H3.1 Flood 13.96% 11.46% 
H3.2 Landslide 
15.92% 
H3.3 Earthquake 23.69% 41.68% 
H3.4 Tsunami 12.19% 46.86% 
H3.5 Cyclone 19.24% 
H3.6 Others 11.07% 
H3.7 None 3.93% 
𝐇𝟑 = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟔𝟗𝟔𝟖𝟑 𝑯𝟑. 𝟏 − 𝟏. 𝟕𝟎𝟕𝟖𝟖𝟖 𝑯𝟑. 𝟑 +  𝟏. 𝟗𝟏𝟗𝟗𝟐𝟓 𝑯𝟑. 𝟒  
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COMPONENT MATRIX 
RP 1 RP 2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 
H3.1 Flood .210 .519 .716 -.390 -.136     .975 
H3.2 Landslide   .120     .207 .968 
H3.3 Earthquake -.991 -.111         -.673 -.673 
H3.4 Tsunami .850 -.522         .975   
H3.5 Cyclone .197 .463   .849 -.151   
H3.6 Others   .176     .950 -.236 
H3.7 None .210 .519 -.716 -.390 -.136   
RP1 RP2 
H1
Disaster 
Experience
H1.6 Riot
Intensity
H1.5 Accident
H1.4 Volcanic Eruption
H1.3 Tsunami
H1.2 Earthquake
H1.1 Flood
H1.7 Domestic Fire
H1.8 Storm/Tidal Surge
H1.9 Burglary
H1.10 Typhoon
H2
Disaster 
affected their 
life most
H2.5 Civil War, Riot
H2.4 Natural Disaster
H2.3 Accident
H2.2 Diseases
H2.1 Unemployment
H2.6 Hunger
H2.7 Domestic Fire
H2.8 Family Conflict
H2.9 Combination of it
Explosion of domestic gas
Unclassified 
Causes
H3
Natural Disaster 
affected their life 
most
H3.4 Tsunami
H3.3 Earthquake
H3.2 Landslide
H3.1 Flood
H3.5 Typhoon
H3.6 Others
2. Disaster Experience  
& Perception
𝐇 = 𝟏. 𝟏𝟒𝟕𝟖𝟏𝟖 𝑯𝟏 + 𝟏. 𝟑𝟎𝟗𝟏𝟗𝟑 𝑯𝟐
− 𝟏. 𝟗𝟒𝟕𝟓𝟎𝟔 𝑯𝟑  
PERCENTAGE  OF CORRELATION 
CONTRIBUTION 
RP1 RP2 
H1 Disaster experienced and 
awareness  
21.33% 33.97% 
H2 Disaster that affected or will 
affect your life the most  
38.73% 33.28% 
H3 Natural disaster affected or 
will affect your life the most. 
39.94% 32.75% 
𝐇 = −𝟎. 𝟒𝟒𝟓𝟒𝟒𝟓 𝑯𝟏 − 𝟎. 𝟕𝟒𝟖𝟓𝟏 𝑯𝟐
+ 𝟎. 𝟕𝟑𝟔𝟔𝟏 𝑯𝟑   
Hi – Hazard Perception and Disaster Experience 
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COMPONENT MATRIX RP1 RP2 
H1 Disaster experienced and awareness  -0.385 .642 
H2 Disaster that affected or will affect your life the most  0.699 -.629 
H3 Natural disaster that have affected or will affect your life the 
most.  
0.721 .619 
RP1 RP2 
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PERCENTAGE  OF CORRELATION CONTRIBUTION RP1 RP2 
V1 Gender 8.08% 15.63% 
V2 Ages 0.12% 10.32% 
V3 Education 11.33% 4.94% 
V4 Average Monthly Income 21.55% 12.69% 
V5 Occupation 16.71% 17.50% 
V6  households Vulnerability 21.27% 20.34% 
V7 House Vulnerability 20.94% 18.58% 
𝐕 = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟔𝟑𝟑𝟐𝟒 𝑽𝟏 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟕𝟎𝟒𝟐𝟎 𝑽𝟐 + 𝟎. 𝟔𝟒𝟗𝟔𝟓𝟕 𝑽𝟑 + 𝟏. 𝟐𝟑𝟔𝟎𝟑𝟗 𝑽𝟒
+  𝟎. 𝟗𝟓𝟖𝟐𝟐𝟑 𝑽𝟓 + 𝟏. 𝟐𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟐 𝑽𝟔 + 𝟏. 𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟗𝟓𝟑 𝑽𝟕 𝟏. 𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟗𝟓𝟑(𝑽𝟕) 
𝐕 = 𝟏. 𝟏𝟗𝟕𝟏𝟐 𝑽𝟏 + 𝟎. 𝟕𝟗𝟎𝟑𝟑𝟔 𝑽𝟐 + 𝟎. 𝟑𝟕𝟖𝟒𝟔𝟑 𝑽𝟑 + 𝟎. 𝟗𝟕𝟏𝟒𝟓𝟐 𝑽𝟒 +  𝟏. 𝟑𝟑𝟗𝟗𝟓𝟐 𝑽𝟓
+ 𝟏. 𝟓𝟓𝟕𝟕𝟎𝟗 𝑽𝟔 + 𝟏. 𝟒𝟐𝟐𝟗𝟗𝟔 𝑽𝟕   
Vi – Social and Physical Vulnerability 
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COMPONENT MATRIX 
RP 1 RP 2 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
V1 Gender .454 .331 -.552 .720   -.120 
V2 Ages .508 -.501 -.112 .324 -.396 .641 
V3 Education .575 -.399 .288 .403 -.463 .201 
V4 Average Monthly Income .543   .432 .726   -.340 
V5 Occupation .517 .411 -.261 .648   .136 
V6  households Vulnerability   .470 .618 .328 .761   
V7 House Vulnerability .275 .539 .150   .544 .689 
RP1 RP2 
T2 Impact of tsunami  [multiple answer] 
𝐓𝟐 = 𝟐. 𝟏𝟓𝟐𝟑𝟐 𝑻𝟐. 𝟏 +  𝟐. 𝟏𝟏𝟑𝟒𝟎𝟖 𝑻𝟐. 𝟐
+ 𝟏. 𝟗𝟏𝟏𝟓𝟓𝟐 𝑻𝟐. 𝟑 +  𝟏. 𝟐𝟖𝟏𝟔𝟔𝟒 𝑻𝟐. 𝟒   
PERCENTAGE  OF CORRELATION CONTRIBUTION RP1 RP2 
T2.1 On yourself 28.86% 34.34% 
T2.2 On family members: spouse, children, parents, 
brothers/sisters 
28.33% 34.90% 
T2.3 On your property/ belonging 25.63% 30.77% 
T2.4 On cattle 17.18% 
𝐓𝟐 = 𝟏. 𝟒𝟒𝟏𝟏𝟖𝟖 𝑻𝟐. 𝟏 +  𝟏. 𝟒𝟔𝟒𝟔𝟔𝟔 𝑻𝟐. 𝟐
+ 𝟏. 𝟐𝟗𝟏𝟐𝟗 𝑻𝟐. 𝟑  T2. Impact of tsunami
T2
T2.4 Nothing loss
T2.3 Loss of cattle
T2.2 Loss of family members
T2.3 Loss of your property
T2.1 loss of yourself
T2.5 N.A.
3/16/2012 
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COMPONENT MATRIX RP1 RP2 
T2.1 On yourself .885 .798 
T2.2 On family members: spouse, children, parents, 
brothers/sisters 
.869 .811 
T2.3 On your property/ belonging .786 .715 
T2.4 On cattle .527 
RP1 
RP2 
PERCENTAGE  OF CORRELATION CONTRIBUTION RP1 RP2 
T1 Tsunami stricken your house 19.73% 27.24% 
T2 Impact of tsunami  [multiple answer] 22.61% 30.71% 
T3 Did you think for a tsunami occurrence following the shaking? 30.19% 20.26% 
T4 What would you feel if the tsunami were occurred? 27.48% 21.79% 
T =1.30592(T1)+ 1.49632(T2)+1.99808(T3)+ 1.81888(T4)  
𝐓 = 𝟏. 𝟒𝟓𝟗𝟐𝟔𝟖 𝑻𝟏 +  𝟏. 𝟔𝟒𝟓𝟐𝟐 𝑻𝟐 + 𝟏. 𝟎𝟖𝟓𝟏𝟓𝟔 𝑻𝟑 +  𝟏. 𝟏𝟔𝟕𝟏𝟑𝟐 𝑻𝟒  
T – Tsunami Knowledge and Triggering Event 
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COMPONENT MATRIX 
RP 1 RP 2 
1 1 2 
T1 Tsunami stricken your house .885 .295 .803 
T2 Impact of tsunami  [multiple answer] .869 .564 .545 
T3 Did you think for a tsunami occurrence following 
the shaking? 
.786 .827 -.349 
T4 What would you feel if the tsunami were occurred? .527 .843 -.303 
RP1 
RP2 
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Training
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Prep re Family Action Plan
 Family & 
Public Education
F mily Safety
𝐂𝐌𝟏 =   𝟎. 𝟒𝟔𝟓𝟗𝟏𝟓 𝑪𝑴𝟏. 𝟏 − 𝟎. 𝟎𝟓𝟕𝟑𝟔𝟓 𝑪𝑴𝑬𝟏. 𝟐 + 𝟎. 𝟕𝟐𝟖𝟑𝟗𝟕 𝑪𝑴𝟏. 𝟑 +  𝟐. 𝟎𝟖𝟐𝟗𝟖𝟑 𝑪𝑴𝟏. 𝟒
+  𝟐. 𝟏𝟎𝟖𝟎𝟖𝟓 𝑪𝑴𝟏. 𝟓 + 𝟏. 𝟎𝟒𝟕𝟑𝟑𝟕 𝑪𝑴𝟏. 𝟔 + 𝟏. 𝟑𝟏𝟏𝟑𝟒𝟏 𝑪𝑴𝟏. 𝟕 − 𝟏. 𝟔𝟕𝟓𝟑𝟕𝟏 𝑪𝑴𝟏. 𝟖
+  𝟎. 𝟖𝟓𝟑𝟗𝟗𝟐 𝑪𝑴𝟏. 𝟗 +  𝟏. 𝟎𝟑𝟏𝟎𝟔𝟑(𝑪𝑴𝟏. 𝟏𝟎) 
𝐂𝐌𝟏 =   𝟕. 𝟎𝟎 𝑪𝑴𝟏. 𝟏 + 𝟕. 𝟎𝟎 𝑪𝑴𝑬𝟏. 𝟐 + 𝟕. 𝟎𝟎 𝑪𝑴𝟏. 𝟑 +  𝟕. 𝟎𝟎 𝑪𝑴𝟏. 𝟒 + 𝟕. 𝟎𝟎 𝑪𝑴𝟏. 𝟓
+ 𝟕. 𝟎𝟎 𝑪𝑴𝟏. 𝟔 + 𝟕. 𝟎𝟎 𝑪𝑴𝟏. 𝟕  
CM1 DRR countermeasures in anticipating tsunami 
3/16/2012 
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PERCENTAGE  OF CORRELATION CONTRIBUTION RP1 RP2 
CM1.1 TRAINING 3.67% 14.29% 
CM1.2 Tsunami Drill 10.86% 14.29% 
CM1.3 Family action plan for tsunami 5.74% 14.29% 
CM1.4 Family education on tsunami 16.42% 14.29% 
CM1.5 Public Education to neighborhood on tsunami 16.62% 14.29% 
CM1.6 Moving to tsunami safe zone (in land and higher ground) 8.26% 14.29% 
CM1.7 Building/renting TSUNAMI SAFER HOUSE (multi stories 
houses) 
10.34% 14.29% 
CM1.8 Not yet done anything 13.21% 
CM1.9 Never 6.73% 
CM1.10 Do nothing just pray 8.13% 
Similar case with Japan 
COMPONENT MATRIX 1 2 3 4 
CM1.1 TRAINING .278 -.581 .199 .347 
CM1.2 Tsunami Drill .501 -.361 .192 .472 
CM1.3 Family action plan for tsunami .345 .331 -.182 -.263 
CM1.4 Family education on tsunami .863 .181   -.110 
CM1.5 Public Education to neighborhood on 
tsunami 
.811 .205     
CM1.6 Moving to tsunami safe zone (in land 
and higher ground) 
  .451   .452 
CM1.7 Building/renting TSUNAMI SAFER 
HOUSE (multi stories houses) 
  .542   .595 
CM1.8 Not yet done anything -.611   -.368 .151 
CM1.9 Never -.188 .358 .678   
CM1.10 Do nothing just pray   .159 .686   
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PERCENTAGE  OF CORRELATION CONTRIBUTION RP1 RP2 
CM1 DRR Countermeasures in anticipating Tsunami 17.01% 50.00% 
CM2 Perception to house strength 26.05% 50.00% 
CM3 DRR Countermeasures on housing 32.16% 0% 
CM4 Reasons not doing DRR on housing 24.77% 0% 
𝐂𝐌 = 𝟎. 𝟕𝟏𝟓𝟏𝟒 𝑪𝑴𝟏 − 𝟏. 𝟎𝟗𝟓𝟐𝟓𝟔 𝑪𝑴𝟐 + 𝟏. 𝟑𝟓𝟏𝟗𝟎𝟐 𝑪𝑴𝟑 +  𝟏. 𝟎𝟒𝟏𝟒𝟑 𝑪𝑴𝟒   
𝑪𝑴 = 𝟏. 𝟎 𝑪𝑴𝟏 + 𝟏. 𝟎 𝑪𝑴𝟐  
CMi - Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Countermeasures 
CM1 DRR countermeasures in an icipating tsunami 
CM2 Perception to 
house strength 
CM3 DRR on 
Housing 
CM  Reason not 
doing DRR on 
H using 
3/16/2012 
14 
COMPONENT MATRIX 
RP 1 RP 2 
1 2 1 
CM1 DRR Countermeasures in anticipating Tsunami   0.685 1.000 
CM2 Perception to house strength -0.854 0.209 1.000 
CM3 DRR Countermeasures on housing 0.879   
CM4 Reasons not doing DRR on housing 0.185 0.725 
RP1 RP2 
TEW1 First 30 minutes after EQ, what did you think about the 
performance of TEWS supporting Infrastructure 
𝐓𝐄𝐖𝟏 = 𝟏. 𝟖𝟗𝟔𝟖𝟖𝟐 𝑻𝑬𝑾𝟏. 𝟏 + 𝟐. 𝟏𝟒𝟒𝟗𝟗𝟒 𝑻𝑬𝑾𝟏. 𝟐
+ 𝟏. 𝟖𝟒𝟔𝟐𝟓𝟒 𝑻𝑬𝑾𝟏. 𝟑 + 𝟏. 𝟗𝟑𝟏𝟑𝟖𝟐 𝑻𝑬𝑾𝟏. 𝟒
+ 𝟏. 𝟑𝟖𝟔𝟒𝟖 𝑻𝑬𝑾𝟏. 𝟓 +  𝟏. 𝟏𝟖𝟐𝟓𝟒 𝑻𝑬𝑾𝟏. 𝟔
+ 𝟏. 𝟏𝟗𝟎𝟓𝟒𝟒 𝑻𝑬𝑾𝟏. 𝟕  
TEW1
TEW
11
TEW 11 
SIREN
less functioning
moderately functioning
highly functioning
fully functioning
not functioning
Don’t knowTEW 12 
MOSQUE’S 
SPEAKERS
TEW 13 
RADIO
TEW
12 less functioning
moderately functioning
highly functioning
fully functioning
not functioning
Don’t know
TEW
13 less functioning
moderately functioning
highly functioning
fully functioning
not functioning
Don’t know
moderately functioning
not functioning
TEW
14 less functioning
highly functioning
fully functioning
Don’t know
TEW14  TV
not functioning
moderately functioningTEW15
TEW 15 
FIX PHONE
less functioning
highly functioning
fully functioning
Don’t know
moderately functioningTEW
16
TEW16 
MOBILE 
PHONE 
PROVIDER
less functioning
fully functioning
Don’t know
not functioning
highly functioning
moderately functioningTEW
17
TEW 17 
Text Message 
(SMS)
less functioning
highly functioning
fully functioning
not functioning
Don’t know
TEW1 
Capability of 
COMMUNICATION 
DEVICES conveying 
TEW at Local Level (City)
PERCENTAGE  OF CORRELATION 
CONTRIBUTION 
RP1 RP2 
TEW1.1 Tsunami Siren as TEWS device 16.38% 20.63% 
TEW1.2 mosque speakers 18.52% 8.51% 
TEW1.3 Radio as TEWS multi-mode device 15.94% 20.48% 
TEW1.4 TV as TEWS multi-mode device 16.68% 11.57% 
TEW1.5 fix phone as communication tool 11.97% 19.29% 
TEW1.6 Mobile phone 10.21% 19.47% 
TEW1.7 Text Message (SMS) 10.28% 0.05% 
𝐓𝐄𝐖𝟏 = 𝟏. 𝟔𝟏𝟓𝟐𝟎𝟒 𝑻𝑬𝑾𝟏. 𝟏 + 𝟎. 𝟔𝟔𝟔𝟒𝟒𝟒 𝑻𝑬𝑾𝟏. 𝟐
+ 𝟏. 𝟔𝟎𝟑𝟔𝟔 𝑻𝑬𝑾𝟏. 𝟑 + 𝟎. 𝟗𝟎𝟓𝟖𝟒𝟖 𝑻𝑬𝑾𝟏. 𝟒
+ 𝟏. 𝟓𝟏𝟎𝟔𝟏𝟐 𝑻𝑬𝑾𝟏. 𝟓 + 𝟏. 𝟓𝟐𝟒𝟕𝟗𝟖 𝑻𝑬𝑾𝟏. 𝟔
− 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟒𝟏𝟗𝟒 𝑻𝑬𝑾𝟏. 𝟕  
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COMPONENT MATRIX 
RP 1 RP 2 
1 2 1 2 3 
TEW1.1 capability of Tsunami Siren as TEWS device at local level (city) .577 .315 .481   .643 
TEW1.2 capability of  mosque speakers to be TEWS supporting device at 
local level (city) 
.559 .555 .754 -.268 -.248 
TEW1.3 capability of  Radio as TEWS multi-mode device to reach wider 
public at local level (city) 
.489 .461 .886     
TEW1.4 capability of TV as TEWS multi-mode device to reach wider 
public at local level (city) 
.672 .141 .238 .666 -.472 
TEW1.5 capability of fix phone as communication tool to save connected 
people by conveying the TEW 
.530   .235 .789 -.108 
TEW1.6 capability of Mobile phone provider and its provider as as 
communication tool to save connected people by conveying the TEW 
.705 -.538   .492 .665 
TEW1.7 capability of Text Message (SMS)  as as communication tool to 
save connected people by conveying the TEW 
.709 -.540 -.332 .389   
RP1 RP2 
TEW4  First 30 minutes after EQ, what do you think about the 
performance of government officials and its stakeholders 
TEW4 = 2.198268 𝑇𝐸𝑊4.1 +  2.174058 𝑇𝐸𝑊4.2
+ 2.128059 𝑇𝐸𝑊4.3
+ 0.326835 𝑇𝐸𝑊4.4  
TEW
2
TEW4.3 Fire 
brigades_performance 
in handling disaster 
situation caused by fire 
due to earthquake
TEW4.1 Police 
(POLRI)_performa
nce in handling 
evacuation 
process
TEW4
TEW4 First 30 minutes after 
EQ, how the performance of 
government officials and its 
stakeholders
TEW
44
TEW4.4 Other 
stakeholder 
(SAR)_performan
ce to fill the gap
less functioning
highly functioning
fully functioning
not functioning
Don’t know
TEW
41 less functioning
highly functioning
fully functioning
not functioning
Don’t know
Don’t know
TEW4.2 Army 
(TNI)_performance 
appreciation in handling 
evacuation process TEW42 less functioning
moderately functioning
highly functioning
fully functioning
not functioning
TEW
43 less functioning
moderately functioning
highly functioning
fully functioning
not functioning
Don’t know
moderately functioning
moderately functioning
PERCENTAGE  OF 
CORRELATION CONTRIBUTION 
RP1 RP2 
TEW4.1 Police 32.20% 33.88% 
TEW4.2 Army 31.84% 33.38% 
TEW4.3 Fire brigades 31.17% 32.74% 
TEW4.4 Others (SAR) 4.79% 
TEW4 = 1.196352 𝑇𝐸𝑊4.1 +  1.178664 𝑇𝐸𝑊4.2
+ 1.156152 𝑇𝐸𝑊4.3  
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COMPONENT MATRIX RP1 RP2 
TEW4.1 Police (POLRI) in handling evacuation process .908 .744 
TEW4.2 Army (TNI) in handling evacuation process .898 .733 
TEW4.3 Fire brigades in containing fire followed EQ .879 .719 
TEW4.4 Other stakeholder (SAR) to fill the gap .135 
RP1 RP2 
TEW5 Based on Sept 30 EQ experience: value the level of trust 
on government 
TEW5 = 1.684683 𝑇𝐸𝑊5.1 +  1.725823 𝑇𝐸𝑊5.2
+ 1.699082 𝑇𝐸𝑊5.3  
TEW1
TEW
11
TEW 11 
SIREN
less functioning
moderately functioning
highly functioning
fully functioning
not functioning
Don’t knowTEW 12 
MOSQUE’S 
SPEAKERS
TEW 13 
RADIO
TEW
12 less functioning
moderately functioning
highly functioning
fully functioning
not functioning
Don’t know
TEW
13 less functioning
moderately functioning
highly functioning
fully functioning
not functioning
Don’t know
moderately functioning
not functioning
TEW
14 less functioning
highly functioning
fully functioning
Don’t know
TEW14  TV
not functioning
moderately functioningTEW15
TEW 15 
FIX PHONE
less functioning
highly functioning
fully functioning
Don’t know
moderately functioningTEW
16
TEW16 
MOBILE 
PHONE 
PROVIDER
less functioning
fully functioning
Don’t know
not functioning
highly functioning
moderately functioningTEW
17
TEW 17 
Text Message 
(SMS)
less functioning
highly functioning
fully functioning
not functioning
Don’t know
TEW1 
Capability of 
COMMUNICATION 
DEVICES conveying 
TEW at Local Level (City)
TEW5 = 1.43616 𝑇𝐸𝑊5.1 + 1.57824 𝑇𝐸𝑊5.2
+ 1.58784 𝑇𝐸𝑊5.3  
PERCENTAGE  OF CORRELATION 
CONTRIBUTION 
RP1 RP2 
TEW5.1 Trust to City Government in isuing 
order for tsunami evacuation 32.97% 31.21% 
TEW5.2 Trust to National Govt (BMKG) in 
disseminating TEW 33.78% 34.29% 
TEW5.3 Trust to National Govt (BNPB) in 
conveying the dissemination of TEW 33.25% 34.50% 
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COMPONENT MATRIX RP1 RP2 
TEW5.1 Trust to City Government .819 .748 
TEW5.2 Trust to National Govt (BMKG) .839 .822 
TEW5.3 Trust to National Govt (BNPB) .826 .827 
RP1 RP2 
TEW3 Reliable 
communication 
device for natural 
disaster situation
6. Appreciation to 
TEWS
TEW1
TEW1 
Capability of COMMUNICATION 
DEVICES conveying TEW at Local 
Level (City)
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PERCENTAGE  OF CORRELATION CONTRIBUTION RP1 RP2 
TEW1 First 30 minutes after EQ - performance of TEWS infrastructure 17.56% 38.70% 
TEW2 Reasons for Low Appreciation 19.52% 7.76% 
TEW3 Realiable communication device in disaster situation 21.54% 0% 
TEW4 First 30 minutes after EQ - performance of government officials 14.58% 37.50% 
TEW5 Based on Sept 30 EQ experience - level of trust on government 17.58% 8.68% 
TEW6 REASONS for low performance appreciation during Sept 30 EQ 9.22% 7.36% 
𝑇𝐸𝑊 = 1.1222(𝑇𝐸𝑊1) + 1.24744(𝑇𝐸𝑊2) + 1.376876(𝑇𝐸𝑊3) + 0.932108(𝑇𝐸𝑊4) + 1.12342(𝑇𝐸𝑊5) +  0.589052(𝑇𝐸𝑊6) 
𝐓𝐄𝐖 = 𝟏. 𝟖𝟕𝟓𝟖𝟗𝟕 𝑻𝑬𝑾𝟏 + 𝟎. 𝟑𝟕𝟔𝟐𝟔𝟑 𝑻𝑬𝑾𝟐 + 𝟏. 𝟖𝟏𝟕𝟓𝟏𝟔 𝑻𝑬𝑾𝟒 + 𝟎. 𝟒𝟐𝟎𝟓𝟗𝟔 𝑻𝑬𝑾𝟓 +  𝟎. 𝟑𝟓𝟔𝟔𝟒𝟏 𝑻𝑬𝑾𝟔  
TEWi - Appreciation to TEWS 
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COMPONENT MATRIX 
RP 1 RP 2 
1 2 3 1 2 
TEW1 First 30 minutes after EQ, what did you think about the 
performance of TEWS infrastructure 
0.724     .810 .369 
TEW2 Reasons for Low Appreciation 0.108 0.806   -.209 .632 
TEW3 Realiable communication device for natural disaster 
situation 
  0.349 0.902 
TEW4 First 30 minutes after EQ, what do you think about the 
performance of government officials and its stakeholders 
0.768 -0.107 -0.114 .881 .213 
TEW5 Based on Sept 30 EQ experience_value the level of trust 
on government 
0.650   0.115 .489 -.379 
TEW6 REASONS for low performance appreciation during Sept 
30 EQ 
  0.745 -0.406 -.250 .677 
RP1 RP2 
Comparison of Mind of RP1, RP2 and RG on Scenario Evacuation 1.2 
No Variables RP1 RP2 RG 
Evac1.2 = f (E1.1.2, E1.1.3, E1.1.4, Hi, Vi, Ti, CMi, TEWSi) 
1 
E1.1.2  What was the reasons not to follow the 
route when immediate evacuate after strong 
shaking? 
0.57724 7.86% 1.447738 19.69% 0.603038 6.42% 
2 
E1.1.3 What alternative route did you take when 
immediate evacuate after strong shaking? 
0.824712 11.23% 1.773732 24.12% 0.633795 6.74% 
3 
E1.1.4 How did you evacuated when immediate 
evacuate after strong shaking? 
-0.46242 6.30% 0.019332 0.26% -1.96159 0.00% 
4 
H Hazard and Disaster Perception and 
Experiences 
1.501194 20.44% 1.552004 21.11% 0.895627 20.87% 
5 V Social Vulnerability and Capacity 1.156557 15.75% -1.65246 22.47% 2.563676 9.53% 
6 
T Knowledge on Tsunami Risk and Triggering 
Event 
-1.23216 16.78% -0.2132 2.90% 1.565015 27.27% 
7 CM Disaster Risk Reduction Countermeasures 1.070411 14.57% 0.69524 9.45% 1.177439 16.65% 
8 
TEWS Appreciation to Tsunami Early Warning 
System 
0.520371 7.08% 1.447738 19.69% 0.603038 12.53% 
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B1 –  Sample Questionnaires For People 
 
 
 
 
1 
Introduction  
Questionnaire Acquiring People’s Mind toward Tsunami Warning 
 
 
Objective of the survey: 
The objective of the survey is to collect data on the mindset of government officials performance for not to 
evacuate for tsunami after a strong earthquakes, in the selected communities of 14 coastal area along 
Padang City (the red and green tsunami risk zone).  
 
Method: 
 First drafted questionnaire is developed based on: tacit knowledge and preliminary interview 
survey conducted 7 days after the September 30, 2009 earthquake in Padang City and 
Pariaman Regency. Number of recorded respondent is 15 representing the urban community, 
fishermen, government officials, and government officials in charged with emergency response 
(i.e. crisis center, fire brigade), as well as other agencies and the mayor/regent and vice 
governor. The survey conducted from October 7 to 16, 2009 under collaboration between ITB 
with EERI and UPitt. The tacit knowledge obtained were from the in-depth survey conducted 
under collaboration of CDM ITB with AUSAID (4,000 data) and the prior knowledge obtain 
based on the secondary data during activities conducted from 2005 to 2009 during and after 
national tsunami drill. 
 The drafted questionnaire is developed based on the further refined and reviewed the first draft 
based on the followed up interview survey on focus target group, i.e. community and 
government officials involved in the emergency response. This survey conducted on June 2010. 
The number of respondent was 9. 
 The pre-test interview survey was conducted by 6 surveyors (students and graduate from 
Economic Department of UNAND) on the zone red zone area (zone 8 and 9) the first day. Result 
of the survey will be evaluated to refine the questionnaire developed.  
 Total numbers of samples needed are 300 respondents. The 6 + 4 surveyors (students and 
graduate from Economic Department and Civil Engineering Department of UNAND. 
 The focus of target group, 300 people representing: 
o Zone 1 to 14 (green and red zone of tsunami protection). 
o Stakeholders of community representatives  
 adult man/women,  
 formal/informal worker,  
 residence/worker/trader 
 students of school located in zone 1 to 14 (max 20% from total respondents) 
 trained/untrained 
 
Note: 
It should be mentioned to every interviewee by the surveyors that any personal data collected through 
this survey will be confidential, strictly used for the study analysis only and will never be disclosed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
Questionnaire for Mindset Model for People from Tsunami Prone City 
 
 
PART I: VULNERABILITY AND CAPACITY OF RESPONDENT 
 
1. Respondent IDs: No Respondent / No Cluster/Name Respondent.  
No. of Respondent   : _____________________________       
No. of Cluster       : _____________________________ 
Name of Respondent : _____________________________ 
Coordinate of Respondent location (using GPS) : _____________________________ 
Name of Interviewer/Surveyor                : _____________________________                       
 
2. Address of Respondent during interview + remark (house/shop/business/office) 
Address  : 
___________________________________________________________________________________  
          
___________________________________________________________________________________                                                                                
Remark  : house / shop / business / office / others : 
__________________________________________________                       
 
3. Gender:  
(1) Man                                        2) Woman 
 
4. Age & Level of Education 
Age:                                          Education: 
(1) 5 – 12                                      (1) Elementary School 
(2) 13 – 18                                     (2) Middle School (Junior High School)  
(3) 19 – 30                                     (3) Senior High school 
(4) 31 – 40                                     (4) Undergraduate (university and vocational polytechnic) 
(5) 41 – 50                                     (5) Postgraduate 
(6) 51 – 60 
(7) 61 – 70 
(8) > 70 
 
5. Average monthly income (in IDR) 
(1) Zero (for school student)                                       
(2)      < 0.5 M IDR   
(3) 0.5 M – 1 M IDR 
(4) 1.0 M – 1.9 M IDR 
(3) 2.0 M – 4.9 M IDR 
(4)      > 5.0 M IDR 
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6. Job 
                                                     
 
7. Number of inhabitants (family members) living at the same house with the respondent : 
Total number of inhabitants     : _____________________________       
Number of children < 15 year old: _____________________________ 
Number of elderly  > 60 year old: _____________________________ 
 
8. House/ shop-houses / business / work place  
 (8a) How long have you stayed in the house/ building?  
(1)  1 –  2 year 
(2)  2 –  5 year 
(3)  5 – 10 year 
(4) 10 – 20 year 
(5)   > 20 year 
 (8b) Ownership of the house / building 
(1) own / family own 
(2) rent 
(3) others : ____________________________ 
(8c) Area  
(1)    < 40㎡ 
(2) 40  – 80㎡ 
(3) 80  – 120㎡ 
(4) 120 – 160 ㎡ 
(5) 160 – 200 ㎡ 
(6)     > 200㎡ 
(8d) Type of house/ building 
(1) Single                        with number of floors    (a) 1   (b) 2  (c) 3 and more 
(2) Shop-house/Townhouse        with number of floors    (a) 1   (b) 2  (c) 3 and more 
(3) Flat/apartment                 which floor             (1 st floor = ground floor) 
(8e) Main structure of house/ building 
(1) Concrete structure with brick wall  
(2) Timbre structure 
(3) Steel structure 
(4) Others:  ____________________________ 
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PART II: DISASTER PERCEPTION AND DISASTER RISK REDUCTION 
COUNTERMEASURES 
 
9. Please select what type of disasters you have experienced and rate how frequent? [Multiple 
answers] 
(1) Flood                 5------------------4----------------3-----------------2-----------------1-----------------NA 
                         Very-high    high      moderate      low         never       don’t know 
(2) Earthquake            5-----------------4----------------3-----------------2-----------------1-----------------NA 
                         Very-high    high      moderate      low         never       don’t know 
(3) Tsunami               5----------------4----------------3-----------------2-----------------1------------------NA 
                         Very-high    high      moderate      low         never       don’t know 
(4) Volcanic Eruption       5----------------4----------------3-----------------2------------------1------------------NA 
                         Very-high    high      moderate      low         never       don’t know 
(5) Accident               5----------------4----------------3-----------------2-----------------1------------------NA 
                         Very-high    high      moderate      low         never       don’t know 
(6) Commotion / Riot       5----------------4----------------3-----------------2------------------1-----------------NA 
                         Very-high    high      moderate      low         never       don’t know 
(7) Other disaster :                                                 
                         5----------------4-----------------3-----------------2------------------1-----------------NA 
                         Very-high    high      moderate      low         never       don’t know 
 
10. Which one of the following disasters, do you think that will affect (have affected) your life the most? 
[only 1 answer] 
(1) Unemployment 
(2) Outbreak/Disease 
(3) Accident 
(4) Natural disaster (earthquake, tsunami, dll) 
(5) Civil war / riot / commotion 
(6) Hunger 
(7) Others                 :                                                 
 
11. Which one of the following natural disasters, do you think that will affect (have affected) your life 
the most? [only 1 answer] 
(1) Flood 
(2) Landslide 
(3) Earthquake 
(4) Tsunami 
(5) Cyclone 
(6) Others             :                                                
 
12. How sure you think that tsunami will occur and stricken your house in the future?  
  5-------------------------4-----------------------3------------------------2-----------------------1--------------------NA 
  Very sure     quite sure      moderately sure      less sure         not sure         don’t know  
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13. Could you describe your opinion on how possible that tsunami would have affected your life if it 
were occurred? [multiple answer] 
(1) loss your life            5------------------4-----------------3------------------2-----------------1-----------------NA 
                      Very-high        high      moderate       low         never       don’t know  
(2) loss your family          5-----------------4-----------------3------------------2-----------------1-----------------NA 
                      Very-high        high      moderate       low         never       don’t know 
(3) loss your property / belonging  
                    5----------------4-----------------3------------------2-----------------1----------------NA 
               Very-high        high      moderate       low         never       don’t know 
 
14. What have you done to prepare yourself for anticipating tsunami in the future? Please select from 
the following questions. [multiple answer] 
(1) Participated in Disaster Risk Reduction training : 
        a. What kind of training: ____________________________ 
        b. Who is the organizer: ____________________________ 
(2) Participated in Tsunami Drill: 
        a. how big is the drill  : city level / neighborhood level / school level 
        b. Who is the organizer: ____________________________ 
(3) Prepared family action plan for tsunami (consisting who is doing what if a tsunami occurs)  
        a. Where/whom did you learn: ……………………………… 
(4) Socialized tsunami disaster to family member and how frequent: 
 5----------------------4--------------------3-------------------2---------------------1--------------------NA 
        Very-high        high       moderate         low           never          don’t know     
(5) Socialized tsunami disaster to the neighbor and how frequent:  
5----------------------4--------------------3-------------------2---------------------1--------------------NA 
       Very-high        high       moderate        low           never          don’t know     
 (6) Moved the house / business to the higher area (tsunami safe zone): 
        a. soon in near future 
        b. still in the plan 
        c. impossible to do because of financial matter 
        d. impossible to do because of family matter 
        e. impossible to do because of working / business location 
(7) Constructed / rented a tsunami safe house (multi story house) 
        a. soon in near future 
        b. still in the plan 
        c. impossible to do because of financial matter 
(8) Not yet 
(9) Never  
 
15. Do you think your house is strong enough against tsunami? 
(1) Yes    
(2) No  if no, please describe your preference among the following option (15a, 15b or 15C): 
       (15a) have a plan to reconstruct/retrofit your current house to be strong against tsunami? 
       (15b) have a plan to move your house to higher area 
       (15c) do nothing 
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PART III: TSUNAMI EARLY WARNING SYSTEM 
 
16. During September 30, 2009 earthquake, did you think a tsunami will come after that strong 
shaking?  
(1) yes        see question 17 
(2) no  
(3) don’t know 
 
17. How was your feeling that time if a tsunami would have occurred? 
     5--------------------4----------------------3-------------------------2-----------------------1-------------------------NA 
Very scared    highly scared    moderately scared   less scared     not sacred at all       don’t know 
 
18. During September 30, 2009 earthquake when you felt strong shaking, did you immediately 
evacuate to save yourself to the tsunami safe area / zone? 
(1) yes               continue to question no 19 
(2) not immediately    continue to question no 20 
(3) no                continue to question no 21 
 
19. For immediate evacuation, did you use local government designated routes for evacuation? 
(1) yes   what kind of transportation did you use during the evacuation through that designated route? 
(a) on foot 
(b) using your own bicycle 
(c) using your own motor cycle 
(d) using your own car 
(e) using public transport 
(f) going with your neighbor’s car 
(g) others: ____________________________ 
 
(2) no   1. Please provide reason why you did not follow that designated route?  
(a) road were blocked 
(b) afraid of selfish behavior of evacuee 
(c) did not know the location of the route  
(d) others:                                                     
         2. What alternative routes you have taken during that day?  
(a) finding empty road even though longer and moving toward beach area 
(b) finding a short cut even though by passing or trespassing some one’s property 
(c) following the crowd 
        3. What kind of transportation did you use to evacuate through this alternative routes? 
(a) on foot 
(b) using your own bicycle 
(c) using your own motor cycle 
(d) using your own car 
(e) using public transport 
(f) going with your neighbor’s car 
(g) others:                                                    
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20. For not immediate evacuation, what did you do that time? [multiple answer] 
(1) went home to save family member  
(2) actively searched information of tsunami possibility following the shaking, from: 
(a) government tsunami early warning  
(b) looking natural sign of tsunami by yourself, such as: no se level change, birds flock at the sky 
etc    
                                                       (please describe) 
(3) waited for tsunami early warning from: 
(a) mayor/city government announcement (order for evacuation) via radio 
(b) warning siren 
(c) Public announcement from mosque’s speaker 
(4) closed and saved the shop/business  
(5) on duty  
(6) Others:                                                    
 
21. For no evacuation, what were your reasons for that? [multiple answer]  
(1) no change on the sea level at the beach  
(2) no tsunami early warning from the government  
(3) belief in yourself that tsunami would not occurred  
(4) giving up because of fate  
(5) just praying 
(6) others:                                                      
 
22. If during that time you have heard tsunami early warning from government, would you 
immediately evacuate? What were your reasons?  
(1) yes     reasons:                                                     
(2) no      reasons:                                                     
(3) don’t know    
 
23. Could you describe your opinion on the performance of the supporting devices for tsunami early 
warning during the first 30 minutes after the earthquake: 
(a) performance of tsunami siren:  
   3------------------------------------2---------------------------------1---------------------------------N/A 
  Fully function          partly function         not function at all           don’t know 
   remark: 
(b) performance of mosque speakers: 
   3------------------------------------2---------------------------------1---------------------------------N/A 
  Fully function          partly function         not function at all           don’t know 
   remark: 
(c) performance of radio 
   3------------------------------------2---------------------------------1---------------------------------N/A 
  Fully function          partly function         not function at all           don’t know 
   remark: 
(d) performance of TV 
   3------------------------------------2---------------------------------1---------------------------------N/A 
  Fully function          partly function         not function at all           don’t know 
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   remark: 
(e) performance of fix-phone (Telkom Co.) 
   3------------------------------------2---------------------------------1---------------------------------N/A 
  Fully function          partly function         not function at all           don’t know 
   remark: 
(f) performance of HP/mobile phone provider 
   3------------------------------------2---------------------------------1---------------------------------N/A 
  Fully function          partly function         not function at all           don’t know 
   remark: 
(g) performance of SMS (short message/text) 
   3------------------------------------2---------------------------------1---------------------------------N/A 
  Fully function          partly function         not function at all           don’t know 
   remark: 
(h) performance of other devices, please describe and value its performance:  
   3------------------------------------2---------------------------------1---------------------------------N/A 
  Fully function          partly function         not function at all           don’t know 
   remark:    
 
24. Could you describe your opinion on the performance of government officials in charge 
during the first 30 minutes after the shaking:  
(a) performance of Police (POLRI) personnel in handling the evacuation process:  
   3------------------------------------2---------------------------------1---------------------------------N/A 
  Fully function          partly function         not function at all           don’t know 
   remark:       
 
(b) Performance of army (TNI) personnel in handling the evacuation process: 
   3------------------------------------2---------------------------------1---------------------------------N/A 
  Fully function          partly function         not function at all           don’t know 
   remark:    
 
(c) performance of personnel of fire brigades in handling the fire induced by the shaking: 
   3------------------------------------2---------------------------------1---------------------------------N/A 
  Fully function          partly function         not function at all           don’t know 
   remark:    
 
(d) performance of other devices, please describe and value its performance: 
   3------------------------------------2---------------------------------1---------------------------------N/A 
  Fully function          partly function         not function at all           don’t know 
   remark:    
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25. Based on your experience during September 30 earthquake, describe your level of trust 
to: 
a) Ability of city/local government to convey BMKG tsunami early warning to the public in the form of order for 
evacuation:  
    5-------------------------4---------------------------3--------------------------2----------------------1-----------------N/A 
    Very high       quite high         moderately high       less high       not at all      don’t know  
 
b) Ability of national/central government (BMKG) to issue tsunami early warning:  
     5-------------------------4---------------------------3--------------------------2----------------------1-----------------N/A 
    Very high       quite high         moderately high       less high       not at all      don’t know 
 
c) Ability of national/central government (BNPB) to issue tsunami early warning:  
    5-------------------------4---------------------------3--------------------------2----------------------1-----------------N/A 
    Very high       quite high         moderately high       less high       not at all      don’t know 
 
 
Signature of Surveyor                                     
 
Date of interview                                          
 
The surveyor is requested to: 
- Take 1 photo (digital) of respondent (in front of the hose/business/school).    
- Tag the coordinate using GPS to show location of the respondents. 
